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You're going to lose your innocence about the sexuality of technology, Mister Young 
Engineer. And I 'm going to take advantage of the opportunity by writing a little 
commentary, a little sociology manual to make your work easier. You're to read it in 
addition to the books on this list; they're all in the school library. 
Bruno Latour in Aramis and The Love of Technology, Harvard University 
Press, 2005.  
 
Chance is conquered word by word.  
Stéphane Mallarmé in ‘Le Mystère dans les Lettres’, 1896.  
 
Game design can be such a pure interaction. I mean, many games are just 
interaction. There’s very little behind them. You’re just in the flow of touching 
something and it moves. It gives you some pleasure and there’s a little bit of 
frustration or stress and you want to overcome this thing. Not all games are 
like this, but many are. And that skill set… designing that and understanding it 
and optimizing it so that it feels really good… getting it right, where people 
have this pure pleasure from it… can be applied to a lot of things. We can see 
how powerful this iterative process is. I don’t know if you get addicted to 
games, but I certainly have… and I know a lot of people who have.  
David Helgason, CEO of Unity 3D, Interview extract from ‘Gamification: 
Turning Work Into Play’, 2010.  
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Abstract  
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Recent research in social and political theory has turned its attention towards the 
development of a so-called ‘ontology of lack’ in the social sciences, with a greater 
importance ascribed to the affective component of agency over structure (e. g. Glynos and 
Stavrakakis, 2010; Fotaki and Kenny, 2014; Simon and Bendelow, 1998). This thesis 
explores this affective turn, and it responds to the deficit of subjective and biographical 
explanations in the study of organizations and information systems (Thompson, 2012).  
In particular, the gamification phenomenon is investigated because its implications beyond 
the marketing hype remain vague and problematic: how can scientific, business or medical 
activity be designed for fun? Are we not crossing a line? Is this innocent? Many studies show 
that the design of technologies presides over the control of organizational practices 
(Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979; Markus, 1983; Markus and Pfeffer, 1983 etc.) but the 
importance of lack and affect in this process is underestimated. Through three ethnographic 
studies of computer game developers, I argue that we need to look at IS phenomena 
(adoption, diffusion, acceptance etc.) not only with economic, institutional or technical 
lenses, but also through the ideological and affective dimension carried by discourse.  
This study’s three key contributions are first (1) to borrow from the poststructuralist 
corpus the ‘materiality of the signifier’, a notion which highlights the inseparability of the 
affective and the political in how users and designers engage with technology and systems. 
Second, I draw (2) on the theory of hegemony to show that, in current times, the production 
of consent at work is no longer secured by disciplinary or coercive processes, but by the 
affective and ideological apparatus of gamification. Thirdly, this study exemplifies (3) the 
need to define the outline of a subject theory and to open a future avenue towards subject-
based studies as an alternative to existing practice-based studies (e. g. Nicolini, 2010) for the 
study of technology in organizations.    
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Aims of the study 
Is it a symptom of our liberal-capitalist times that the enthusiasm of crowds is not devoted 
to inspiring leaders, but increasingly to the functionalities of technology itself? A well-known 
example is Foldit, an online puzzle video game about protein folding. Non-scientists get 
involved in producing predictions of protein structures, and their intuitive, three-dimensional 
pattern-matching abilities have been shown to outperform the best known computational 
methods (Cooper et al. 2010). According to Seth Cooper, the lead designer of the project: 
They are motivated by the sense of purpose of contributing to science. It’s a game, but you’re 
not just playing a game. Something can come out of it, and we’ve shown that scientific results 
actually do come out of the game-play. A lot of the players, top players even, don’t have much 
background in biochemistry, and they’re still able to do well and solve interesting problems. 
(American scientists, 2015) 
This statement led scientists to find ways of systematically harnessing the skills of the 
human volunteers, involving the inclusion of gaming elements to make Foldit appealing and 
engaging to the general public. Players may collaborate in teams, tracking progress, 
comparing their scores, joining groups and sharing puzzle solutions.  
Technology or, in our jargon, information systems, truly function when people enjoy using 
them – and this excitement has nothing to do with automation and technical support.  For 
example, information systems such as Second Life, Airbnb or online community forums only 
function because users invest their energy into, and enjoy themselves using, these tools by 
engaging in social interaction through rituals such as hospitality or by providing biographical 
data. How and why does enjoyment come to be central in technology implementation today? 
Is it new, or has this always been the case? Ethnographic studies of human-computer 
interaction or IT design are now a well-established field, yet organizational culture is 
frequently associated with symbolic processes, and its affective grounding is overlooked. 
Emergent studies have grown dramatically in number in IS (e. g. Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 
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1996), where causal agency derives neither from technology nor organizations, but 
unpredictably from complex social interactions (Markus and Robey, 1988). From this 
perspective, situated practice is seen as a privileged level of analysis (Hutchins, Lave, 
Suchman, and Nicolini). Yet there is a lack of studies that question the emerging role of 
subjectivity in this process, and which take seriously the self-interpretations of individuals.  
Thus, the affordance of this thesis is that we need to understand IS phenomena such as IT 
diffusion, adoption or acceptance, not only in a technical, calculative or institutional way, but 
also through the ideological and affective dimension carried by discourse. This thesis 
explores the affective turn (e. g. Fotaki and Kenny, 2014; Stavrakakis, 1999; Stavrakakis, 
2010; Stavrakakis and Glynos, 2008) and the still relatively-unexplored place of subjective 
and identity-related issues in IS phenomena (Thompson, 2012). I will therefore propose an 
affective theory of ideology, drawing on Lacanian theory and post-Lacanian political theory, 
essentially the Essex school of Discourse Analysis (Laclau, Glynos and Howarth) and the 
French tradition of political philosophy (Althusser, Badiou). Looking more specifically at the 
design of computer games through three ethnographic studies, I will follow the trajectory of 
computer game design from the game engine to the end-users. I will retroductively work back 
and forth to and from the following research questions: Why do game developers aim at 
producing enjoyment in the workplace- is this innocent? How do they decide on a right way 
to enjoy- through exclusion or inclusion of certain affects? How do they imagine the users' 
feeling and when does the design practice resist their imagination?  
The following is a summary of the aims of this thesis:  
• To highlight the role of identity, subjectivity and affect in the adoption and acceptance of 
computer technologies.   
• To detect the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourse of designers and users of 
a game engine through a framework known as ‘logics of critical explanations’ (LCE). 
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• To draw out the meaning of the affects experienced in the design phase of a new game 
technology.  
Subject theory and the study of work and technology  
Lacan, psychodynamic and organization studies 
This thesis will look at computer game design as a paradigmatic case to demonstrate why 
notions such as affect and discourse make a difference in the study of technology, work and 
organizations. Theoretically, I will elaborate on, and propose, a subject theory, drawing on 
Lacanian theory and the post-Lacanian corpus including continental philosophy (Badiou, 
Zizek), American post-structuralism (Butler, Pluth) and Essex political and discourse 
theorists (Laclau, Stavrakakis, Glynos). I will articulate this subject-based ontology with the 
theory of ideology (Althusser, Laclau, Glynos and Howarth) to address how collective 
subjectivities play out in technological matters. While there is no unified theory of the 
subject, the dominant place of Lacanian theory in this thesis and, more broadly, of 
psychoanalytic theory is hard to deny. The eminent body of authors cited above has in 
common the use of certain key notions derived from Lacanian clinical work and their 
application to various fields, from the clinic, naturally, to the social sciences in a broader 
way. Methodologically, this work innovates by conducting ethnographic work derived from 
the poststructuralist corpus and by seeking to render the science of the subject amenable to 
empirical observation. 
Although the incursion of Lacanian theory into IS research is still negligible, there already 
exists an established research area of ‘psychoanalysis and organization studies’.  In the 
Anglo-Saxon world, a major influence on the field of organization studies stems from the 
body of work produced by the Essex Discourse Group (Laclau, Mouffe, Stavrakakis, 
Howarth, and Glynos) in political theory. While the work of the Essex group is indeed 
valuable and helpful, numerous other authors have drawn upon Lacan’s work in order to 
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understand organizational dynamics and processes. Suitable places to start might be the 
recent Organization Studies special issue on Psychoanalysis in Organization Studies, the 
recent ‘Lacan and Organization’ book, the S.I. in Organization on ‘Lacan and Work’, among 
others, including Fotaki, Hoedemaekers, Driver, Scriver and Kenny, etc. A growing body of 
analyses is currently drawing academic attention to the power of fantasy in structuring the 
motivations underpinning workplace practices (e.g. Cederström and Grassman, 2008; Kenny, 
2012; Sköld, 2009; 2010).  
Beyond Lacanian theory, an emblematic version of the psychosocial study of work is the 
British Tavistock tradition of social research. As Fotaki et al. (2012) recall in their review, the 
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations played a crucial role in introducing psychoanalysis 
into the study of organizations and settings outside the clinic through its socio-technical 
systems approach (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Trist and Emery, 1965 and Miller, 1993). In 
this vein, following the tradition of Klein’s psychoanalysis, specifically known as object 
relations theory (Klein, 1952, 1959), a generation in the 1950’s and 1960’s creatively adapted 
this work to the field of organizational analysis and consultancy (Jacques, 1951; Lewin, 
1951; Bion, 1961; Menzies, 1960). This work was extended to an investigation into the 
unconscious dynamics and neurotic aspects of leadership in the work of authors such as 
Abraham Zaleznik (1977, 1989), Manfred Ket de Vries (Ket de Vries & Miller, 1984; Kets de 
Vries, 1993, 1996) and Yannis Gabriel (1999), Mark Stein and Michael Maccoby (2003, 
2007a, 2007b).  
In France, another crucial work is that of Christophe Dejours, psychiatrist and founder of 
the psychodynamic of work at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) in 
Paris. Dejours highlighted the central role of sexuality at work. According to Dejours, work 
involves a fundamental enjoyment, a mix of pain and pleasure, or a certain state when pain 
becomes pleasurable, otherwise it does not work. This leads him to redefine work from a 
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psychodynamic perspective through the distinction between prescribed work and real work 
i.e. between the task (what is expected to be done) and the actual activity of performing the 
task (Dejours, 1980, 1998, 2009a, 2009b). The idea is that if the gap between the ideal of 
work (e.g. prescription, total quality) and actual work is too large, people need to lie, to cheat 
and to defraud in order to meet administrative expectations. If the gap is too large between 
the realm and the prescription, people are depressed, feeling that the system does not work or 
is corrupted: hence the risk of decompensation as sudden as the fall of the USSR or the spate 
of suicides at France Telecom (2009, Bègue and Dejours).  
Intended contributions 
The adoption of gaming technologies in highly prestigious institutions raises some 
spontaneous questions: is this just a fashion? Or is work, as we know it, becoming obsolete? 
This leads us immediately to another set of questions. What counts as work? What does it 
mean? Who has the authority to label a set of skills as work? There is little doubt that a 
psychologist and an economist from the European Central Bank would offer different 
answers. The confusion is that, most of the time, organizational scholars speak only about 
what is measurable, and one cannot measure work but only, at best, the outcome of work 
(Dejours, 2009a). Let us think about the black market in Greece. A plumber repairs the sink 
of a neighbour tax-free. This is work, certainly involving time, know-how, and even 
craftsmanship, and it is experienced as such by the client who pays and by the plumber who 
works. However, there will be no trace of it, nor will there be any accounting records. 
Furthermore, can people making money out of Airbnb or Uber be called workers? This 
debate also takes place within institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) when considering recognizing prostitution and drug 
dealing as part of the GDP, or within feminist circles when discussing whether or not to 
abolish sexual work. 
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My attempt to respond precisely to these questions will lead me to contribute topically to 
the literature of technology in organizations. My contributions are three-fold: 
• Topically, I will add a study to the field of IT design, and more specifically to the research 
territory located at the intersection of the large IT design literature, as well as the corpus on 
affect/emotions in IS studies and computer game studies. In particular, this will lead me to 
criticize the technological determinism regarding affect assumed by the design science 
literature (Malone) and positivist motivational studies (Davis, Venkatesh, Bagozzi), including 
the Technology Acceptance Model, from which the growing body of gamification literature 
(Deterding, Mollick and Rothbard) originates historically.  
• Theoretically, this work will contribute to the Marxist and post-Marxist approaches to the 
study of work and industrial relations, also known as the capitalist labour process or 
deskilling literature (e. g. Braverman, Burawoy). More precisely, I will reinvigorate the 
theory of ideology, and provide it with a novel illustration derived from the study of work 
and information systems. I will show that the production of consent nowadays takes soft 
forms, and that making people work harder in modern times equates to gamifying their 
practices and leading them to forget that they are actually working or providing data.  
• More fundamentally, the paradigmatic contribution of this thesis will be to contribute to the 
interpretive constructivist literature on information systems, by offering a subject theory and 
Glynos’ and Howarth’s Logics of Critical Explanations (LCE) to the study of technology in 
organizations. By doing so, I will also provide post-structural studies with a novel incursion 
into the field of technology design and information systems, an area which is still largely 
underexplored by this field’s literature.  
The content and structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews the literature 
on information systems, technology and organization studies in order to set the scene for the 
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dissertation and to problematize the relationship between technology and our ways of 
organizing. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical foundations of my work. In particular, I 
examine how a subject-based ontology can provide new insights into the underexplored 
materiality of affects, rituals and social interaction. This then leads us to identify the 
centrality of sexuality and discourse in technology matters. Chapter 3 is also theoretical and 
switches from the individual to the collective act of identification, by introducing a material 
conceptualization of ideology which draws heavily on my subject-based ontology. In Chapter 
4, I begin to posit the research questions, and I justify the choice of the context of this study. I 
explain why, based on the above, game design is the best place to consider the agency of 
affects in technological matters. Chapter 5 introduces the methodology and the set of methods 
used to apply my subject-based ontology to the analysis of social and organizational 
phenomena. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are devoted to the empirics of the thesis, and will follow the 
trajectory of game design. Thus, Chapter 6 considers more specifically the adoption of the 
game engine. In particular, I will look at the process through which Unity3D, one of the 
major actors in the market, has been widely adopted and mainstreamed. In Chapter 7, I will 
address how game designers deal with the problem of the acceptance of video-game 
technologies by looking at a case of a medical game designed for elderly people. In Chapter 
8, I seek to ascertain how ideology is inscribed in the technology, and I specifically examine 
the role that the notion of genre plays in this process. I want to establish why it is not 
innocent to name a practice a ‘game’ or not, and what the implications are for programmers 
and clients. Chapter 9 discusses the main findings and contributions of the research, 
comments on implications for practice, highlights the limitations of this research and 
proposes avenues for futures studies.  
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Chapter 1: Setting the scene for the 
dissertation  
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In this chapter, my aim is to set the scene for the dissertation by reviewing the literature 
which deals with the interaction between our ways of organizing and technology. In 
particular, I will exemplify this relationship with the emergence of game design, so that the 
challenge is altogether empirical (can we identify an ideology sustaining the growing 
importance of computer games) and theoretical (what does the case of computer games reveal 
about the missing reflection about affectivity in the IS interpretive literature). Thus, notions 
of the organizational, the ideal, or the discursive are often opposed with notions of the 
material, the technological and the non-discursive. While recent approaches have led our field 
to transcend the materialist-idealist dualism, the direction taken by this evolution needs 
clarification. The core contribution of this section will be to highlight the ambiguity of the 
notion of materiality in the literature, which is especially visible in discussion such as 
whether to consider discourse and or discourse as materiality. Finally, I will try to 
demonstrate that one way to address this conceptual muddle is to take seriously the place of 
affect in information systems research.  
Turning work into play 
Where does it come from? What is the history of the notion? Is it just a marketing 
fashion, a buzzword or a profound intellectual project? I will address three milestones in the 
gamification discourse, namely the tradition of Design Science; the models derived from 
applied psychology such as the Technology Acceptance Model. 
Design science 
The notion of design itself became established as an academic discipline, most notably in 
1969, when Herbert Simon published the first version of his seminal work, The science of the 
artificial. The project of this book is to overcome a traditional and historical divide between 
the science disciplines teaching about natural things – how they are and how they function – 
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and professional disciplines teaching about artificial things – how they ought to be in order to 
achieve goals: 
The intellectual activity that produces material artifacts is no different fundamentally from the 
one that prescribes remedies for a sick patient or the one that devises a new sales plan for a 
company or a social welfare policy for a state. Design, so construed, is the core of all 
professional training; it is the principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the sciences. 
Schools of engineering, as well as schools of architecture, business, education, law, and 
medicine, are all centrally concerned with the process of design. 
Simon’s project was therefore is to provide the so-called artificial sciences with a new 
academic and institutional legitimacy, beyond existing intellectually-soft, informal and cook-
booky account. In other words, his project was the establishment of design theory, the 
knowledge underlying the creation of artifacts, as theory. Simon describes his book as a call 
to action, inciting professional schools to move towards analytic, partly formalizable, partly 
empirical, teachable research on the process of design. Thus, engineering schools start to 
move towards design research in the 1970’s; for instance, the Carnegie Mellon University 
opens a Design Research Center which contributes to develop the science and practice of 
design as well as the elements of a theory of design. The introduction of computers to aid the 
design process is absolutely central to this process, drawing upon the tools of artificial 
intelligence and operations research in computer science, engineering and architecture 
departments, and in operations research groups in business schools. 
Computer games became very early on a research paradigm at the intersection of applied 
psychology and design science. Thomas Malone, a psychologist from the Xerox Palo Alto 
Research Center, who were specifically exploring the motivation of technology users, draw 
typically lessons from Computer Games. The intent here is clearly to identify the features that 
make computers games so captivating and to apply them to other spheres such as systems’ 
users’ interface or more broadly learning – especially learning through computers. Malone 
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wrote a ‘What makes things fun to learn? A study of intrinsically motivating computer 
games’ which hinges on experiments in the classroom with a video game including one called 
Darts designed to address math problems: 
In the version of the game used, three balloons appear at random places on a number line on the 
screen and players try to guess the positions of the balloons (see Figure 1). They guess by typing 
in mixed numbers (whole numbers and/or fractions), and after each guess an arrow shoots across 
the screen to the position specified. If the guess is right, the arrow pops the balloon. If wrong, the 
arrow remains on the screen and the player gets to keep shooting until all the balloons are 
popped. Circus music is played at the beginning of the game and if all three balloons in a round 
are popped in four tries or fewer, a short song is played after the round. 
Eight versions of the Darts game were constructed and their appeal tested with students, 
by each time taking out, one at a time, characteristics that were presumably motivational. The 
features included the music, the scorekeeping, the graphic representation, the fantasy of 
arrows popping balloons, and constructive or performance feedback. 
Technology Acceptance Model  
A decisive milestone in foregrounding computer games was the Technology Acceptance 
Model (Davis 1989; Davis et al. 1989) which was derived from Malone’s work as well as the 
social psychology theory of reasoned action (TRA). Do people adopt and use computers and 
software at work because they are useful, or because they are enjoyable?  
The TAM model explains user acceptance of technology as being based on the user’s 
perceptions. Thus, Davis et al. (1989) propose that variables such as attitudes, subjective 
norms and behavioural beliefs framed as perceive usefulness (U) and perceive ease of use 
(EOU) preside over individual intentions to use a technology. In TAM, the effect of external 
variables on intentions, such as the design characteristics of the system, are mediated by these 
two key beliefs. Perceived ease of use is the extent to which a person believes that using a 
technology will be free of effort. Perceived usefulness can be understood as the extent to 
which a person believes that using a technology will enhance his/her productivity.  
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The TAM later incorporated a motivation-oriented perspective1 to predict technology 
acceptance and usage behaviour. Thus, Davis et al. (1992) made a key addendum to the 
model by introducing the notion of perceived enjoyment, which can be defined as ‘the extent 
to which the activity of using the computer is perceived to be enjoyable in its own right, apart 
from any performance consequences that may be anticipated’. While usefulness is connected 
with the performance outcomes associated with using a system, enjoyment is connected with 
the process of using the system. Davies et al. (1992) demonstrated through two studies that 
people’s intentions to use computers in the workplace are influenced primarily by perceptions 
of the usefulness of computers to improve their job performance, and secondarily by the 
degree of enjoyment they experience in using computers per se. Their findings suggest that 
an increased pleasure in using a system enhances the acceptability of a useful system, but is 
less effective as regards the acceptance of useless systems, as it may encourage the 
unproductive and frivolous overuse of said system. For these authors, enjoyment and 
usefulness together represent a powerful explanation of what influences computer usage 
intentions. Enjoyment operates in combination with usefulness, and it still depends on 
productivity in order to operate. 
Venkatesh (1999) applied the TAM model to the context of software training. According 
to Brody (1992), systems are not necessarily built from the ‘joy angle’, whereas people 
increasingly expect their time spent on computers and the internet to be entertaining and 
pleasurable. Venkatesh makes the following assertion, that ‘current and future forms of 
computer technology will be used for both work and fun, causing a reduced distinction 
between work and play’. Venkatesh also measures the effect of game-based learning on 
                                                          
1
 Davis et al. (1992) mobilize the motivation literature (e. g., Calder & Staw, 1975; Deci, 1971, 1972; Pinder, 
1976; Porac & Meindl, 1982; Scott, Farh & Podsakoff, 1988). These authors found intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation to be key drivers of behavioural intention to use IT. ‘Intrinsic motivation’ refers to the pleasure and 
inherent satisfaction derived from a specific activity, while ‘extrinsic motivation’ emphasizes performing a 
behaviour in order to achieve a specific goal, such as a reward. 
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perceived usefulness (extrinsic motivation) to account for the case where users would dismiss 
game-based learning as being ‘just a game’. This observation leads Venkatesh to formulate 
and verify that the perceived ease of use (EOU) is more important among users in game-
based training intervention (an internet-based fantasy role-playing game, MUD) than it is for 
users in traditional training.  
Venkatesh et al. (2012) attempt to integrate this notion of hedonic motivation beyond mere 
systems in order to understand consumers’ acceptance of information technologies (such as 
the IPhone…). Sherry (1990b, p. 180) describes the consumers' apparent ‘oscillation . . . 
between homo economicus and homo ludens.’ To understand better this notion of enjoyment, 
IS researchers have also drawn on consumer research literature in marketing (e. g. Hirschman 
1983; Babin et al. 1994), and have borrowed from it the notion of hedonic pleasure, and 
connected it to the notion of perceived enjoyment. According to these authors, hedonically 
valuable experience is characterized by increased arousal, heightened involvement, perceived 
freedom, fantasy fulfilment and escapism (Bloch and Richins 1983b; Hirschman 1983). For 
example, shopping has been characterized by marketing researchers as performing an act 
which is both utilitarian and hedonic, a trying to ‘get something’ as well as something we do 
because ‘we love it’ (Triandis, 1977). Shopping is described as an experience or an adventure 
sometimes, which is in itself more exciting and self-fulfilling than the strict acquisition of the 
product.  
However, the TAM model has been criticized by Bagozzi (2007), who underscores the 
reliance on naïve and over-simplified notions of affect or emotions. The role of emotions in 
technology acceptance has been treated in a rather ad hoc way in the extensions of TAM; 
notions such as intrinsic motivation, affect or anxiety towards performing a behaviour have 
been proposed as being indirect determinants of intentions (Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh et 
al., 2003). Yet other promising roles for emotions in explaining technology acceptance can be 
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identified, such as the role of social identity through affective commitment in influencing 
desire and intentions (Bagozzi, 2007). As Bagozzi states (2007), such models are overly 
individualistic and hold an individualistic conception of intentions; nevertheless, affect also 
has socio-political implications.  
Furthermore, the notion of hedonic motivation attempts to understand the relation between 
affect and intention, but in a way which is theoretically and methodologically unsatisfactory. 
Van der Heijden invited researchers to identify the hedonic nature of a system by scrutinizing 
the tactics that system developers employ to encourage us, such as the inclusion of hedonic 
content, animated images, a focus on colours, sounds and aesthetically-appealing visual 
layouts (2004). More processual psychosocial methods such as ethnography or ethnographic 
interviewing are ignored by these authors. IS researchers have used questionnaire-based 
empirical studies to measure enjoyment (e. g. Davis et al., 1992; Koufaris, 2002). For 
example, Davis et al. (1992) measured enjoyment through 7-point questionnaires, asking 
questions such as: ‘I find using Write One to be enjoyable (likely/unlikely)’ or ‘I have fun 
using Write One (likely/unlikely).’ Such an account demonstrates a cognitive fallacy, and it 
ignores the non-intentional element of affectivity, that is, the fact that affect is very often 
experienced by social actors in the context of doing, and not in the context of knowing.  
In sum, deterministic models and methods carry with them a logical and temporal flaw, as 
well as an illusion of control over subjectivity and affect; contrastingly, novelty by definition 
is a one-off, and can neither be predicted nor re-produced in a laboratory.  
Ideology at work 
At this stage, we might be tempted to see gamification as a new managerial ideology. 
But what do we know about ideology at work? The study of managerial ideology addresses 
typically the relationship between regime and practice, between the rhetorics and their actual 
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application. In this section, I will address classic studies of ideology and technology before 
presenting a view beyond idealist-materialist divide.  
Making people work harder 
In this section, I will show that the critic of ideology of automation and technology 
implantation has been attempted but criticized because of its presupposed idealism. This view 
can be said radical as it finds explanations at the roots of technology design.  
The idea of turning work into play, for which I have dedicated a description in the last 
chapter, can be designated not merely as a research tradition, originating from the design 
science, but more fundamentally as a managerial ideology. In their historical study of 
American managerial discourse, Barley and Kunda (1992) define ideology as a stream of 
discourse which promulgates, yet unwittingly, a set of assumptions about the nature of the 
objects with which it deals with, would it be managers, corporations, employees, and their 
means. For Barley and Kunda, the progressist idea that the history of management would be 
characterized by a shift from rational towards normative control is wrong and underplay 
events that happen in the later 19th century and after World War 2. For these authors, we 
actually observe a less linearly evolution and managerial discourse appears to have alternated 
repeatedly between ideologies of normative and rational control. Moreover, the relationship 
between ideology and practices is unclear. Some authors assert that practices have remained 
stable in spite of change in rhetorics (Braverman, 1974). Others state that ideologies are fad 
which affect practices only at the margin, in large corporations exclusively (Edwards, 1979). 
Licht refuse any generalization based on these ideologies (1991) while Barley and Kunda 
explains that, while managers have not always apply ideologies they have preached, it is still 
important to study the link with practices to understand the organizational culture at a specific 
time. In sum, few authors have really interrogated the link between managerial regime and 
effective practices.  
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The succession of Managerial Ideologies since 1870 
Ideology Era of ascent  Tenor 
Industrial betterment  1870-1900 Normative  
Scientific management  1900-1923 Rational 
Welfare capitalism/ Human 
relations  
1923-1955 Normative  
Systems rationalism  1955-1980 Rational 
Organizational culture 1980-present Normative  
 
With the growing social importance of information technologies, the question of 
materiality and politics are becoming central. A specific debate in the 1970’s addressed the 
way numerically controlled (NC) machine had deskilled machinists. Deskilling theorists 
argued that technology does not necessarily increase human agency but reify a specific 
rapport-the-force which may benefit one dominant group over another. In Labor and 
Monopoloy Capitalism, Braverman (1973) argues that technologies deskill workers because, 
all else being equal, managers and staff choose designs and labour processes which divorce 
work from it execution. Braverman illustrates his claim by demonstrating how NC altered the 
skills and autonomy of an army of scheduling clerks, inventory clerks, timekeepers, machine 
tenders, machine repairers, stock chasers etc. The NC enables the programmers to address the 
cognitive aspects of machining, which forced and relegated the skilled machinists into the 
role of ‘machine tenders’: 
Each of these workers is required to know and understand not more than did the single worker of 
before, but much less. The skilled machinist is, by this innovation, deliberately rendered as 
obsolete as the glassblower or Morse code telegrapher 
This in fact is the inevitable outcome of a dominant managerial ideology rooted in 
Babbage’s principle of division of labour in the early 19th century  and Taylor’s so-called 
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Scientific Management. Braverman identifies historically and geographically a discourse of 
scientific management which praises, as a condition for productivity, the concentration of all 
engineering knowledge in a few specialists and the subsequent ignorance of the masses of 
workers. As a result, the more machinery is designed as an aid to workers, the more workers 
become servant to machinery.  
Taylor had a huge impact on his peers and managed to erect institutionally the discourse of 
scientific management as a ‘science’ of management- giving rise to the birth of business 
schools. Taylor crafted the management scientific discourse to promote the engineering 
movement while contesting the underpinnings of  industrial betterment. Braverman’s core 
ideological critique here is that scientific management is not so much a science of work but in 
fact the science of the management of others’ work under capitalist relations. What is 
presented as a science is in fact the promotion of the subjective interests of the capitalists:  
It starts, despite occasional protestations to the contrary, not from the human point of view but 
from the capitalist point of view, from the point of view of the management of a refractory work 
force in a setting of antagonistic social relations. It does not attempt to discover and confront the 
cause of this condition, but accepts it as an inexorable given, a ‘natural’ condition. It investigates 
not labour in general, but the adaptation of labour to the needs of capital. It enters the workplace 
not as the representative of science, but as the representative of management masqueradering in 
the trappings of science.  
In other words, Braverman attempts a historical genealogy of the ideology of work 
management, which once embedded in work organization, has silently deskilled employees 
and impoverished their agency. Thus, his work discloses the dark side of technical revolution 
and innovation.  
Braverman’s study was so emblematic that NC became the most well researched 
technology in the history of organization studies (Orlikwoski and Barley, 2001). This is 
maybe ironical, as the kernel of his work probably resides not so much on the technology 
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under study but rather on the critic of an ideology and its subsequent material effects. In other 
terms, Braverman was a Marxian structuralist who adopted an orthodox objective approach to 
Marxist theory (Burrel and Morgan). However, what is absent from Braverman is an account 
on how and why consent is achieved. Later studies cast doubt on the ubiquity of the 
deskilling process and criticized Braverman for underestimating the agency of the machine 
‘tenders’. From this perspective, the deskilling theorists  underplay the possibility that 
workers are never fully deprived of agency.  
In the next section, I will therefore explore how the study of ideology in organizations 
have addressed the process through which machinists accept the ideology of work they are 
subjected to.  
Producing consent at work 
Another classic industrial sociologists Burawoy in Manufacturing consent: Changes in the 
Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism raises the central question of consent at work.  
Paradoxically, deskilling theorists tend to substantiate the belief in automation which 
underlies their conceptualization of technology. Thus, a debate occurred in the end of the 
1970’s restoring the considerable formal and informal power of the machinists on the shop-
floor (Aaronowitz, 1978; Burawoy, 1979). The success of machining processes shows the 
importance of the skills of the machinists and their formal and informal power: the ‘tenders’ 
of the machine are even more important when an organization is automated. Introducing 
effective machines will progressively emptied their work of its characteristics, rendering it 
less painful, less tiring, less demanding… yet the machine tenders’ performances are not 
enhanced and, ironically, better technologies may lead to demotivation and under-
performance. In fact, numerous examples of resistance occur either at a conscious (sabotage, 
whistleblowing, call centres do not work if employees do not play the game) or an 
unconscious level (the contemporary psycho-pathological literature of work (Dejours) is 
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littered with examples of where it does not work, such as burnouts, suicides at the workplace, 
work accidents, epileptic crises…)  
In particular, Burawoy is concerned with the following question: why people work as hard 
as they do? What do they accept the prescriptions of management? Some transgressions are 
needed and even orchestrated by the management to generate consent and games turn out to 
be one of these more efficient tactics.  
Why should workers push themselves to advance the interests of the company? Why cooperate 
with and sometimes even exceed the expectations of those “people upstairs” who “will do 
anything to squeeze another piece out of you”? But it wasn’t long before I too was breaking my 
back to make out, to make the quota, to discover a new angle, and to run two jobs at once- 
risking life and limb for that extra piece. What was driving me to increase Allied’s profits? Why 
was I actively participating in the intensification of my own exploitation and even losing my 
temper when I couldn’t? That is the problem I pose.  
Not only do they consent to provide their energy to the ‘people upstairs’ but they 
sometimes do excessively. In other terms, management extracts surplus value from workers, 
beyond economic or rational motivation, and this surplus sustains and increases his 
productivity even more. Capitalist management organizes the refractory dimension of the 
workforce through games.  
Thus, Burawoy comes to describe the labour process as an informal game, which arise 
from workers’ autonomous initiative, illustrating this idea through the specific practice of 
making-out, which means making an acceptable percentage output, one that was not higher 
than 140% and not lower than 125%. Altogether operators, auxiliary workers and shop floor 
supervisors understood and accepted the rules. Burawoy describes ‘making’ out as the pivotal 
practice which connects individual to the rationality of the capitalist ideology: it is through 
this informal game that individuals are subjected. As a result individual violation of rules 
leads to ritual punishments which ironically reinforce the consent-producing consequences 
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and strengthen the rules. Burawoy gives the example of operators at Allied complaining 
about ‘being screwed’. Their complaint is not so much a self-awareness on their exploited 
status but rather a concern that the rules of the informal practice of making out are violated 
by management (e. g. the blueprint has disappeared or the drills have burned up). By accusing 
the management of cheating, the operators in fact unconsciously reinforce the legitimacy of 
the rules to which they are subjected.  
From this perspective, games at work are not subversive reaction oriented against 
managers, but rather has the effect to reinforce the oppressive system with which they cease 
to identify with:  
just as playing a game generates consent to its rules, so participating in the choices capitalism 
forces us to make also generates consent to its rules, its norms. It is by constituting our lives as a 
series of games, a set of limited choices, that capitalist relations not only become objects of 
consent but are taken as given and immutable.   
The game metaphor is therefore used explicitly as a ‘critical tool’ to understand not only 
the practice of making out but also the functioning of capitalism. The game aims at the 
satisfaction of needs defined by making out and which are presented by the game as natural 
and inevitable. The key contribution of Burawoy is to question Braverman’s account of 
agency and the ignorance of the workers2.  
Fundamentally, participation in the game differs from routine and requires an element of 
uncertainty, without which making out loses his value as a game. In other words, although 
                                                          
2
 This is in fact, a classic debate in the social sciences. Laclau and Mouffe also interestingly use the metaphor of 
sport: kicking a spherical object in the street is physically equivalent to, but does not mean the same thing as, 
playing a football game on a dedicated pitch (1987). The game metaphor is reminiscent of another social 
theorist, Bourdieu, who also conceptualized the illusion at stake when playing sport – in particular, tennis.  
When we play the game, are we really aware of it? Are we not precisely forgetting the meaning of our actions? 
Is this forgetting not even the very definition of a game? Is the notion of discourse relevant to capturing the 
sense of urgency that makes a game function? There is here a clear divide between Marxist authors contesting 
the consciousness of the actors (Braverman, Bourdieu) and post-Marxist authors who, while accounting for the 
non-intentional element of social actors immersed in everyday practices, also foregrounds their agency and 
capacity to attribute practice with new meaning.  
34 
 
Burawoy does not frame it that way, various affects are associated with the engagement with 
the game. When the chances of winning are too high, the game degenerated into boredom but 
when the uncertainty is too big, the game generates frustration. To function effectively and 
absorb the operators without diminishing returns, making out needs to keep their excitement 
intact, otherwise making out fall into a motivation or legitimation crisis.  
Burawoy reminds us that we never obey directly to procedures and rules, and that even 
apparently senseless tasks or prescriptions require their subjective integration by the 
employees who execute them. 
Language and materiality  
As we have seen, technology (or its design and use) is not merely a tool but also the 
product and subject of language. Thus, debates on the relationship between discourse and 
materiality highlight the plenum of agencies associated with technology.  
As a response to deterministic positivist studies conferring materiality with a strong causal 
force3, interpretive studies emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s with a different agenda, 
focusing more attentively on social dynamics, the social context and human aspects, and on 
why people and organizations respond differently to computers. Language and materiality 
become typically the two poles of these debates. After the linguistic turn which occurred in 
the social science, with the influence of Wittgenstein, the structuralist linguist Saussure or 
later Derrida, linguistic methods have progressively addressed organization studies (Alvesson 
& Karreman, 2000) in response to the hegemony of positivist and deterministic studies in 
management research. Organizational scholarships tend to study issues such as 
communication or discourse for themselves as distinct from materiality.  
                                                          
3
 Deterministic approaches typically argue that social effects automatically follow from the introduction of a 
new technology. For instance in the tradition of contingency theory, technology transforms our institutions, 
organizations and ways of organizing. In his study of U.S. hospitals, Perrow (1967) quoted the saying: 
‘technology is an independent variable, and structure… a dependent variable.’ In other words, the social is 
expected to adapt to the technical. 
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However, communicative, discursive or linguistic explanations are said to exaggerate the 
muscle of symbolism (Ashcraft et al. 2009). At the other side of the spectrum, neo-
materialists thinkers such as Latour, in open polemic with the linguistic turn (1991), accuses 
this linguistic idealism also known as postmodernism of having marginalized objects. Latour 
is the architect of the hybridation of the social, the discursive and the material. A way for him 
to cut the Gordian knot between the three was to coin the hybrid notion of ‘quasi-objects’, 
drawing on the work of Michel Serres. Such studies progressively cohered and paved the way 
for the theoretical movement of social constructivism in the 1990s which can be divided into 
two streams. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), which examined the social 
processes during the design and development process (Callon, 1986; Klein and Kleinman, 
2002; Latour, 1987; Pinch and Bijker, 1984 etc.) The second, in the field of organizational 
studies, studied technology implementation in organizational contexts, drawing heavily on 
Giddens’ structuration theory (Orlikowski, 1992; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Jones and 
Karsten, 2008) 
Materiality at work 
In this section, my aim is to overcome the conflict between the linguistic and the 
materialist tradition in interpretive IS studies. I will seek to propose a radical approach, by 
which I mean a subject-based approach. Thus I will demonstrate that affect is a notion which 
is neglected in the study of technology in organizations. More importantly, this neglect is a 
pity as this notion would enable to re-materialize the linguistic approach to organizations, 
addressing issues including organizational discourse, communication and ideology, in a way 
which is more aligned with its subject-based roots.  
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Practice as unit of analysis  
What about the materiality of work? How was the notion applied to the context of work? 
Some researchers have attempted to connect discourse and materiality, to materialize 
organizational communication through a practice lens.  
Thus, IS and organizational scholars have coined the notion of sociomateriality to 
address the significant neglect of technology in the interpretive information systems 
literature. Thus, Jones (2014) counted 140 articles published since 2007 that have referred to 
sociomateriality, and almost all cite the work of Orlikowski as the originator of the concept 
(Orlikowski, 2007, 2010; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). Thus, sociomateriality emphasizes the 
ontological inseparability of objects from their context, which means that there is no social 
action that does not entail material means. As Orlikowski and Scott argue (2008: 456): ‘Any 
distinction between humans and technologies is analytical only, and done with the 
recognition that these entities necessarily entail each other in practice.’ In other terms, a 
sociomaterial ontology highlights the constitutive entanglement between the social and the 
material:  
The socio-material view asserts that materiality is integral to organizing, positing that the social 
and the material are constitutively entangled in everyday life. A position of constitutive 
entanglement does not privilege either humans or technology… Instead, the social and the 
material are inextricably related – there is no social that is not also material, and no material that 
is not also social (2007: 1437) 
The restoration of materiality leads Orlikowski, in the second stage of her research, to switch 
from an appropriation perspective – where designers structure the users’ field of actions – to 
an enactment perspective (2000) – where designers and users are both symmetric actors 
within networks of humans and non-humans. Whereas appropriation researchers focus on 
patterns of deviation and conformity, enactment researchers look at practices and how people 
concretely use technology when carrying out their work:  
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rather than starting with the technology and examining how actors appropriate its embodies 
structures, this view starts with human action and examines how it enacts emergent structures 
through recurrent interaction with the technology at hand. (Orlikowski, 2000: 407)  
Enactment researchers recognize the role of designers and implementers in shaping the social 
order. However, they constitute only one among many forces, including networks of users, 
regulators, marketers, modders or hackers who actually contribute to modifying, improving 
or damaging technologies.  
Thus, work researchers within the practice turn have a performative view of social and 
organizational phenomena such as knowledge, human activity and sociality: ‘our world is 
increasingly in flux and interconnected, a world where social entities appear as the result of 
ongoing work and complex machinations’ (Nicolini, 2012: 2). This leads Orlikowski to coin 
the notion of technology-in-practice, which captures the ‘particular structures of technology 
use that users enact when engaging recurrently with a technology’. Technologies are 
constructed with particular material properties (hardware, software, techniques) and are 
inscribed with the developer’s assumptions at a particular point in time. Thus, Orlikowski et 
al. (1995) underscore the role of images, descriptions, rhetoric, ideologies carried by 
intermediaries such as translators, vendors, journalists, consultants, champions, trainers and 
managers. However, it is only when technologies are used repetitively and are instantiated in 
social practices that they can be said to partake in the ongoing process of the structuration of 
social actions. From this perspective, technologies-in-practice are also types of institutions 
and their enactment is the engine of institutionalization. 
Technology and work: an impossible fusion 
As Nicolini (2011) put it, the notion of practice is primitive and foundational, and it can 
be understood as the texture from/against which epistemic objects emerge, theories become 
intelligible and the existence of a relationship between a knower and knowing is rendered 
possible.  
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Borrowing a notion from Schatzki, Nicolini develops the thesis that practice can be 
viewed as the site of knowing: he illustrates this point through the example of a nurse 
conducting a call constituting a choreography in which material and discursive aspects blend 
with each other. He illustrates this by demonstrating that part of knowing, in the context of 
healthcare telecommunications, depends on how the recorder is positioned and whether the 
nurse is capable or not of hearing what is recorded (Ibid). Furthermore, Nicolini et al. (2011) 
suggest that we may be able to understand the role of the object through the metaphor of the 
actor: objects are given a role and follow a trajectory or career (Engeström and Blackler, 
2005). From a practice-based perspective, objects can act. In addition, they perform specific 
functions before disappearing behind the scenes until the plot requires them to re-enter the 
stage. From this perspective, objects organize the relationships around them. 
 Thus, Rheinberger sheds light on the power of material objects, arguing that objects are 
‘open-ended’ and operates as a source of interest and motivation by virtue of their ‘opacity, 
their surplus, their material transcendence’, which is ‘what arouses interest in them and keeps 
them alive as targets of research’ (Rheinberger, 2005: 406). The power of objects has also 
been analysed by Knorr Cetina (1997, 1999) who asserts that the source of this power stems 
from the subject’s lack of completeness which generates energy and emotional investment on 
the part of the developers. The attempt to ‘fill this void fuels the attachment for the object but 
also paradoxically specifies ever further issues and the sense of lack, so that the process is 
self-fuelling’ (Nicolini et al., 2011). While it is interesting to understand how an epistemic 
object operates, these object-centred approaches fail to provide an in-depth account of why 
their users is absorbed by their power.  
Consequently, they tend to anthropomorphize properties of the object- it is not clear 
whether the surplus belongs to the objects or to the perception of their users. I call 
anthropomorphic the tendency of researchers to attribute human properties to non-human 
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entities. Typically, Actor Network Theorists have metaphorically let the objects talk, 
liberated and translated their speech, and provided them with the legitimacy which they had 
historically lost in modern times. ANT is anthropomorphic in his attempt to provide objects 
not only with speech, but also with a ‘parliament of things’ (Latour, 1991). In that 
perspective, if I had to extend Latour’s metaphor, the sociologist would not merely be a 
puppeteer, but also a ventriloquist (this image is also used by Cooren, 2012). Yet it is not 
clear what it is that speaks; what instance fundamentally mediates the technology’s words 
and claims.  
Orlikowski and Scott invite us to theorize the ‘fusion’ of technology, work and 
organizations. Is this constant interpenetration between the human and material so desirable? 
For example, Leonardi defines material agency as the ‘capacity for non-human entities to act 
on their own, apart from human intervention’ (2011). Leonardi accurately reflects the divide, 
and it seeks to respond to the ‘provocative claim in actor-network theory that material agency 
is equivalent, in semiotic terms, to the agency of humans’. He offers the metaphor of 
imbrication rather than Latour’s hybridicity in order to understand the relationship between 
the human and the material. While in Latour, human and non-human are hybrid, qua quasi-
objects, in Leonardi they are imbricated and the distinction is maintained: ‘people have 
agency and technologies have agency, but ultimately, people decide how they will respond to 
a technology’ (Leonardi, 2011). However, Leonardi never discusses his own ontological 
assumptions about materiality. In a very Lacanian way, one might ask whether this 
provocation is not, in its very excess, the kernel of sociomateriality, altogether its strength 
and its limitation?  
There is in fact a major debate amongst researchers who inspired the sociomaterial 
sensitivity about the degree of symmetry to be ascribed to the relationship between the social 
and the material. Callon (1986) talks about ‘generalized symmetry’, arguing that there should 
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be no a priori distinction between human and non-human, and that both should be analysed 
in the same terms, whereas Suchman argues that ‘persons and artifacts do not constitute each 
other in the same way’ (2007: 269). Latour’s provocative post-humanist claim does not 
constitute an actual threat to the humanist spirit, but the ethical awareness of the 
environmental issue and the danger of technology for the human species4. That a machine can 
have natural effects which escape human will (a nuclear plant can explode and destroys its 
environment), is very easy to understand. But that a machine acts – this should always 
involves an audience, a theatre (such as a parliament whose etymology, parler in French 
means ‘to speak’)? In other terms, acting involves a politics. Even the software that our 
machine learning specialists program to translate foreign languages always face the problem 
of translating idioms, cultural specificity and jokes – precisely because programmers who 
design the tools are never fully aware of all the subtleties of language.  
In sum, is there not an impossibility of any social science to address material phenomena 
that are beyond meaning, extra-discursive and things-in-themselves? In order to be agent 
themselves, objects would need to act independently from signification, our attempt to 
interpret the world. Is this assumption plausible? Even if this really were the case, that objects 
had their own rationality, the autonomous worlds of robots and AI that fuel the sci-fi 
imaginary could no longer be the territory of the social sciences. As far as we social scientists 
are concerned, we have no other option but to consider this second life as an extension of the 
first. In contrast with the imbrication lens, which views material agency neutrally, the view 
adopted here stresses the impossibility of such neutrality, which is always blended with 
power and affect.  
                                                          
4
 Latour frequently highlights the question of climate change and the contestation of scientific institutions to 
this end. There we face the problem of a scientific truth or claim not being accepted by the population. How is 
that possible? In fact, many populist politicians in Europe (for example, Claude Allègre) and the US contest the 
scientific legitimacy of this claim and its institution. Here we can see that even crucial technological issues 
cannot bypass the need to mobilize and motivate people behind a collective cause 
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An interrogation of sociomateriality  
There has been a general lack of attention to power and affect in the study of the 
relationships between artifacts/objects and human activity among IS scholars. This is also the 
case with the sociomateriality movement in which materiality matters, but affect much less 
so.  
In the organizational field, recent sociomaterial discussions about the materiality of 
objects have not addressed the role of bodies in sociomaterial entanglement. The problem is 
well posited by Jones:  
These accounts, however, employ several different terms, sometimes interchangeably, to 
characterize the nature of this entanglement, such as inseparability, interpenetration, 
relationality, and embodiment, and to refer to what is entangled, for example the social and the 
material, humans and technology, work and technology. While such variation may be justified 
on aesthetic or stylistic grounds, treating these terms as synonyms may be seen as conflating 
different ontological claims.  
In particular, the sociomateriality literature uses the materiality of the body and that of 
technology interchangeably and overlooks dimension of practices such as specifically the 
significance of body. In Althusser’s terms, it ignores the different modalities of materiality by 
focusing exclusively on technology.  While bodies and embodied actions are arguably 
neglected in accounts of sociomateriality, the place of embodiment is yet recognized more 
broadly among agential humanists. For instance, Suchman talks about embodied 
competencies, action, practices – say the nurses’ dexterity in performing tasks. In Schatzki, 
cognitive capacities, activities and understandings are all identified as embodied (Schatzki et 
al., 2001). Alternative body-sensitive definitions of practice do exist, such as Reckwitz’s 
definition: ‘forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a 
background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge.’ As Pickering says, ‘every practice contains a certain practice 
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emotionality’ such for examples the compassion or relational support of a nurse caring for 
patients. 
The materiality of the body and associated aspects of organizational practices including 
affects and sexuality also lead us to address questions of power relations and domination. 
This issue raise the problem of the articulation of the material and the discursive. This is 
regarded by certain practice theorists as a promising research avenue (Contu and Willmott, 
2003; Jones, 2014). Here we should bear in mind that the body is not only the locus of agency 
and affective response, but also the target of power and normalization (Nicolini, 2012). For 
example, Nicolini calls for further research exploring the relationship between siteness, 
knowing in practice and power: 
the idea that the site of knowing is always a specifically organized arrangement of practices 
reminds us that looking at knowing in practice necessarily requires addressing issues of 
interests, conflict, and power. This, in turn, necessitates being attentive to (…) how deviance 
and resistance manifests themselves and are dealt with, and how normalcy is pursued through 
the attempt at making these differences disappear through material and discursive practices of 
hegemonic closure and ‘suturing’. (Nicolini, 2011: 616) 
Specific knowing regimes are thus produced and performed in practice and through practice. 
However, the use of the word material in Nicolini’s sentence is ambiguous, as it bears very 
different ontological presuppositions in Laclau’s theory of subjectivity (see Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1987) and in object studies drawing on ANT. In his overview of practice theories 
(Nicolini, 2012), Nicolini indeed distinguishes between two groups of authors in term of the 
prominence conferred to discursivity- a distinction which reproduces the humanist/realist 
divide. On the one hand, authors belonging to the so-called contemporary Heideggerian and 
Wittgensteinian tradition, including Schatzki, Rose, Pickering and… Laclau and Mouffe 
postulate that intelligibility presides over the functioning of practice; on the other hand, other 
authors such as Giddens, Bourdieu, Barad or Latour are much more sceptical, for various 
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reasons, regarding the potentiality of human intentionality. In fact, Nicolini’s scholarship 
does address affect and subjectivity only in passim. He does not draw the ontological 
consequences of the link between the material and the discursive and relegates notions of 
collective representation or ideology to an old structuralist tradition where the horizon of 
intelligibility was the causal motor of conduct and the trigger of emotions.  
As a result, the subjective properties of innovation are underestimated, as is typically the 
case in Nicolini’s studies of medical innovation. Typically, in the following extract, Nicolini 
seeks to demystify the use by entrepreneurs of the first person:  
It predisposes us to believing the heroic narratives that entrepreneurs often use in describing 
themselves. Entrepreneurs will necessarily be tempted to narrate themselves in first person 
because that reinforces their role as spokesperson for the network which sustains them. In other 
words, the narrative told by entrepreneurs is often politically informed and aimed at reinforcing 
their position by reinterpreting their genealogies, not unlike the powerful historical figures who 
hired poets who should celebrate the direct lineage from some divinity. (2009: 1023) 
Are poetics and heroism not the subjective qualities par excellence? For Nicolini, however, 
their role appears to be reduced to that of an ornamental and imaginary account of the self. In 
other words, Nicolini denies their epistemological veracity. This account ignores the material 
dimension of subjectivity, how the subject makes a difference in any entrepreneurial project, 
and the fact that any innovative project also persists largely (and maybe nearly all) thanks to 
the charisma of its creators.  
Thus, the social and political outcomes of more deeply-rooted psychological dimensions 
such as affect or biographical identity need to be further explored. Hence, some authors have 
criticized the subjective stance of the sociomaterial ontology. According to Thompson, no 
studies have carefully examined the non-cognitively experienced, subjectively emergent 
structures (2012) operating in performative organizations. Thompson explicitly calls for a 
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rebalancing of the debate in the IS research community involving a greater acknowledgement 
of the role of subjective and biographical explanations: 
The concept of ‘sociomateriality’ (e.g. Orlikowski, 2007) is currently attracting growing interest 
within the IS research community, a formulation that, whilst not explicitly conflating social and 
subjective, often uses these concepts interchangeably. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the 
term’s dyadic formulation comprising ‘social’ and ‘material’, a formulation in which explicit 
acknowledgement of the subjective is absent. From the standpoint of this paper, there is an 
attendant danger that any dyadic formulation comprising exclusively ‘social’ and ‘material’ 
dimensions risks downplaying or even overlooking latent subjective structures, yielding 
accounts of social reality that remain primarily cognitive in orientation, with the results for IS 
studies, in particular, that were outlined during the review of the literature in section one. From 
this perspective, it is perhaps a shame that the word ‘sociomateriality’ works so much more 
seductively in an etymological sense than any alternative formulation attempting to incorporate 
the materially-implicated nature of two types of (social and biographical) latent structure. 
(Thompson, 2012: 204) 
In other terms, not only is materiality over-simplified but the social and the subjective 
have been altogether conflated as well. In a later stage of his work, Thompson proposes an 
affect-based ontology of practice, drawing on the Essex Lacanian school, that surfaces the 
influence and significance of invisible ‘structures’ (social and psychoanalytical) upon 
empirically observable ‘actions’. From this Laclauian perspective, social practices are 
primarily characterized by a state of ‘radical contingency’ or, in Lacanian terms, ‘lack in the 
Other’, hence the notion of ontology of lack. The purpose of such an analysis is therefore to 
disclose this ontological contingency and to surface how it is significant in shaping the ‘ontic’ 
register. Central to the dialectic between the ontic and ontological is the actors’ ‘ongoing 
affective identification with practices’ (Thompson and Willmott, 2015: 2) and the way their 
behaviours reproduce, contest or restore these. These subjective acts materialize the ‘trace of 
contingency within the structure’ (Laclau, 1993: 435)  
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As we have seen, pluralistic approaches, known as practice theories, have highlighted the 
sociomaterial ontology and the inseparability of the material and the social. Nevertheless, the 
role of subjectivity and embodiement, the affective relationship with machines, needs to be 
further explored. What if technology and systems have been granted too much importance 
over their users? Why has so much power been accorded to artifacts? Computer-based 
technologies are constantly reduced to their functional or socio-material dimension, whereas 
it is increasingly clear that they encode subjective and ideological ambitions. What about a 
study which would explore and demonstrate the unavowed intimacy of designers, the values 
embedded in technology design? This has nothing to do with profound psychology or digging 
imaginary layers; instead, it requires a rigorous conceptual toolkit to trace the materiality of 
the subject – because one way of defining the material is that it exists out there, and this can 
be demonstrated empirically. 
Affect is a notion which is neglected in the study of technology in organizations. More 
importantly, this neglect is a pity as this notion would enable to re-materialize the linguistic 
approach to organizations, addressing issues including organizational discourse, 
communication and ideology, in a way which is more aligned with its subject-based roots. 
Therefore, endorsing an affective turn is necessary for any radical approach to organizations, 
namely any approach which addresses the roots of IS phenomenon (adoption, acceptance, 
etc.), which is conformed with the Latin etymology of the word (radix means root). 
Constructionism has attempted to move beyond dualism and to articulate the discursive and 
the material under the banner of socio-materiality. Yet the place of  ‘contingency within the 
structure’, identity performances and embodiedforces motivating the ritualization of everyday 
practice, are under-theorized in IS. How can this affective turn enrich our understanding of 
how people organize, and are organized by, their relationship with machines? Is this project 
feasible under the scope of the sociomaterial ontology. 
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A radical approach: Ideological materiality  
In this section, I will draw on the labour-process literature to reframe materiality at work. 
To achieve this objective, it is crucial to deconstruct, contest and re-signify existing 
formulations of matter in IS, by shedding light on the outright omission of the ‘materiality’ of 
signification and affectivity.  
The study of ideology is typically divided between idealist who consider that change 
arose from tensions endogenous to the system of ideas itself (Sutton et al. 1956; Gramsci, 
1957) and materialists claiming that exogenous events such as wars, immigration, climatic 
shifts are responsible (Marx, 1977; Harris, 1979). A symptomatic element is that the existing 
constructivist literature in IS (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001; Leonardi and Barley, 2010) tend 
to classify deskilling theorists as altogether deterministic and idealist. This is perhaps unfair 
given that the critical (and even revolutionary ambition of Marxist theory) has a very concrete 
transformative ambition . According to Orlikowski and Barley:  
unlike a strict materialist, he argued that American management’s ideology of control 
determined which designs were commissioned and deployed (…) Braverman told a decidedly 
deterministic story of NC tools’ effects and his analysis, in retrospect, unwittingly hinged on the 
technical specifics of the type of NC tools used at the time he wrote. (2001: 150) 
Thus, based on the above, Braverman would tell a ‘deterministic story’. There is a 
common misunderstanding of criticality in the constructivist literature which often too 
immediately views deconstruction and construction as antagonistic. In fact, deconstruction is 
the necessary step which precedes construction, it is the necessary opening up of a new space 
of possibility, in which the new can emerge. Braverman is engaged in a process of 
deconstruction of the ideology of scientific management and from this perspective, his 
attempt is not deterministic but rather seeks to render visible the contingency behind a certain 
taken-for-granted practice of work organization.  
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The second argument is that Braverman would not be a ‘strict materialist’ and the trap of 
the exercise of Marxist critique is indeed to fall into conspiracy theory which means to 
overemphasize the intentionality behind action, to make connections without evidence. 
Prolonging the Marxist discussion on the material reproduction of the conditions of 
production, Althusser argues that this involves not only the reproduction of the means of 
production (the machines), but also the reproduction of labour-power (the people). The 
crucial point to us is that reproduction is not automatic and always relies on ‘living labour’ 
(Marx, 1973: 263) which means the possibility for labour-power to accept or contest the 
injunction to work. Althusser’s view rematerializes the notion of ideology and goes beyond 
the Marxist criticism of Hegelian idealism by radically rejecting Marx’s assumption that 
ideology is a ‘false consciousness’  which has no history (Ibid, 1971): 
An ideology always exist in an apparatus, and its practices, or practices. This existence is 
material. Of course, the material existence of the ideology in an apparatus and its practices does 
not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving-stone or a rifle. But a the risk of 
being taken for a Neo-Aristotelician (NB Marx had a very high regard for Aristotle), I shall say 
that ‘matter is discussed in many sense’, or rather that it exists in different modalities, all rooted 
in the last instance on ‘physical’ matter. (Althusser, 1971: 40) 
In fact, the crucial point of his theory of ideology is not to invert the traditional divide 
between the ideal and the material, but that the notion of idea itself disappears from his 
framework. The notions of subject, consciousness, belief and action remain. In addition, the 
new terms of ‘practices’, ‘rituals’ and ‘ideological apparatus’ emerge. Consciousness itself 
becomes material, like in the psychotherapeutic procedure where the patient materializes 
loudly his consciousness.  
In particular, the determination of identity occurs through the interpellation of the subject 
by dominant discourses, metaphorically like a police officer, embodying the Law, who 
interpellates a man in the street (Althusser, 1971). Althusser’s performative chain of 
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determination of the subject can read thus: the material ideological apparatus prescribes the 
material practices governed by a material ritual, practices which exist in the material actions 
of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his beliefs (Ibid, 1971). From this 
perspective, Althusser is more concerned with the ‘organization of thought’, through 
ideological apparatus, rather than ‘thinking about organizations’ by essentializing this notion 
(Chia, 1996). In other terms, Althusser sees ideology as an organization of signifying 
practices whose function is to turn individuals into subjects, and thereby provides them with a 
social and political identity.  
To criticize an ideology, it is not enough to criticize a discourse and to stay at the level of 
intentionality; we need to comprehend ideology not as cognitive process but rather as 
affective cement or a glue (Glynos, 2001). At the time of Burawoy, the site of the antagonism 
between labour and capital happened to be the factory floor:  
People do not carry ideologies around in their heads. They carry theories, knowledge, attitudes, 
in the form of consciousness. These become an ideology, ‘a material force once it has gripped 
the masses.’ Ideology is neither a ‘cold utopia’ nor ‘learned theorizing’ but a ‘creation of 
concrete phantasy which acts on the dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organize its 
collective will’ Ideology acts as a cement for social relations; it binds individuals to one another 
; it connects immediate experiences to each other, to the past, and to the future. (1982: 18, 
emphasis added) 
Burawoy is here citing Althusser’s work, which is seminal for the understanding 
discourse as materiality. In other words, the only valid criticism would involve developing a 
conceptual and empirical toolkit to demonstrate subjective and affective processes inaction 
and address these questions: when and why does this mode of production dysfunction, when 
does the body reject symbolism and how and why people accept to work as hard as they do 
(Burawoy, 1982). 
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The Althusserian affective turn in Marxist theory echoes the transformation of the 
paradigmatic appreciation of labour power in the 1970s. A particular example (Staples, 2007) 
is how the figure of the housewife assumed a critical role in social reproduction after the 
1973 crisis in the United States. According to Staples, women’s revolt against patriarchal 
oppression has been recuperated by capital by converting the outside-of-wage housewives’ to 
the emergence of ‘woman workers’. What is more, this is symptomatic of the affective turn 
which concerns the transformation of a version capitalism inherited from Taylorism and the 
Industrial revolution: 
Thermodynamic capitalism in the European and American social factory of the 1960s and 1970s, 
therefore needed to somehow transform or eliminate those entropic labor forces whose energy 
could not be put to work – the recalcitrant shift workers, the unhappy housewives, the social 
deviants, the rebellious colonials, and so on. (Staples, Ibid: 133) 
While divorce rate increases, the recalcitrant housewives are turned into productive 
workers, the ‘twenty-four-hour, social factory woman’, and made useful and exploitable. At a 
structural level, women occupy the place of ‘destructive excess and loss’ which ensures the 
reproductive vitality of the system. The displacement of value production into affectivity and 
the antagonism of the struggle over time and subjectivity have extended nowadays, beyond 
the factory, to all various different sites, including the home, the office, the Internet, health 
care, education politics, entertainment etc.  
What we are after in the next section is the materiality through which subject copes with 
the determination, beyond mechanistic explanations, and negotiates with it, keeps it at 
distance through discourse; this is the place of human agency where contestation and re-
signification is located. This leads us to question the belonging of the materiality to the genre 
of practice-based study which is currently dominant in IS literature. What does a subject 
theory has to say? How does issues if identity, language, sexuality, embodiment renew the 
study of practice? Is it a simple change of perspective or a radically new ontology? 
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Understanding the process through which subjectivity is constituted is the work of Lacanian 
subject theory. Does the Lacanian theory of subjectivity add to the genre of practice-based 
studies or does it have the potential for becoming a genre in itself? Thus, we need now to turn 
to Lacan to address not merely the epistemological but also, more radically, the ontological 
underpinnings of a materialist theory of ideology. 
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Chapter 2: A Lacanian subject theory   
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In the following chapter, I will explain why much is to be gained if we turn towards the 
development of subject theory. I will acknowledge the importance of Lacanian framework for 
subject theory, and then introduce the negative ontology of lack and the Lacanian view of 
communicative action. I will address the distinguishing characteristics of subject theory and 
the two theses about subjectivity: (1) the subject-of-meaning and then, beyond linguistics, (2) 
the subject of affects and jouissance. This subject-based view of the relationship between 
discourse and sexuality will lead me to reframe notions such as materiality and 
performativity, and I will demonstrate how it differs from the views discussed previously. 
Finally, I will address the politics of the subject and the crucial importance of anxiety.  
Who was Lacan?  
Jacques-Marie Emile Lacan was born in 1901 and grew up in a middle-class Catholic 
family in Paris. His brother went to a monastery.  
In 1931 Lacan became a licensed psychiatrist and was awarded the Doctorat d'état, one 
year later, for his thesis On Paranoiac Psychosis in its Relations to the Personality (De la 
Psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité suivi de Premiers écrits sur la 
paranoïa. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975.) This work was based on observations of several 
patients, with a primary focus on one female patient whom Lacan called Aimee. This thesis 
shows Lacan’s dissatisfaction with traditional psychiatry and the growing influence of 
Sigmund Freud on his works.  
Lacan gave annual seminars in Paris from 1953 to 1981, in which he urged what he 
described as ‘a return to Freud’ which, he argued, would illuminate the linguistic nature of 
psychological symptomatology by drawing most notably on the work of the Swiss 
structuralist linguist and semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure. Lacan's 27-year-long seminar 
became highly influential in Parisian cultural life, as well as in psychoanalytic theory and 
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clinical practice. In particular, Lacan influenced leading French intellectuals in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, including the communist philosopher Althusser. 
However, Lacan’s work really turned mainstream with the publication of his seminal 
work Ecrits in 1966. Before this date, Lacan was known only within a group of Parisian 
intellectuals, and was still perceived as an eccentric figure (Webster, 2002). Published by the 
prestigious Editions du Seuil, the success of Ecrits led him to a subsequent two-volume 
edition in 1969. Ecrits was then translated, in abridged form, into German and English, which 
led him to be invited to lecture in Italy, Japan and the United States. He gave lectures in 1975 
at Yale, Columbia and the MIT.  
Politically, Lacan’s trajectory is elusive. While Lacan attended the far right-wing Action 
Française political meetings in his youth, he later became highly critical of it. By the 1960s, 
Lacan was associated with and endorsed by the far Left in France. In May 1968 he voiced his 
sympathy for the student protests but, a few years later, clearly showed his scepticism in 
Book XIX of his seminar of 1971 towards revolutionary ideals in politics.  
Arguably the most virulent Lacanian revolution is not so much to be found in Lacan’s 
content, but in his form. As Lacan's English translator, Alan Sheridan, put it, 'Lacan doesn't 
intend to be understood... He designs his seminars so that you can't, in fact, grasp them' 
(Sheridan quoted by Webster, 2002). Lacan also succumbs to the temptation to invent 
neologisms. Lacan's style is a deliberate rebellion against the traditional French clarté, 
namely clarity. The main justification usually offered to his virulent critics is that the 
discipline usually demanded of scientific language also bears, by its very nature, an element 
of authoritarian ideology, repression and loss.  
His later work in the 1970’s had a major influence on feminist thought, including the work 
of Luce Irigaray, Julie Kristeva and Judith Butler, as well as upon the informal movement 
commonly known as post-structuralism in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Nowadays, his influence is evident in various academic areas such as criminology (Bond, 
2009), cultural theory (Zizek, 2002), ethics (Zupancic, 2000), film studies (McGowan and 
Kunkle, 2004; Zizek, 1992, 2007), gender studies (Copjec, 2002; Grosz, 1990), literary 
theory (Rabaté, 2001), philosophy (Chiesa, 2007; Badiou, ), political theory (Stavrakakis, 
1999, 2007), psychology (Parker, 2010) and science studies (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2002).  
Lacan died on 9th September 1981. 
 
The Lacanian view of communicative action  
What did Lacan say? In this part, I will discuss how and why the type of knowledge 
acquired in the clinic, together with its ontological and epistemological presuppositions, can 
be mobilized for critical studies in organizational and information systems research. Subject 
theorists are specifically interested in how speaking subjects, desiring subjects, which means 
they are understood as being ontologically-driven by the ‘lack in the Other’ (Lacan 2006), are 
constantly engaged in identification practice. Lacan conceptualized three modes of 
communication which he calls ‘registers’. Speech acts can thus be registered under the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic or the Real. For the purpose of clarity, I will briefly describe these 
three registers now, and subsequently discuss Lacan’s central principle of subjective 
decentrement, namely that subjectivity is divided between the desiring subject and the 
conscious ego.  
Imaginary  
The Imaginary is a binary mode of communication similar, so to speak, to the 
information-processing approach (Simon, 1977) which first dominated the conceptualization 
of organizational learning. Following this view, language is functional, and cognition is 
viewed as a rule-based manipulation of organisational contents – data, information, pictures 
etc. In this register, others’ subjectivity is denied and pathologically replaced by mirror 
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images, such as the sociopath’s purely instrumental use of language. The Imaginary leads to 
an ‘objectifying representation’ (Lacan, 2006) of the self and others, and is therefore the 
place of the neurotic responses of the subject: aggression, paranoia, and so on. In contrast 
with the Cartesian legacy, the conscious ego, the representation that the subject has of 
himself, is for Lacan a fantasy-construction distinct from the subject. In sum, the imaginary 
act is a response that misrecognizes itself and overemphasizes the agent’s own potency and 
agency, and it is motivated by an alienated desire.  
Symbolic 
In contrast, the Symbolic refers to all that is spontaneous and not inscribed by pre-written 
rules in communication and speech activity. It is a ternary mode of communication, one that 
is always mediated by a shared agency which Lacan calls the ‘big Other’, symbolizing others 
in general: i.e. society’s constitution which unconsciously controls my acts. As Wittgenstein 
asserts in his Philosophical Investigations, language is not a ‘private property’ (1953), but 
always public, socially shared and socially constituted. Zizek (2006) interestingly connects 
the Lacanian notion of Symbolic to what the linguist Jakobson calls the phatic 
communication of language; human speech does not simply convey a message, but also 
reflexively symbolizes the practice of communication. The symbolic mediation of the ‘big 
Other’ typically appears through social practices such as respecting of rules of politeness. 
Queuing, listening to a lecture silently or holding the door open for an old lady are examples 
of practices that are spontaneously and mechanically structured by the Symbolic. The 
symbolic agency enacts a degree of influence or power in relation to a specific situation or 
context; it is an act which is motivated by the desire of the Other.  
Real 
Psychoanalytic knowledge, the study of the unconscious, differs ontologically from an 
exact science, ascribing a positive meaning to the phenomenon under study: the Real, the 
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hard-kernel of the subject’s desire, is an empty space, a fundamental lack around which the 
subject circulates. The Real has a status of paradoxical knowledge: when one tries to capture 
it, to get too close to it, it dissolves.  
Furthermore, the Real has to do with sexuality and is a traumatic locus which causes a 
series of failures in the life of the subjects; it spontaneously emerges and reveals something 
about the unconscious desire of the subject – this is particularly true in moments such as 
when experiencing sexual drive, dreams, lapses or jokes. It is traumatic because it is 
impossible to inscribe and articulate through words (Zizek, 1989). It is altogether necessary – 
we cannot deviate from it – and impossible – it is not representable (Laclau in Butler et al., 
2000). The Real is an impasse of signification and stands for the impossible transparency 
between speech and its object: ‘the Real can only be inscribed on the basis of an impasse of 
formalization’ (Lacan, 1998:93).  
A subject-based ontology can be termed a ‘negative ontology of lack’ (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007: my emphasis) in contrast with a positivist account in the sense that it does not 
provide an objective account of the phenomenon. In other words, the phenomenon is not 
located out there, but it comes into being as the product of individual or collective 
unconscious. This leads Butler, in Bodies that Matter (1993), to theorize the Real as a kind of 
resistance. If the Real (or the unconscious) is what resists symbolization, which means any 
form of discursive representation (such as gender categories), does it equate with symbolizing 
the Real as a resistance? Well, yes and no. In Butler’s words: ‘The former claim (the Real 
resists symbolization) can only be true if the latter claim (“the real resists symbolization” is a 
symbolization) is true; but if the second claim is true, the first is necessary false’. Finally, the 
Real is an act that does not draw support from the subject’s symbolic or imaginary constructs, 
but is motivated by psychosexual and biographical events – the resurgence of the Real.  
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In sum, the act of speaking is a kind of signifying practice, implying not only a speaker 
and an addressee but a third place, the Other, that guarantees the truth and meaning of what is 
being said (Pluth, 2007). Lacanian theory of agency distinguishes between the imaginary act, 
which is alienated and ignores the Other, the symbolic act which integrates the desire of the 
others and the real act which represents a rupture with identity and reconfigures the symbolic 
network. Here the term ‘subject’ does not represent the one who acts: instead, it represents 
what an act does. A real act subjects in a new way. 
An illustration 
In this dissertation, I am proposing that real work is a subjective psychosexual experience: 
work exists when it resists, when it does not tick right, when it produces us as subjects of 
affects – whether these involve pain or pleasure. In a sense, it is only retroactively that I know 
that I did some work, a ‘good job’ or a ‘dirty job’. Far from the lessons from machine 
learning and artificial intelligence, which regard automation as the essence of work, I argue 
that work starts when automation stops. Before returning subsequently to these notions, I will 
use here a little personal story to illustrate the triadic Lacanian registers (Imaginary; 
Symbolic; Real), an understanding of which is necessary to navigate comfortably through the 
subject-based ontology introduced here. When I was 20, my dream and desire was to become 
a Professor of French Literature (Imaginary). As I was ambitiously seeking the recognition of 
my peers, and as this is quite a specialist job, I decided I would focus all my energy on being 
admitted to the most elitist school and obtaining the most sought-after degree, namely the 
concours of the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure (Symbolic). I enrolled on a 2-year, 
highly-intensive preparatory school course to prepare for this, studying, among many others 
subjects, Latin, the history of the 19th century European peasantry, and memorizing thousands 
of literal quotes, including some from a navigator’s diary in America written in the 16th 
century – and thereby in ancient French. I performed extremely well in literary criticism 
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when I had the time to focus on my essays at home, to do some side research and to 
improvise and learn by myself. Nevertheless, I was unable to memorize lists of quotes, and I 
knew that I did not perform well in time-restricted tasks, such as formal exams. Nor did I 
work well with a pre-established program to learn. The weeks passed and, on the day of the 
exam, I felt I could not do it. The second day of the entry exam featured a 5-hour philosophy 
exam and the topic was – and this sounds like an intellectual joke: ‘What can the body do?’ 
Petrified by the importance of this event, the two years I had spent thinking about this day 
and the neurotic over-investment in a type of exam which did not suit my intellectual profile 
rendered me paralyzed, and I was absolutely unable to write anything. The body was saying 
no. I left the examination room, bought an IPod to listen to some music, and decided to relax 
by walking along the lake of the Bois de Boulogne. I had to face the truth: I would not be a 
Professor of French Literature (Real).  
First definition: subject-of-meaning 
A distinction can be made between the early Lacan and the late Lacan, with a transition 
taking place in seminar XI, in which Lacan no longer addresses solely analysts-in-training, 
but a broader audience of academics. After this, the Real is ascribed more importance, as 
opposed to the Imaginary and the Symbolic in the early Lacan. In this section, I will follow 
this chronology and firstly address the definition of the subject as a subject-of-meaning.  
Subject as an effect of signifiers  
In the early Lacan, the subject is seen as a product or an effect of signifiers: this is the 
linguistic or structuralist dimension of his work. In contrast with Freud, Lacan’s contribution 
to psychoanalysis is well known for its use of linguistic categories, and in particular the 
Saussurian notion of the sign as a union of the signifier and the signified. Identity can be read 
as a signifying practice: there are certain signifiers to which a subject gets fixated. Certain 
signifiers matter more for the subject than others, and these signifiers contribute to the 
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identity of the subject. Lacan defines a signifier as that which, ‘represents the subject to 
another signifier’. Thus, the signifier is never isolated or central, but always connected to 
other signifiers, caught in the signifying chain. Lacan’s first definition of the subject can be 
read as such: ‘The subject is the consequence of the fact that there is a signifier’ (Lacan 
quoted by Pluth, 2007: 46). Signifiers produce a meaning, and therefore produce a subject as 
a meaning. In particular, signifiers produce signified effects through metaphor and 
metonymy. This is what I would term the semiotic or representational view of subjectivity:  
I am giving you a possible definition of subjectivity, by formulating it as an organized system of 
symbols, aiming to cover the whole of an experience, to animate it, to give it its meaning. (1988: 
40-41) 
From this perspective, the purpose of the analysis is to shift the value of such deterministic 
signifiers, to relativize them, to empty their oppressive power and to ascribe different 
meanings to them. In that respect, Lacan’s theory departs from Saussure by differentiating the 
sign and the signifier. The signifier appears when the meaning of the sign is reduced, 
autotomized from its signified effects. In Lacanian terminology, there is an essential 
‘supremacy of the signifier over the signified’ (Lacan, 2006), and a sliding of the signified 
under the signifier, which renders a possible analytic shift.  
This is still a traditional theory of the subject, a conscious awareness of identity, a subject 
who wishes to express itself, who represents the world to itself. In this first definition, 
representation is central, as the subject is represented by a signifier, except that what is 
represented is not his intentions, but his existence as a desiring subject. The subject is 
represented by a signifier, but not at a Cartesian rational level: his intentions are not 
represented. The signifier stands for the unconscious desire of the subject which is constantly 
seeking, but failing to be fully represented by the signified; it is what speaks through the 
subject: ‘the subject is the subject of the signifier – determined by it’ (Lacan 1962 quoted by 
Stavrakakis 2009). The relation to others in general, the Other, enables us to understand the 
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subject’s representation by a signifier. Any use of signifiers always involves a symbolic 
relation to others in general, which Lacan names the Other. In other words, a subject is 
characterized by the ‘lack in the Other’, namely the desire of being recognized by the Other.  
Identity and identification  
Identity, for Lacan, involves being desired by others, gaining recognition. In Lacan’s 
approach, a subject differs from a flesh-and-blood being. It differs from an individual. Yet a 
subject is not possible without flesh and blood, without an individual. A flesh-and-blood 
individual is not produced by signifiers, yet no individual exists, lives, feels or suffers 
without their interaction. In this sense, the signifying chain is ‘the Other’s discourse’. The 
subject-in-meaning is constructed before the actual birth of the individual, for instance when 
the name is chosen. The name precedes the subject and provides it with a discursive place. 
This recalls an important milestone of Lacanian theory, namely the importance of the name in 
the construction of identity. While the social, economic and genetic background of the birth 
of a child play a crucial role in his/her life, what really determines the conditions under which 
the subject will live is what is said about him/her (economists or geneticists are right to 
follow their rationality, but are they concerned with the subject?). While names per se are 
meaningless, they constitute a trait:  
If something is a proper name, it is inasmuch as it is not the meaning of the subject that it brings 
with it, but something that is of the order of the mark applied in some way to the object, 
superimposed on it. (Lacan quoted by Pluth, 2007: 55).  
The name precedes the subject and provides him with a place. Although it is meaningless, it 
is also the bearer of a string of meanings, and it is already invested with the desire of others. 
My name positions me in the field of meaning. I am already attached to several connotations 
before I act, and this fact obviously plays out when I have a foreign or provincial name in the 
city centre, for example. The construction of the subject-of-meaning and the signifying 
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operations precede the actual birth and sexual development of the subject. Its existence as a 
desiring subject is already represented:  
So representation and identification are closely related. Identity, according to Lacan, always 
involves being desired by others: more specifically, our identities are what enable us to think we 
are desirable. (Pluth, 2007: 46)  
In other words, Lacanian subjectivity is materialized through recognition by the Other. 
Identification confirms or affirms the meaning that is already located in the Other. As I stated 
earlier, Lacanian theory helps us to theorize how subjectivity is split between the subject and 
the ego, and the process through which the subject is constituted through multiple practices 
of identification.  
In a his seminal text, ‘The Mirror Stage’, Lacan draws on comparative experiments 
between children and primates derived from Gestalt psychology in order to state that the ego 
of a 6 month–old child is constituted through the initial experience of facing a mirror and 
recognizing his own image. Meanwhile, at this young age, the chimpanzee is still superior in 
terms of instrumental intelligence. The difference between the child and the primate resides 
in a primordial acting, a playful event, the child being fascinated by his own image:  
This act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of a monkey, in eventually acquired control 
over the uselessness of the image, immediately gives rise in a child  to a series  of gestures in 
which he playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and 
the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates – 
namely, the child’s own body, and the persons and even things around him. (Lacan, 2006: 93) 
Thus, through this ‘jubilant assumption’, the child interiorizes idealized images which are 
initially fragmented and chaotic in his mind, but unified through the bodily cohesion reflected 
by the mirror. The mirror provides his own self with an imaginary contour – a virtual 
representation of his own body, things and environment.  
On the one hand, the subject of lack, constantly seeks to be represented but always fails to 
identify with an image. The playful acting through which the subject comes into being and 
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endorses a particular role is the driver of the practice of identification. Although he is not a 
child anymore, the adult will continue to fall into the mirror stage, at different stages of his 
life, for his identity is never complete and never reaches a final closure. The mirror-stage 
exemplifies the process of identification which Lacan defines as ‘the transformation that 
takes place in the subject when he assumes an image.’ The mirror-stage shows how the 
subject is precipitated in a symbolic matrix, before it is objectified in the dialectic with 
others, assuming and accepting, through joyful acting, the role ascribed to him in the mirror. 
Thus, the ego is established and stabilized through the cumulative history of such 
identificatory relations. Identifications are never completely made or achieved, but rather 
insistently constituted, contested and negotiated (Butler, 1993).  
Furthermore, the Lacanian conceptualization of the mirror stage enables Althusser to 
shed light on the affective identification at stake in the construction of the ideological subject. 
Metaphorically, it refers to all the successive biographical transformations that take place in 
the personality each time the subject identifies with a new representation. For Althusser, the 
ideological misrecognition is described as a self-misrecognition, which is an effect of the 
‘imaginary’ dimension of human existence. As we have seen above, ‘Imaginary’ here is 
distinct from ‘unreal’; it means ‘pertaining to an image’. Like the infant in front of the mirror, 
in the ideological sphere the human subject transcends his true state of decentrement and 
finds a coherent image of himself reflected back in the mirror of a dominant ideological 
discourse such as fascism, neo-liberalism, communism, etc. Ideology then refers to ‘a 
representation of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence’ (Althusser, 1971).  In other terms, for Althusser, ideology stems from our 
affective, unconscious relations with the world, the ways in which we are pre-reflectively 
bound with social reality. 
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Discourse and materiality  
In this section, I will now demonstrate how the Lacanian view on the subject as an effect 
of signifiers leads us to take a different perspective on the relationship between discourse and 
materiality. This will lead me to introduce the notion of materiality of the signifier (Lacan, 
1998; Laclau; 2000; Butler, 1992) which more accurately designates the site where meaning 
is always negotiated.   
The sliding of the signifier under the signified 
At this stage, I need to explicitly underscore that the materiality encapsulated under the 
banner of sociomateriality and the one which I try to capture in this thesis are of radically 
different kinds. One way of proceeding here could be to mention the defenders of 
sociomateriality themselves, as they recognize the primordial role of mattering, understood as 
the act of attaching the category of matter to something (Carlile et al., 2013) Accordingly, the 
performative power of naming is a linguistic act which is not rooted in the ‘stuffiness’ of 
artefacts. This inevitable practice of signification involves, in particular for ethnographers 
immersed in the field, an ideological act of description in order to delimitate the extra-
discursive, what matters: 
The delimitation, which often is enacted as an un-theorized presupposition in any act of 
description, marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that decides, as it were, what will and 
will not be the stuff of the object to which we then refer. This marking off will have some 
normative force and, indeed, some violence, for it can construct only through erasing; it can 
bound a thing only through enforcing a certain criterion, a principle of selectivity. (Butler, 1993: 
11) 
Let us call ‘subjective’ this normative force which sustains the marking-off and which is the 
power of the subject. I am proposing here that the Lacanian Real may well be this residual 
category, one which would enable us to move beyond the dyadic separation of the social and 
the material. The social and the material can be related to the Lacanian distinction between 
the symbolic register of the Other and the imaginary world of objects or small others. The 
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classic misunderstanding associated with the former statement is: does psychoanalysis say 
that the world out-there, the reality around us, is imaginary, mere images projected on the 
mirror, and one which does not exist? Of course, I do not mean to deny the existence of the 
chair out-there. Reality fundamentally differs from the Real and its subject-effects. From the 
perspective of the subject, an object is nothing unless it becomes a signifier, unless it is 
invested with meaning, unless it subjects me in a way or another.  
The trait-d’union between the social and material is precisely one that does not work, one 
which malfunctions, our access to things is always mediated by discourse (and, as we shall, 
affectivity): there is no immedicay; it is always the place of an approximation or a retroactive 
discursive construction: 
The references or things the signifier serves to approach remain approximate (…) At the level of the 
signifier/signified distinction, what characterizes the relationship between the signified and what serves 
as the indispensable third party, namely the referent, is precisely that the signified misses the referent. 
The joiner doesn’t work. (Lacan, 1999: 20) 
What the Real seeks to capture is the way that signifiers mobilize us, as subjects of desire, 
how signifiers (which may well designate technology) retroactively constitute us as a subject. 
Agency is a retroactive effect of particular master signifiers on us, which subjects us, 
produces us as subjects. This is how Butler’s ‘marking-off’, the speech act through which the 
Law is instantiated, can be seen as a crucial operation through which speech acts produce 
their environment.  
Subjects need to cope with the fundamental, unmediated relation to the thing, the 
autonomy of the signifier vis-à-vis the signified; in the case of human relations, the 
impossibility of sexual relationship (Butler et al., 2000). In Lacan, subjectivity is divided 
between the ego and the barred subject (Cederström and Willmott, 2007).Barred is a pun in 
French and means both barred and crazy, nonsensical. To be accurate, the bar5 
                                                          
 
5
 The bar is illustrated by the expression: signifier/signified 
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(signifier/signified) located between the referent and the signified is the linguistic site where 
meaning is always negotiated or contested, namely the materiality of the signifier. This 
notion was later appropriated by Laclau, the political theorist:  
We will understand by ‘materiality of the signifier’ not the phonic substance as such but the 
inability of any linguistic element – whether phonic or conceptual – to refer directly to a 
signified. This means the priority of value over signification, and what Lacan called the 
permanent sliding of the signified under the signifier. (Laclau et al., 2000: 71)  
This ‘sliding of the signified under the signifier’, the switch from signified/signifier to 
signifier/signified is precisely where Lacanian theory departs from the Saussurean semiotics, 
which has inspired studies in our field (Bailey, 1983; Bailey et al., 2012.). Thus, the 
materiality of the signifier captures both signs and their ‘significatory efficacy’ (Butler, 
1993), the signifier’s retroactive affective effect on us, in a more central way than existing 
formulations of symbolic interactionism (Markus, 1983; Prasad, 1993). This fundamental 
autonomy of the signifier is the condition for subjectivity to manifest its arbitrary power and 
its capacity of subversion, parody or re-writing (Fotaki et al., 2014).  
The signifier carries a normative force, a ‘formative force of mattering’ (Butler, 1993). 
However, not every object and subject are invested with the same importance, the same 
desirability; these are the obvious laws of attraction. The materiality of the signifier captures 
that which puts us into motion, that which produces us as subjects. This is never automatic; to 
act can be risky and expose/isolate us, and this is why people do not always choose to act 
subjectively and politically except in moments of crisis, particular events when the Real 
emerges. In sum, the recognition of the materiality of the signifier conditions the constitution 
of a science of the subject. This is true not in terms of an impossible scientifically measurable 
positivity of course, but of material empirical observability: as Dejours says (2009), one can 
never measure work as a subjective realm, but only (and this would lead to another 
complicated discussion) the outcome of work. 
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The barred subject 
Lacan’s theory of the subject, as we have seen, is all about enabling displacement and 
destabilizing the determining forces of signification. In this thesis, I have defined the Real, 
the subject-effect, as a kind of resistance, which is also a political category. This fundamental 
autonomy of the signifier, the sliding of the signifier under the signified, is the condition for 
subjectivity to manifest its potential/power6 and its capacity of subversion, parody or 
displacement of meaning. As Laclau put it, drawing on the Lacanian notion of the barred 
subject: 
For the same reason the ‘barred subject’, which prevents the process of interpellation from 
chaining the ‘individual’ entirely to a subject position, introduces an area of indeterminacy 
which makes possible, among other things, Butler’s parodic performances. (Laclau, et al. 2000: 
71) 
Notions such as the Lacanian ‘lack in the Other’ or Laclau’s ‘radical contingency’ capture 
the post of post-structuralism: that is, the fact that social structures are ontologically 
incomplete. The subject is fundamentally barred which is also a punning in French - barré 
means crazy, nonsensical – there is a fundamental undecidability which characterizes the 
subject.   
As a response to the strong structuralist stance in Althusser’s work, Judith Butler in 
Excitable Speech, succinctly proposes a convincing revision of the theory of interpellation 
which illustrates a sort of revenge of the signifier (Butler, 1997: 31). Butler argues that there 
is no reason why we should accept society’s identification of us as a particular sort of subject. 
Thus, Butler imagines the following scene: the man in the street who is named resists and 
protests about the name. Consequently, the interpellation misses its mark: ‘This is not me, 
you must be mistaken.’ The subject deals with the interpellation, negotiates with it, and 
                                                          
6
 Lash interestingly refers to authors beyond Lacan to define the Real, and draws on Spinoza and his notion of 
potential, understood as ‘force, energy, potential’ (Lash, 2007: 59) In Lash, power/real has a fundamentally 
ontological dimension, in the sense that it ‘enters into us and constitutes us from the inside’ (Lash, 2007: 61). 
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identity is constituted by discourse, albeit at a certain distance from it. What is more, 
interpellation might not have a speaker, yet it may take other insidious forms materialized 
through artifacts such bureaucratic paperwork, adoption papers, employment application 
forms or gender categories. Butler argues that gender identity may be constructed 
linguistically through administrative formulae. A specific form of interpellation is hate 
speech or the injurious racist name. The words by which we are hailed are rarely those we 
ourselves would choose; they may be traumatic or excitable, although there is always room 
for resistance and re-signification located in human agency. In sum, Butler argues that the 
subject can resist or oppose interpellation through parodic performances, for example, which 
may in their turn destabilize powerful ideological apparatuses such as the heterosexual 
matrix.  
In the following table I have attempted to summarize the Lacanian theory of the sign. The 
signifier pertains to the symbolic function of communication as it represents a signifier for 
another signifier (Lacan, 2006), always mediated by the desire of the Other. As Lacan 
expresses it, the signifier is contingent, open to polysemy and sliding of meaning, whereas 
the signified is routine (Lacan, 1998). The signifier manifests itself in speech activity through 
its phatic dimension, while the signified is instrumental and similar to procedures or recipes. 
At the signifying level, the signifier always stands for more than itself (metonymical) 
whereas the signified repeats what is meant (tautological). The signifier reminds us that the 
site of knowing is the Other, and the act of knowing is therefore a performance, an effect on 
the subject, material in a sense of a subjective drama; by contrast, the signified is functional 
and self-centred, and it remains at the level of a possession or private property.  
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Table 1. Lacanian structure of the sign  
 Signifier Signified 
 
Lacanian Concepts 
 
Symbolic Position 
Perceptual (subjective) and 
Unconscious Representation 
 
 
Imaginary Position  
Cognitive (objective) and 
Conscious Representation 
 
Politics Contingency (materiality) Routine (functionality) 
Communication Speech activity Mirror-images 
Signification Metonymy Tautology 
Learning/Knowing Performative Process Private Property 
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Second definition: beyond linguistics  
While the early Lacan studies the subject-of-meaning, a subject as something that gives 
meaning, this definition is progressively complemented and replaced by something in-
between the ‘system of symbols’ and particular events such as the mirror-stage and 
jouissance. The subject is produced by an interaction of signifiers, but it also has to cope with 
the real of the Other’s desire, which renders manifest the limits of discourse. Drawing on the 
work of another subject theorist, Ed Pluth, I will call this second pole ‘sexuality’.  
Affect, pleasure and pain 
In his work, Pluth roughly interpreted the subject as a function or an effect of the 
interaction of language and sexuality. Pluth says ‘roughly’ because in Lacan the second pole 
is intentionally kept vague:  
Where is the subject […]? Does it suffice to know that the function of the subject is in the 
between-the-two, between the idealizing effects of the signifying function and this vital 
immanence which you will readily confuse again, I think, despite my warnings, with the 
function of the drive? What we are engaged in, precisely, and what we are trying to push 
further, is precisely this. (Lacan, quoted by Pluth, 2007:15) 
The second pole is described either vaguely (‘vital immanence’) or negatively (it is not to be 
confused with the ‘drive’). As we have seen, this is precisely the characteristics of the Real 
which means that it cannot be grasped. The crucial point here is that Lacanian theory is not 
reducible to language, but it involves something non-linguistic.  
Subjectivity in Lacan is a form of power which creates meanings in language, a power 
which fills empty signifiers with content, which confers a style on the structural features of 
language. From that perspective, Lacan is a kind of post-linguistic psychology, in the sense 
that subjectivity also involves a relation to the body, affects, and the traumatic Real. 
Language alone does not make a subject. There is something else, an obstacle to 
signification. Pluth’s work considers the subject not merely as an effect of language, but as an 
‘effect of language plus the Real’ which he conceptualizes in terms of sexuality. Here 
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Lacan’s notion differs from structuralism, and the subject is not reducible to the free play of 
signifiers. This aporia in Lacan’s work leads critics to regard Lacanian theory as a 
metaphysics, which is also unfair because the Real can be identified only through its material 
effects. To summarise, Lacan is a psychoanalyst and his psychology is essentially post-
linguistic, exploring the limits of language and incorporating non-linguistic events, whether 
we relate them to affectivity or sexuality. Lacan’s theory deals with how the subject confers 
power to some signifiers over others; how the subject, which is always positioned within 
these signifiers, can be oppressed by them or contrastingly emancipated from a given 
symbolic configuration.  
In particular, Stavrakakis (2010) states that affect is a promising direction for future 
research in the field of discourse theory. More research needs to reorient critical theory 
towards ‘a dynamism immanent to bodily matter’ (Clough 2008: 1). Affect has been defined 
in numerous ways. For example, according to Thoburn, as a pre-signifying mode of bodily 
activation:  
Affect is an experience of intensity – of joy, fear, love, sorrow, pity, pride, anger – that changes 
the state of a body, that has concrete effects on individuals and social practice (…) affect is a key 
dimension of experience (…) and one that most clearly marks the movement of cultural studies 
away from a conception of culture as signifying practice. (Thoburn, 2007: 84) 
Stavrakakis describes the body as the site of a continuous dialectic between the Real and 
symbolic – between the real body (the one of sexual drive and somatic activation) and the 
body marked with signifiers. As Laclau cogently asserts: ‘affect […] is not something added 
to signification, but something consubstantial with it.’ (Laclau, 2004: 326) Thus, the process 
of identification requires the simultaneous, successful, symbolic articulation of the subject 
and its affective, libidinal investment operating in the mobilization of jouissance. 
Subsequently, Stavrakakis describes jouissance as this real remainder which is not reducible 
to language. 
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Post-Lacanian theorists contributed to this ‘affective turn’ in the social and political 
sciences as a response to criticisms regarding discourse theory, largely from actor-network 
theorists but also from Marxists in the purist tradition (Geras, 1990; Lash, 2007). Affect 
differs from emotions (Thompson and Hoggett, 2012). Affect speaks to the more embodied, 
unformed and less conscious dimension of human feeling, whereas emotion speaks to the 
feelings which are more conscious and individuated since they are more anchored in 
language and meaning. Emotions provide affect with category. An affect such as anxiety is 
experienced in a bodily way, while an emotion such as jealousy is directed towards objects (a 
lover, a rival) which give it meaning, focus and intentionality. The distinctive thing about 
anxiety is the way in which its object constantly shifts from one thing to another, almost as if 
the object is secondary to the feeling. Thus, whereas emotion is embedded in discourse, affect 
appears to be more abstracted from it. Affect also differs from sexuality. Sexuality, 
specifically at the workplace, is ubiquitous and present in jokes, dress, self-presentation, 
secret affairs, fantasy and coercive behaviors known as sexual harassment (Pringle, 1990). 
For Burrell, sexuality is not just genital pleasure or orgasm but a primordial human feeling 
which encompasses the full gamut of libidinal excitations, including sensuality and erotic 
play (Burrell 1984, 1992). Further, organizational sexuality is a site of control and resistance 
(Fleming, 2007), and historically with the subordination of women’s or gays’ sexualities at 
the workplace and derision associated with homophobic or heterosexist behaviours. Sexuality 
might become discursively subsumed into ‘culture of fun’ and ‘being yourself’ becoming 
thereby an instrument of management with the risk of provoking either cynical resistance 
and, in the case described by Fleming, resistance of the subordinate to management through 
homophobia.  
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Fantasy and jouissance  
In Lacan, the definition of fantasy is not that of the dictionary; the word does not designate 
imagined scenes of wish fulfilment. Fantasy is a Lacanian clinical category whose aim is not 
to enact the fulfilment of desire, but rather to sustain the subject’s desire by telling it how to 
desire. In other words, fantasy sustains the subject understood as a subject of lack, a desiring 
subject, one which is not reducible to need or demand. When the need is articulated and the 
demand satisfied, say for a child to be fed, desire is what emerges in the dissatisfaction felt 
when the demand is met. For example, the behaviour of a child repeatedly refusing the food 
given by an over-loving mother can be interpreted as his desire that his mother find her desire 
outside of him (Lacan, 2006). Fantasy activates and structures jouissance. Thus, there is a 
point of impossibility of consciousness, an impossibility of absolute jouissance, summarized 
by the famous Lacanian statement: ‘there is no such a thing as sexual relationship’ (1970: 
58). Fantasy structures enjoyment, and it serves as a protective screen against its excess: 
‘through fantasy, we learn “how to desire”’ (Zizek, 1989: 118).  
Pluth proposes the notion that the subject is grounded on a fundamental fantasy, a 
consistency about how the subject is attached to and positions himself with signifiers.  Where 
is the subject located with regard to the fantasy?  
A subject is not something situated on either side of a fantasy – it is not the object in the fantasy, 
nor is it the actor who plays a role in the fantasmatic scenario, nor is it the conscious individual 
(or ego) who encounters fantasy as a foreign entity. Where is the subject to be found in fantasy? 
I will be arguing here that it is to be found in the very consistency and structuring relation that 
the fantasy establishes for an individual – a junction and disjunction of language and jouissance 
(Pluth, 2007: 85) 
In ‘traversing the fantasy’ (Lacan, 1977), we learn to achieve a distance from the fantasy 
and to stop seeking jouissance somewhere (Zizek, 1997). In Lacan, the notion of jouissance 
designates the unconscious enjoyment which drives and motivates our everyday habits, 
routines, attitudes, beliefs and activities. The eruption of jouissance in social practices 
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renders change more difficult and perilous (Rickert, 2007). Nietzsche gives the example of 
the ascetic man who renounces to all pleasure in order to obtain the paradoxical jouissance of 
his sacrifices. Thus, jouissance may operate in self-destructive and addictive behaviours such 
as anorexia. The enjoyment of having a perfect body is inextricably correlated with the pain 
of malnutrition. It is distinct from mere pleasure. For example, a love affair without risk 
would feature mere pleasure, whereas enjoyment involves an act of transgression, a 
‘challenge to the gallows’ (Zizek, 1991), the risk of being caught or surprised. In sum, 
jouissance embodies the specific union of pain and pleasure, the joy associated with the 
psychic drama of self-destruction.  
In other words, jouissance is the site of the subject. But how do we see jouissance? When 
is jouissance amenable to observation? This is a crucial point, and not only for the 
psychoanalyst or the ethnographer. As Zizek (1997) put it: 
When do I actually encounter the Other ‘beyond the wall of language’? Not when I’m able to 
describe her? Not when I learn her values, dream and so on? But only when I encounter the 
Other in her moment of jouissance? When I discern in her a tiny details (a compulsive gesture, 
an excessive facial expression, a tic) which signals the intensity of the real of jouissance (1997: 
61)  
Thus, consciousness itself can be understood materially, so to speak, and the psychoanalytic 
clinic provides the setting for this materialization or dramatization. In that case, jouissance 
becomes jouis-sens, which is a pun in French: enjoyment-in-meaning. More fundamentally, 
consciousness itself is material primarily in the sense that it is an affective process. Thus, the 
eruption of jouissance can be read as a manifestation of the real, the acting out of the subject. 
The symbolic system of language and social relations is always lacking, and this lack is 
above all a lack of jouissance, of a lost fullness, castrated/sacrificed when one enters the 
symbolic field of language and social relations (Stavrakakis, 2007). For Lacan, jouissance is 
posited as being already lost, thereby constituting the subject as a subject of desire, a desire 
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structured around the unending quest for the lost, primordial, impossible jouissance. In 
psychoanalytic theory, the prohibition of jouissance is the nodal point of the oedipal drama. 
The lack that constitutes subjectivity is the lack of jouissance (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008).  To summarise, Lacanian theory displaces the focus from the image of the object of 
desire to the subjective determination materialized through enjoyment. 
Utility, desire and the law  
How does such a subject theory differ from existing accounts of technology matters? 
Existing debates in IS studies, such as that around the TAM, are articulated around the 
dichotomy between intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, enjoyment/utility; they problematize the 
relationship between pleasure and productivity at work. To some extent, some pleasure is 
needed to increase performance, yet not too much.  
Notwithstanding this, predictive models are ill-equipped to deal with what we shall call 
this paradox of affectivity. For example, Venkatesh, after diagnosing the blurring of the 
distinction between work and play7, elaborates on what he calls a ‘modern conceptualization’ 
of play which leads him, rather strangely, to re-introduce a distinction between unproductive 
play being ‘unproductive, pleasant and involving’ and playful work being ‘productive, 
pleasant and involving’. Consequently, there is a good way to enjoy, which basically means a 
productive way, and a bad way to enjoy, which is reduced to unproductive distraction. In that 
case, the abolished distinction reappears under a new categorization. Grounded on the design 
science tradition, TAM assumes that productivity is understood from the perspective of the 
organization, whose interests the training aims to serve. However, the question is not to 
separate pleasure and productivity, as these notions have always been hybrid. The real 
                                                          
7
 There is a long intellectual tradition here, embodied by Rifkin’s best-seller, The End of Work (1995) and the 
deskilling literature, which I already mentioned above. 
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question, then, is: which productivity does the subject mean to serve? What is the law 
structuring the desire of subjects? 
I will now draw on the Lacanian notion of the law and jouissance to conceptualize the left-
over of the dualistic classification between enjoyment and utility, as conceptualized by the 
TAM. This question is raised in a very precise terms in the chapter ‘On Jouissance’ of  book 
XX of Lacan’s seminar, where Lacan posits as an ethical imperative the distinction between 
utility and jouissance – a crucial point which also leads us to deconstruct Venkatesh’s notion 
of playful work. While utility aims at serving a purpose, it is never clear precisely which 
purpose it serves (in the organisational field, it is likely to be managerially-imposed tasks), as 
speaking subjects may always attach different contents to the signifier ‘utility’. In contrast, 
jouissance is a negative instance, one which by definition serves no purpose: jouissance is 
what is useless. Thus, to overcome the dual opposition between jouissance and utility, Lacan 
borrows from legal terminology the suitably double-edged notion of usufruct:  
A word here to shed light on the relationship between law and jouissance. ‘Usufruct’ - that's a 
legal notion, isn't it? - brings together in one word what I already mentioned in my seminar on 
ethics, namely, the difference between utility and jouissance. (…) Usufruct means that you can 
enjoy your means, but must no waste them. When you have the usufruct of an inheritance, you 
can enjoy the inheritance as long as you don’t use up too much of it. That is clearly the essence 
of law – to divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything that counts as jouissance. (Lacan: 
1999: 3) 
Usufruct is metaphorical of the psychoanalytic law and means that you can enjoy a heritage, 
but you should not enjoy it excessively. One of the key contributions of Lacan’s subject 
theory is that the subject needs the instance of the law to organize and enjoy the possibility of 
its transgression. In other words, the desire of the subject is predicated on a prohibition.  
Even the apparent notion of objectivity such as the Kantian notion of ‘neutral 
representation’, the thing-in-itself, is interpreted by Lacan as a super-egotistical injunction, 
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an image of objectivity, which by definition the subject cannot assume, and the subject will 
have to transgress it. The paradox is that the subject needs the law to experience pleasure:  
If there is no God – the Name of the father as an instance of the Law/Prohibition – enjoyment is 
forbidden. Enjoyment itself, which we experience as transgression, is in its innermost status 
something imposed, ordered. When we enjoy, we never do it spontaneously, we always follow 
certain injunction: ‘Enjoy!’  (Zizek, 2002: 9) 
Far from holding atheist views, the libertine needs the existence of God in order to heroically 
articulate the subjective drama of his/her transgressions and overcome the fear of Hell. Thus, 
the Law organizes the right-to-jouissance, which fundamentally differs from a duty or 
managerial work. Nothing, including game-based training, obliges anyone to enjoy itself 
except the superego. In Lacan’s words, there is no other law for the desiring subject than the 
superego: ‘The superego is the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!’ (Lacan, 1998: 3). The law 
of the subject, the superego, is regarded by Zizek as an individual injunction experienced as 
something traumatic, irrational and non-integrated, which means that the subject fails to make 
sense of it. Nobody is born speaking, and sexuality is first experienced as a trauma: 
‘Sexuality is always traumatic as such’ (Lacan, 1976: 22).  
Here we touch upon the crucial psychoanalytic view on acceptance. The Law functions as 
a tautology. It is accepted because it is accepted, not because of any first principle; the 
foundation of the law lies in its process of enunciation8. For the law to be accepted and to 
function normally, its traumatic contingent origin must be repressed into the unconscious 
through an imaginary meaning of the law, belief/ideological system, such as religion, regime 
of truth, or in our case belief in managerial utility or functionality (Zizek, 1989). As the 
above review of the history of the TAM shows, the question of knowing the origin of the law 
that administers enjoyment is crucial, as it also determines what legitimates some behaviours 
                                                          
8
 Here Zizek quotes Pascal: ‘Custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason that it is accepted. That is the 
mystic basis of its authority. Anyone who tries to bring it back to its first principle destroys it.’ (Pascal, 1966: 
46) 
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and excludes others, i.e. what counts as normal and deviant pleasure. My lens leads me to 
understand normalcy as the subjection to a particular law that is contingent and always 
contestable. When and how does the subject experience the truth of the law? Again, this 
exists not so much at the level of consciousness, docile processing and acceptance of rules, 
but in our concrete affectivity. In Butler (1993), the awareness that the subject has of his 
body, ideas of the body so to speak – what she calls the ‘sexed gender’ – is regulated by 
prohibition and the nexus of pain/pleasure. Nevertheless, prohibitions do not always produce 
a docile body that fully conforms to the social ideal. Once a prohibition is installed, some 
body parts emerge as sites of punishable pleasure, which Butler relates to the Freudian idea 
that we achieve an idea of our own body through pain. Thus, in The Ego and the Id (1923), 
Freud develops the thesis that bodily pain is a condition of self-discovery.  
The subject is not understood through information-processing as an organized systems of 
symbols, but through this pre-conscious nexus of pain/pleasure, evident in biographical 
events, that we experience the Real of the law as well as the sense of when to say “Stop!” 
Traversion of fantasy 
Lacan considers the subject as a product of signifiers, as well as an encounter with some 
sort of event. The subject is still something that has to do with a consistency of signifiers, an 
effect of discourse, organized by a fundamental fantasy. What affects traverse the subject 
who resists the determining force of fantasy? When does a subject find the courage to 
traverse the fantasy? Why does an act succeed to re-articulate the Symbolic? 
Subjectivation and subject-process 
Badiou’s opus Theory of the subject, in Pluth’s words, is a ‘guide to locating the subject in 
structures’. No individuals choose to be involved in what Badiou calls a ‘truth procedure’, 
being affected by an event, or being interpellated, and it is through affects that subjects 
become aware of what is happening to them, of the truth procedure which absorbs them. In 
78 
 
the example of the event of love, happiness is the affect which signals to the human animal 
that he’s some subject of truth. In other words, affects signal the emergence of the Real- the 
emergence of the new. In particular, Badiou addresses two components of the subject – 
subjectivation and the subject-process. As we know from Lacan, the subject is split. Badiou 
uses two terms for designating the different aspects of this split or barred- namely 
subjectivation and subject-process.  
Thus, these two terms capture the torsion which is the subject itself: ‘the divisible unity of 
subjectivation and the subject-process’ Subjectivation marks the moment of the subject’s 
emergence while subject-process describes the subject’s persistence and refers to the process 
of the creation of a new order or a new regime. Subjectivation designates something like the 
subject’s sudden appearance in the structure, the subject-process entails a recomposition of 
the structure. In Badiou’s terms: ‘subjectivation designates the subject in the principle 
dimension of interruption, the subject-process in the dimension of recomposition’ 
Subjectivation depicts how the structure is split by force, which reveals its incompleteness, 
but this does not equate the subject with force or interruption, because this force is itself split 
by structuring, by being made into a re-composition. The subject is something like the 
appearance of lack: ‘it makes lack be’ (Badiou) 
The meaning of affects 
In Badiou’s framework, subjectivization is split between the style of anxiety and courage 
while subject-process includes the attachment to a superegoic Law or the pursuit of justice. 
Subjectivization is more passive and names an interruption: I am seized by an event, a 
decision occurs inside me whereas subject-process is more active: choice, deliberation, doubt 
or loyalty to my true being, are part of the process. For Badiou’s material view, the subject 
drained with agency, is an effect. Thus, affect designates ‘the mode of consistency of the 
subject-effect’.  
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Anxiety is a foundational affect to the Badiousian theory of the subject. A subject theory 
shows us that it is not so much when our public ideal or ego is affected that we are most 
vulnerable. By contrast, we reach a state of anxiety when, suddenly, our existence as a 
desiring subject is threatened. A subject theory argues that the Real of resistance is not so 
much a technical dysfunction or a management problem; on the contrary, it is an affective 
experience grounded on anxiety, to which Lacan dedicates a seminar, and which he defines as 
follows:   
When something appears there, it is because, if I can express myself in this way, that the lack is 
lacking. [...] I would just like to point out to you that many things can appear which are 
anomalous, this is not what makes us anxious. But if all of a sudden all norms are lacking, 
namely what constitutes the lack ―because the norm is correlative to the idea of lack― if all of 
a sudden it is not lacking ―and believe me try to apply that to a lot of things– it is at that 
moment that anxiety begins. (Lacan, 1962: 35) 
Lacan defines anxiety as the lack of lack, which Glynos relates to the subject’s threat to his 
existence as a subject of desire9. The extinction of subjectivity potentially produces either 
catastrophic acts such as suicides in the workplace (Bègue and Dejours, 2009), or acts of 
courage, such as taking the risk of a confrontation with management, facing a rapport-the-
force through strike or a constructive negotiation. 
                                                          
9
 Glynos typically captures this apparent paradox of anxiety when describing the ironic effects of the 
permissive liberal-capitalist dream, which promises a world of leisure and sexual freedom, free from the 
barriers and mediation constitutive of social relationships:  
Our commonsense view predicts that the removal of social and technological barriers will result in a healthy 
burgeoning of pleasurable experiences. That is what a permissive liberal-capitalist ideal might be seen to promise. 
But, due to the impossibility inherent to desire, we have an alternative and plausible model with which to explain 
why the removal of obstacles may lead to a far oppressive state of affairs in which we are threatened with the very 
extinction of our desire, and therefore of ourselves as subjects of desire. This occurs precisely when we are suddenly 
presented with the real possibility of actually living our fantasy. The prediction is that the kind of acting-out this type 
of threat elicits is of a potentially much more violent sort than one in which our self-image or public ideal is blocked 
or under threat. Why? Because what is at stake is our very being, that which sustains us as fundamentally desiring. 
(Glynos, 2010: 203) 
However, as Lacan states, ‘there is no such thing as a sexual relationship’, which means that even when the 
barriers seem to be removed, the sexual encounter does not function as I wish, it resists, it does not tick right. 
There is always a but.  
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Badiou’s complements Lacan’s theory with the notion of courage. Destruction should 
occur twice for an act to succeed, as in Badiou’s reading of the Marxist act: first, the 
destruction of the classes at a political level, and second the destruction of the proletariat 
itself at an affective level. The subject of the second destruction requires more than a double 
negation; it requires a more purely wilful element, which is the subject (Hallward, 2003). The 
crucial point is that, for Badiou, the subject is this force exception, which is the outcome of 
anxiety, of lack of lack and which therefore comes in a second moment:  
The lack of the lack… is not twice the lack… It requires something more. (…) I provisionally 
called subject this unpredictable bifurcation. Any subject is a force exception, which comes in 
second place. (Badiou, 1999: 88) 
Anxiety and courage are chosen for Badiou to designate the way political subjects react to 
an insurrection- not so much as a distinction but rather as a continuum. While anxiety seeks 
the destruction of the symbolic (Badiou uses the example of suicidal riots as temporary 
outbursts), courage challenges the law and seeks its recomposition: ‘Courage positively 
brings about disorder in the symbolic, breakdowns in communication, while anxiety calls for 
their death’. While anxiety is a destructive impulse seeking the destruction of the possibility 
of communication itself, the risk of breakdown in communication is necessary for the new to 
emerge. The paradox is that for Badiou, anxiety generates the destruction of destruction, 
namely there is a manifestation of affects which remains impotent to change the law and 
finally reinforce it. There is even here a secret jouissance to restore what is destroyed. In 
Badiou’s terms, in subjectivization, the act precedes the reasoning, there is a logic of excess 
at stake, a too-much-of the real: courage is a successful ‘wager on the real’ which relies on 
the division of the law. In contrast with anxiety, it succeeds in ‘putting law to the test, instead 
of calling for its restoration’ (Badiou, 2009: 311). Justice differs from superego in the sense 
that ‘justice relativizes law whereas superego absolutizes it’ (Ibid: 311). While superego is 
restorative, justice is instituting of a new social order or regime.  
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For Badiou, every subject-effect is a knotting together of subjectivation and subject-
process. In particular, Badiou foregrounds two main subject-effects through the pairs anxiety-
superego (designated with the Greek letter: ψ) and courage-justice (designated by the Greek 
letter: α). The ethics which Badiou praises consists in favouring α−series as much as possible 
– an embrace of the new (Pluth, 2010). Badiou also attributes meaning to the two other 
correlations and allows the possibility for linking anxiety and justice which he names 
scepticism and courage and superego which he names dogmatism and constitute two formal 
concepts of ideology. Badiou says the diagonals have an imaginary function of suturing, in 
the dialectic of lack and excess, it fills the psychic role of the ego, it provides similitude, 
identity and imaginary cohesion. I would relate scepticism to work studies where cynicism or 
derision prevails where workers are complicit with their own subjection. For Badiou’s 
scepticism manifests itself through fatalistic discourse: 
In the factories, the fatalistic discourse is very well implanted. ‘Workers will be workers’, ‘We 
will always be fucked over’, ‘Here nobody wants to do anything’, and so on. Defeatism is the 
spontaneous philosophy of Proletarians. Although he coarseness and stupidity of this discourse 
are dis-couraging, for those who are enlightened by the theory of the subject it is nevertheless a 
divisible and precarious historical production. An organized micro-confidence (a communist 
workers’ group) locally disrupts its rule. (Badiou, 2009: 328) 
On the other side, dogmatism designates those courageous acts which never traverse the 
fantasy of the superegoic law and lead for instance to overinvestment at work and blockage 
by overemphasising the subject’s own potency.  For Badiou, it is associated with active 
nihilism distinct from passive nihilist: ‘Active nihilism valorises only itself. This is always 
better than to end up tolerating the world.’ (Badiou, 2009: 329). 
Badiou foreshadows various knotting together of affects which are summarized in the 
following table:  
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Subjectivation Subject-process Meaning Examples 
Anxiety Superego Terror Suicides, sabotage, 
burnouts, nihilistic 
acts 
Anxiety Justice Scepticism Working at cynical 
distance, fatalistic 
discourse 
Courage Superego Dogmatism Study on 
overinvestment at 
work 
Courage Justice Confidence Heroic acts, 
courageous 
negotiation, some 
version of 
whistleblowing 
 
Organizational studies from a Lacanian perspective  
In this section, I will address more specifically how Lacanian notions such as 
embodiment or language have enabled to rethink our embodied presence and impact on our 
teaching, research and theorizing about management and organization studies.  
Materiality and embodiment in organizations  
First, the Lacanian lens offers a relevant framework for addressing the neglect of 
materiality in post-structuralist management and organization theory, which is identified by 
Fotaki et al. (2014).  
In particular, recent reviews in organization theory have addressed the various 
approaches to materiality. For instance, Philipps and Oswick (2012) focuses on 
organizational discourse in relation to matter and review its application in various empirical 
contributions to the understanding of organization and management, in order to study topic of 
identity, strategy, and organizational change. These authors problematize the position of 
discourse in relation to materiality, which may be connected (discourse and materiality) or 
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co-constituted (Iedema, 2007: 936) - discourse as materiality. Furthermore, Philipps and 
Oswick (2012) invite researchers to introduce methodological plurality and to combine 
discourse with non-discursive approaches, as approaches cashed out in terms of discourse as 
materiality may neglect other forms of materiality.  
Further, materiality or matter can be decoupled from technology and called a matter of 
concern, something which concerns, preoccupies, or mobilizes a person. From this 
perspective, there is no divide between the world of materiality and the world of discourse 
and communication (Latour, 2008; Cooren et al.) However this account is still minimal and 
adhoc. Ashcraft et al. (2009) points at the neglect materiality in communication studies where 
dualism between the mind and the body prevails and symbolic activity is viewed as 
superimposed on material forces. However, bodies reject the say of symbolism by enduring 
pain, injury, illness, death, hunger, reproduction, aging (Riach, Rumens, Tyler, 2014), and 
this is especially important in management studies where disembodied notions such as 
strategy, institutions or corporate governance have prevailed historically (Ashcraft, 2009). 
Lacanian approach to materiality in organization typically addresses how subjective 
notions of competence and identity are corporeality navigated (Benhabib, 1995). The body 
typically relate to professional identity and is seen as something to be managed and 
disciplined. The body is often absent from the study of white collars and knowledge workers 
as if the body  was peripheral to the work they perform, in contrast with the body related to 
‘blue collars’ and ‘dirty labour’ (Ashcraft et al. 2009). Bringing the body back to work 
consists in asking whose body does matter or not, and identifying what are the manoeuvres 
through which the erasure of the body occurs (Ashcraft, 2008).Approaches driven by 
psychoanalysis have paid attention to the sexuated subject and led to better reflection about 
the subjectivity of researchers itself. The study of work and organizations implies that 
workers, including academics writing these papers, are not disembodied subjectivities but 
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have specific musculatures, organs and are subjects to specific affects, pain and pleasure 
being associated with their sexual idiosyncrasies (Fotaki et al., 2014). Thus, the diversity and 
complexity of emotions are increasingly addressed to understand people’s experiences of 
workplaces and organizations (Walkerdine & Jimenez, 2012; Glynos, 2010; Frosh, 2010; 
Hey, 2006). Language and its associated practice such as writing or speaking, emerge from 
the body, which is a sexuated body. This understanding leads feminists scholars to call for 
parodic performances or re-writing practice, which echoes Fotaki’s call for a feminist écriture 
(Fotaki et al., 2014) for organization studies. The latter constitutes an attempt to consider 
academic writing itself as a bodily act rooted in the materiality of language.  
Gender relations at work  
Second, by responding to the need for more sexualized and embodied view of work and 
organizational life, Lacanian theory manages to address the way organizations ignore the 
gender dimension (Fotaki et al. 2012).  
This leads us to another crucial aspect, namely that discourse is not only sexuated but 
also gendered. Thus, gender approach to work and organizations typically draws on Judith 
Butler, and her well-known distinction between sex and gender, to draw attention to gendered 
aspects and to understand gender in organizations (e. g. Kenny 2009). Butler argues that the 
practice of gendering is performative by constituting mundane practices within societal 
norms, practices which themselves instantiate and produce intelligible subjects as such. Thus, 
in the organizational field, there is a growing interest in Butler’s work on performativity 
(Borgerson, 2005; Tyler and Cohen, 2009) and her theory of subjectification (Kenny, 2010; 
Harding, Lee, Ford and Learmonth, 2011).  
However, gender is most often ignored or under-valued in organizational theory.  Witz 
invites the sociology of the body to consider how gendered bodies have always enjoyed 
varying degrees of absence or presence in the sociological imaginary (2000). However, there 
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is an increasing recognition of gender-sensitive approaches to organizations, most notably 
through the influence of post-Lacanian philosophers including Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva 
and Hélène Cixous. These studies have theorized the absence of women from the symbolic 
space (Cooper, 1992; Höpfl, 2000; Philipps and Rippin, 2010; Kenny and Bell, 2011), as well 
as how the sexed subject is constituted in the workplace, through the exclusion of women 
(Vachhani, 2012).  
In a reflexive, gender-sensitive reflexion on academic work, Fotaki and Harding (2012) 
propose an academic politics involving a self-conscious, bi-sexual hysterical10 position for 
critical management scholarship, which fundamentally is hysterical, by criticizing the system 
to which it belongs. Reference to bisexual stems from Freud who associates hysteria with 
people who identifies with members of both sexes and cannot choose their sexual identity. 
According to Fotaki and Harding, the hysteric position is the optimal one as it allows 
researchers to avoid, as much as possible, slipping into the discourse of the master, a position 
averse to research’s  imperative for change and innovation.  
Power relations in organizations  
Third, Lacanian theory offers an appropriate vocabulary for thinking power relations and 
subjection in organizations and work context.  
From this perspective, subjectivity, identity, resistance or power relations are seen as 
specific discursive practices located within complex network of signification, whose 
deconstruction enables possibility for transformation and change (Mumby, 1996). In 
particular, Lacanian theory offers the vocabulary to understand the paradoxical desire for 
subjection at the workplace, well illustrated, for example, by Stavrakakis convincing 
interpretation of the well-known series of experiments directed by Stanley Milgram at Yale 
                                                          
10
 They do a feminist reading of Lacan’s theory of discourse in Seminar XVII and propose a Lacanian model of 
reflexivity to critical management studies, drawing on the four dominant discourses––the university, the 
master, the hysteric and the analyst 
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University in the early sixties. This study addresses the phenomenon of obedience, which 
manifested itself in contexts such as the Holocaust. The experiment was designed to verify to 
which extent and under which conditions people would accept to obey the 
scientist/experimenter and to punish another person by subjecting it to ever-higher level of 
electrocution. Most of the participants did, thereby committing acts that would disavow their 
openly stated values! Stavrakakis is interested in the binding factor, namely that most people 
are prepared to accept anything coming from a source of authority. There is a structural and 
structuring role of the command, here justified ideologically by the acceptable idea of 
science, without which social reality would dissipate. Finally, Stavrakakis called the 
organized Other, the one who embodies the symbolic command, whose function is to 
consolidate and ‘manage’ the lack, and which is equally lacking, enabling the subject to 
potentially escape the subjection.  
The Lacanian view about the implications of the division of the subject at work, between 
the ego and the barred subject $ (Arnaud and Vanheule, 2007) provides a language to make 
sense of complex psychic mechanisms of criticism-cum-obedience at work.  Lacanian studies 
typically look at how subjects are complicit with their own subjection, taking an apparent 
ironical or cynical distance with the Law, yet enacting the Law nonetheless. Prolonging the 
tradition of labour-process theory, Lacanian studies have thus typically facilitate 
understanding of issues of misbehaviour, derision at work, and cynicism in the workplace 
(Fotaki, 2009; Grugulis, Knights and Wilmott, 2001; Knights and Willmott, 1990; Faÿ, 
2008). Such defence reaction have been well captured by the metaphor of a decaf(feinated) 
resistance (Contu, 2007) as opposed to Real act, which is solely capable of changing the 
socio-symbolic configuration. 
I now need to turn to politics and the theory of ideology, more in-depth, as it has been 
theorized in organizational studies and, and in a more systematic way, in political theory. 
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*** 
In this chapter, I have introduced the theoretical foundations of my thesis by drawing 
mainly on subject theorists. Thanks to the work of Ed Pluth, I have presented the subject as 
an interaction between sexuality and discourse, which has led me to revisit the usual 
understanding of materiality and embodiment in technology and work studies. I have 
addressed more specifically the affective dimension of the Real, this part of ourselves that 
resists any attempt to make sense of it. In the following chapter, I will address the notion of 
politics – how new articulation is rendered possible – and ideology, namely the phenomenon 
through which acts of identification become collective and produce wider effects.  
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Chapter 3: Bringing politics back to information 
systems  
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What are the broader social and political implications of affective and biographical realm? 
Many issues raised by the development of the internet economy require a better 
understanding of affect: the insertion via social networks of embodied performances into the 
machinery of data production and collection, the regulation of users’ enjoyment and sexuality 
and issues of privacy and confidentiality, to name but a few. While affect/emotions have 
featured progressively in the IS social constructivist literature, this account always runs the 
risk of being an ad-hoc account of the existing sociomaterial account. In fact, the politics of 
the subject can be conceptualized as force, and in this sense it has nothing to do with a 
complaisant, touchy-feely account of emotional life. Based on the above, we know that 
subject-effect is a political and affective process, which comes in second place. I will now 
turn to the politics of affect in order to explore the potential post-structural theory – its 
politico-structural and affective-ideological dimension - to study innovation and 
organizational transformation.  
The centrality of consent 
Articulation and hegemony  
As we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, the question of consent is absolutely 
central to Burawoy’s book.  In his own words, his project consisted precisely in translating 
Gramsci’s vision from the political to the organizational arena. As Burawoy recalls, in 
‘Americanism and Fordism’, Gramsci, in one of his rare incursion into the field of labour 
process in the United States, makes the following statement: ‘hegemony here is born in the 
factory’. Burawoy sees his own book as an elaboration on this brief but suggestive comment:  
In contrast to the conventional wisdom among both Marxists and post-Marxists, I propose to 
demonstrate how consent is produced at the point of production- independent of schooling, 
family life, mass media, the state, and so forth.     
Thus, Burawoy departs from Marx by stating that people work harder, because they are 
subject to hegemonic rather than a despotic regime of production. In other terms, consent 
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rather than fear ruled the workplace (Burrawoy, 2012). No longer does management rely on 
arbitrary rule like in early capitalism, management had to persuade workers to deliver surplus 
and constituted game as the social structure in the factory: management had to manufacture 
consent. The economic process of producing things through games turns out to be both a 
political process, by reproducing particular social relations - at an objective-strucutral level, 
and an ideological process, by producing consent to these relations - at a subjective level 
(Burawoy, 2012). Burawoy’s thesis is that the game comes to compensate the degradation of 
work and the organization of work holds the worker’s subjectivity even deeper: ‘The 
craftworker of the 19th century (…) exhibits deeper class awareness of exploitation than the 
autoworker of the 20th century.’ (Burawoy, 2012: 11) More work needs to be done to develop 
a proactive strategy and demonstrate how such subjective claims and acts may, in turn, 
modify social structures. 
A crucial contribution to the theory of hegemony is of course the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The concept of hegemony can be 
understood as the ‘organization of consent’ (Barrett, 1991), i.e. the way through which 
subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence. According 
to Howarth (2009), the notion of hegemony bears two dimensions. In the first place, it is a (1) 
practice of coalition-building, which involves the linking together of disparate demands to 
forge projects that can contest a particular form of rule, practice or policy. Laclau and Mouffe 
borrow Lacan’s notion of point de capiton to capture this practice of articulation as ‘the 
construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning.’ (1985:13) The point de capiton is 
the notion which Lacan introduces to provide a mechanism from which out of arbitrariness 
some sort of fixity can emerge, some sort of stability at the level of discourse, at the level of 
the sign. In psychoanalysis, when this elementary fixity of the signifier is missing, the analyst 
deals with a case of psychosis (Lacan, : ) Further, Laclau and Mouffe introduces the notion of 
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articulation, which describes the way in which ideologies emerge by bringing discursive 
elements that do not have pre-assigned political significance into a ‘relation of equivalence’. 
Thus, ideology pertains to the way discursive elements are combined, which provides each 
specific discourse with its ideological significance (Purvis and Hunt, 1993).  
In the second place, hegemony is also the outcome of contesting projects and constitutes 
therefore (2) a form of governance which pertains to the way actors get attached affectively 
to specific practices. Central to hegemony strategy is the production of tendentially empty 
signifers (Laclau, 2000) which explains how social formations are constructed around 
impossible and always-contestable objects of discourse (Laclau, 1996). For example, Laclau 
demonstrates how the hegemonic project of Thatcherism was able to elaborate and institute a 
new set of nodal points articulated around signifiers such as the ‘strong state’ or ‘free 
economy’, and by instituting a new discursive configuration. This project was able to 
inculcate a set of concrete practices (‘strong leadership’, ‘entrepreneurship’).  
Finally, the ‘ultimate fixation of meaning’ (1985, ibid) is always incomplete - impossible 
and necessary - and Laclau and Mouffe use the surgical metaphor of suture, again drawn 
from Lacan, in order to remind us that the traces of the old regime cannot be destroyed by the 
new. A residue always remains, like a scar marking a difference when the flesh is cut:  
Hegemonic practices are suturing in so far as their field of operation is determined by the 
openness of the social, by the ultimate unfixed character of every signifier. The original lack is 
precisely what the hegemonic practices try to fill in. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 88)  
The above quote allows us to create a bridge between Lacanian theory, political theory, and 
organization studies à la Buravoy. In other terms, what is at stake here is the centrality of 
consent (Buravoy) in any work practice, including technology-in-practice- this centrality is 
not only structural/political (Laclau) but also affective/subjective (Lacan). I will now turn to 
the notion of ideological fantasy in work practice.  
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Ideological fantasy at work 
Within the Essex school, Jason Glynos’ scholarship has explored more deeply the 
ideological significance of affect.  
His work prolongs the interpenetration between the Laclauian and Lacanian 
discourse, especially by exploring the potential of the logic of fantasy, to study work 
practices, which are our interest in this thesis. Far from reducing ideology to false 
consciousness, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s seminal work inverted the good old Marxist 
proposition. Thus, Laclau’s theory maintains the Marxist concept of ideology and the 
category of misrecognition by inverting their content. It can therefore be described as 
post-Marxist because of its anti-essentialism: 
The ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive essence [an illusion as to 
real class interests, for example], but exactly the opposite: it would consist of the non-
recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate 
suture. (Laclau, 1990: 92) 
In other words, the invisibility of contingency is constitutive of ideological misrecognition, 
and the critical intervention aims to render contingency visible. Thus the work of Glynos 
consist in connecting Laclau’s view of hegemony to Zizek’s Lacanian development on 
fantasy:  
The fundamental level of ideology,  however, is not that of an illusion masking the real state of 
things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. (…) Cynical 
distance is just one way – one of many ways – to blind ourlseves to the structuring power of 
ideological fantasy (Zizek, 1989: 30) 
The key idea here is that the deviation from Marxist (or liberal) theory of ideology is not only 
epistemological but also ontological- ideology is not an illusion, as in false consciousness, 
but pertains to the way any social reality itself is constituted. For Glynos, it is not the 
description of ideology’s content which matters but rather its ‘capacity to account for an 
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ideology’s grip, its power to transfix subjects’ (2001: 192); in other terms, how ideology 
manages to exert its hold over us. 
Study of workplace practices need to focus on ideological fantasies as it is not enough to 
understand the discursive patterns if we wish to make sense of social practice, we must also 
analyze the degree of ‘libidinal investment’ they arouse in the relevant actors (Ekman, 2013). 
There is indeed a research avenue addressing the power of fantasies to structure the 
motivations underpinning much economic and production practices (e. g. Cederström and 
Grassman, 2008; Kenny, 2012; Sköld, 2009; 2010). These studies, most often positioned 
within the field of critical management studies and inspired by discourse analysis, typically 
look at workplace practices in terms of logics. Instead of describing the content of the 
fantasy, these studies look more specifically at the mode of attachment of social actors to 
their fantasy; the greater the attachment and dependence towards the fanasy, the stronger the 
ideological grip. As being overinvested in a fantasy, any attempt to destabilize the subject’s 
fantasy narrative, will be experienced as a threat and generate anxiety.  
A core distinction is the one between ‘ideological’ and ‘ethical’ logics in a fantasmatic 
context. Put briefly, the ideological logic involves a subject struggling with competing hyper-
intense fantasies, whereas the ethical logic involves a subject struggling with her or his 
tendency to fantasize at all (Ekman, 2013). On the one hand, the ideological logic of fantasy 
intends to repress the social contingency of human practices and to fill the void with fantasy 
images of fulfillment. On the other hand, the ethical logic seeks to endure the social 
contingency of practices by reducing fantasmatic over-investment. This is reminiscent of 
Badiou’s distinction between superego and justice or the Lacanian distinction between phallic 
and non-phallic jouissance. The difference pertains to the extent to which the ‘lack in the 
Other’ is acknowledged or not.  
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In their study of the organizational culture of a nearly hegemonic IT corporation, 
Cederström and Grassman (2008) provide a telling application of the logic of fantasy to 
analyse Google’s workplace Googleplex, describing how the employee is encapsulated inside 
the Googleplex. With four buildings totalising 47, 038m², the Googleplex includes numerous 
cafés, gyms, and other exciting facilities designed for recreational activities, free-meals, 
onsite doctors, a replica of SpaceShipOne and a dinosaur skeleton.  
The injunction to ‘be yourself’ precipitates the indistinction between working-self and authentic-
self to an even greater degree than do normative control systems. Its blend of work and 
recreation – an intermixture of fun and seriousness – disintegrates Homo faber (the working 
man) to allow for Homo ludens (the playing man). The formula of the neo-normative perspective 
is that work should not be considered as a necessary evil that one is forces into, but as a hobby 
that one pursues and which expresses the radical ‘edge’ of onself.  
The Googler is not freed from superegoic pressure, but is even more insidiously subjected to 
normative control; the injunction is not conform with the corporate ideal but an ambiguous 
injunction to ‘be yourself’ which apparently obliterates the distinction between the private 
self and the oppressive institution. In other terms, infantilization is not antonymic but 
partakes to the logic of neo-normative control; it defines the modern man who stubbornly 
refuses to grow up, as in Virilio’s Peter Pan world. Ideological fantasy captures this logic, 
which sets forth a fantasy-world that encapsulates and comforts the employees.  
Kenny (2012) 
Another classic example of fantasy analysis at work is Contu and Wilmott’s reading of 
Orr’s famous ethnographic study Talking about Machines (1996). In this study, Orr shows 
how in practice the work of photocopy repair technicians involved the construction of hero 
narratives and war stories and that this process is central to the employees’ work. By 
transgressing the management’s explicit documentation and procedures, the copiers repair 
copiers with greater efficienciy and higher success rate than would have been the case by 
95 
 
obeying the prescription. This transgression not only solidifies the identity and sense of 
belonging within the community of copiers, it also enables them to derive recognition and 
motivation from their boring work. In Lacanian terms, these technicians enjoy (real) and take 
pride in (imaginary) a form of transgression of Xerox’s bureaucratic procedures (the 
symbolic Law). Contu and Wilmott illustrate how the technology organizes the desire of their 
users and provides them with the energy and the drive required for their tasks. The copier’s 
machine is invested with fantasmatic properties that far exceed its concrete materiality. The 
machine is characterized in their stories as being ‘recalcitrant, annoying, fascinating and 
whimsical’ and even ‘potentially humiliating’. The machine serves as the object ‘through 
which the technicians live out the fantasy of heroism, freedom and autonomy by battling to 
control its performance’ (Contu and Willmott, 2006: 9). Contu and Wilmott interpret the ‘war 
stories’ of Orr’s study, where individual workers take pride in bypassing and transgressing 
management’s explicit documentation and procedures. The irony here is that, for these 
authors, this guilty pleasure of transgression is the cynical twist through they sustain, protect 
and reproduce the social relationship, which reproduce the (capitalist) relations of 
domination. 
A logics approach to change 
I will now address the work of Glynos and Howarth, who have highlighted the category of 
logics as the units of explanation of this dialectical movement governing practices. What does 
all this mean empirically in the study of IS and organizational change? What constitutes 
evidence of the operation of logics?  
Regimes and practices  
An affect-based ontology posits the notion of articulation as foundational to the practice 
of hegemony. Central in this account is the triangular relationship between regimes and two 
kinds of practice, namely social and political.  
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Based on the above, one can argue that from the ontology described by Glynos and 
Howarth, practices are governed by a dialectical movement between incomplete structures on 
the one hand, and the collective act of identification that reinforces or transforms those 
incomplete structures on the other. Glynos and Howarth define social practice as ‘the 
ongoing, routinized forms of human and societal reproduction. They are thus largely 
repetitive activities that do not typically entail a strong notion of self-conscious reflexivity’ 
Various everyday activities such as driving, lecturing or the respect of rules of politeness are 
conducted and reproduces a particular system of social relations without being challenged or 
without putting into questions the rules sustaining these practices. The notion of logics leads 
Glynos and Howarth to understand the way social actors make sense of the practices they are 
involved in: ‘the logic of a practice comprises the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as 
the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable.’ (2007: 136) From this 
perspective, the role of the contextualized self-interpretation of the actors engaged in 
practices, is central in attributing a certain identity and a certain coherence to those practices 
themselves. Thus, the social logic captures what rules, norms and self-understanding inform 
a practice.  
Specific events, such as technological innovation, may provoke the dislocation of 
existing systems of social relations and render visible their contingency. Such conditions 
enable the emergence of political practices which ‘comprise struggles that seek to challenge 
and transform the existing norms, institutions and practices – perhaps even the regime itself – 
in the name of an ideal or principle.’ Political practices bring about a transformative effect on 
existing social practices. Thus, political logics enable us to understand the way a social 
practice or regime was instituted or is being contested and instituted. The political logic aims 
at showing how social practices historically come into being or are transformed. The 
invocation of a political logic is a practice of articulation understood as ‘the construction of 
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nodal points which partially fix meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 113). Articulation 
consists in gathering heterogeneous elements under a name; in other terms, it is ‘the creation 
of something new out of a dispersion of elements’ (Laclau 1988: 16).  
Glynos and Howarth connect the macro-micro contrast with the distinction between 
regimes and practices (2007). In their model, the notion of regime seems to be synonymous 
with structure, order or systems; however, the word has a more specific ideological 
dimension, a system of meaning or ‘grammar’; identification with a certain technology-in-
practice (Orlikowski, 2000: 408) requires the consent to a specific ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 
1991: 73). In Glynos and Howarth’s terms: ‘regimes have a structuring function in the sense 
that they order a system of social practices’. In a moment of dislocation, new possibilities 
become available and subjects may identify differently. These new forms of identification 
may take the form of political practices. Moreover, ‘in characterizing a regime, we also 
describe the context of the practices under study, since a regime is always a regime of 
practices.’  
Political attempts to construct a new logic may become hegemonic by managing to link 
various demands together across a variety of social sites, resulting in the institution and 
consolidation of a new regime and the social practice that comprise it. The table below 
summarizes the triangular model:  
 
    
    Structuration        Hegemony     
 
 
 
Regime (Order, system, discursive 
formation) 
Work Practice 
(reinforcement) 
Political Practice 
(transformation) 
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Figure 1. A simplified model of practices and regimes (adapted from Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 105). Social 
practice has been replaced by work practice, the latter being a specific form of the former.  
 
Rituals and enjoyment  
Other studies consider how technologies are invested with meaning and symbolic 
processes within the organizations in which they operate (Meyer, 1982; Markus and Pfeffer, 
1983; Markus and Robey, 1988; Prasad, 1993). Although these approaches perceive how 
signifying processes impact on the social realm, these are not central to this process. As a 
result, affect and signification are mentioned only in passim.  
Prasad (1993) argues that symbolic interaction is appropriate to study technological 
change because of its emphasis on the processes whereby individual meanings crystallize into 
taken-for-granted realities. In his study of the computerization of a health maintenance 
organization, Prasad demonstrates how computers symbolize professionalism; this renders 
the technology more desirable, excludes serious opposition and ensures long-term 
commitment to computerization. In particular, Prasad provides the example of a receptionist 
refusing to report certain technical problems with her terminal because she feared that her 
computer would be taken away, and with it the prestige she enjoyed in her family. Prasad 
does not demonstrate that enjoyment is constitutive of whether receptionists perform their 
roles efficiently or not.  In other words, enjoyment is here seen as futility on the part of the 
receptionist, not as an agential characteristic. 
Furthermore, semiotic studies state that anything can be an expressive sign capable of 
signification. Semiotic analysis enables the study of interpretive systems and considers the 
processes by which expressions - or signifiers - are linked to their contents – or signified 
(Barley, 1983). Thus, Barley examines the rituals of funeral work to show how preparing a 
body, choosing the design of the coffin and removing deceased persons from their homes are 
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not merely the routine activity of funeral work. These routines are also linked to a common 
interpretive scheme through which the funeral director tries to moderate the emotional 
distress of the participants and to construct an impression of naturalness. In such studies, 
affect is regarded as a problem, a dysfunction of the ritual or the choreography, a contextual 
element of a funeral which needs to be addressed and disciplined. In other terms, affect is 
viewed as a weakness and not as a force, as passive and not active materiality. Affect is 
deprived of agency and is ontologically de-skilled. While these approaches refer to the 
affective consequences of the symbolic, this account is ad-hoc and still tends to keep affect 
and language separate; signification, meanwhile, appears as a closed system of meaning with 
its own independent logic.   
Furthermore, studies have already looked at the development of information systems as a 
political process (Robey and Markus, 1984). From this perspective, system design does not 
comprise only the logical features of a rational process, but also rituals, namely symbolic 
behaviours which reinforce the prevailing belief system in an organization:  
Rituals in systems development function to maintain the appearance of rationality in systems 
development and in organizational decision making. Regardless of whether it actually produces 
rational outcomes or not, systems development must symbolize rationality and signify that the 
actions taken are not arbitrary, but rather acceptable within the organization’s ideology. (Ibid: 
12) 
These authors illustrate their claim through Meyers’ study of hospitals, where 
computerization symbolizes the organization’s ‘corporate cybernetic ideology’. The choice 
and use of computers signal to employees and clients that the organization favours an 
efficient and progressive management. However, the inter-linkage between emotions and 
rationalizing ideology is not addressed. Rituals are here to ‘maintain the appearance of 
rationality.’ As such, this may be read as an instrumental and cynical description of the 
concept. These authors do not explain why we enjoy rituals, nor why we are immersed into 
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them. While these approaches refer to the affective consequences of the symbolic, this 
account is ad-hoc and still tends to keep affect and language separate.  
In the IS field, Robey and Boudreau (1999) have, for example, already theorized the 
notion of logic of determination and logic of opposition to explain organizational changes by 
identifying tendencies that promote and those that oppose change; yet they do not account on 
the force that such logics need to perform a reversal. Perhaps one of the core merits of Glynos 
and Howarth’s logics approach is to foreground this affective dimension, at an ontological 
level, no merely epistemological. While in either case, the sign is a unit of analysis, Lacanian 
theory differs from semiotics, precisely by conferring priority to the signifier, not the 
signified as in the work of Saussure. As we have seen above, the Lacanian barred subject is 
characterized by an ontological arbitrariness. Furthermore, the Lacanian notion of jouissance 
(enjoyment) accounts for the resilience of a host of practices and rituals. This notion is 
helpful to capture this ‘embodied materiality of practices’. As Reckwitz put it: ‘when we 
learn a practice, we learn to be bodies in a certain way (and this means more than to ‘use our 
bodies’)’ (2002) The function of fantasy is thus to provide practices with direction and 
energy. Reckwitz’s notion of ‘learning to be bodies’ deeply resonates with Zizek’s statement: 
‘through fantasy, we learn how to desire’. When successfully installed, a fantasmatic 
narrative hooks the subject – via the enjoyment it procures – to a given or promised practice 
or order. An ideological fantasy is a narrative that conceals the contingency of practices by 
providing an image of fullness, on the one hand, and conjuring up threats and obstacles to its 
realization on the other. Thus, the notion of fantasmatic logic captures the extent to which a 
social practice can tap into the subject’s mode of enjoyment and fantasmatic frame (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007) It explains why subjects are gripped by a specific practice or regime. 
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Forms of transformation 
Based on this politico-affective account, transformation of a practice or regime of 
practices takes place at the level of norms (the socio-political contents of the fantasy) but also 
of the subject’s relation to that fantasy (his/er mode of enjoyment).  
To capture whether subjects are complicit or not with their own subjection, Glynos and 
Howarth introduces a distinction between the ethical and ideological pole of fantasmatic 
logic. To reproduce or transform themselves, hegemonic orders can first utilize the socio-
political reality. The social and political dimensions pertain to how actors engage with norms- 
either by reproducing dominant norms or by contesting them. Second, hegemonic order holds 
on through a specific ‘administration of enjoyment’ (Stavrakakis, 1999) and transformation 
occurs in the mode of enjoyment. The fantasmatic logic is divided between the ideological 
and the ethical dimensions which speak to the way actors cope with the contingency of social 
relations. When confronting, for instance, with the choice and adoption of a new technology, 
subjects’ confront the contingency of the social relations more directly than at other times.  
Glynos and Howarth capture the difference between two modes of enjoyment through 
the notion of authenticity, through which they aim to capture a subject’s openness to the 
contingent origin of social relations- the emergence of the new or the surprising. Thus, an 
authentic response is ethical and an inauthentic response is ideological. Dealing with notion 
of authenticity requires a complete immersion: the notion is used in IS by Schultze as a 
feature of high-calibre ethnography to demonstrate that the ethnographic researcher was 
indeed immersed in the field (2000). By inauthentic, Glynos and Howarth means that the 
subject is complicit in concealing the radical contingency of a practice. While ideological 
inflection may lead to political success by providing a powerful motivational energy, it often 
leads to disappointment because the outcome of this investment rarely encounters one’s 
fantasmatic expectations. At the other pole of the spectrum, political mobilization wherein a 
subject has already taken a detachment from its fantasy, is likely to be ‘long-standing, 
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dynamic and innovative’ (Glynos, 2008). Thus, Glynos and Howarth’s framework can be 
summarized as such:  
  Norms  
  Social  Political 
Modes of enjoyment  Ideological  Overinvestment Overinvestment  
Ethical  Authentic investment  Authentic investment  
Adapted from Glynos (2008) 
In Table 1, the socio-ideological axis characterizes a social practice which is deeply 
sedimented because routine and ideological closure are predominant. The political-
ideological axis depicts case where contestation occurs at the level of norms, providing an 
alternative fantasmatic content, but the subjects’ relation to fantasy remains stuck in the mode 
of overinvestment. The socio-ethical axis presents the case of a subject’s mode of enjoyment 
shifting in a way that does not disturb the existing social norms: e. g. the subject get a 
detachment with the fantasy sustaining his social reality. Finally, the politico-ethical axis 
presents the situation where the shift in one’s mode of enjoyment is accompanied by the 
public contestation of social norms (Glynos, 2008).  
Let us finally illustrate this issue with an example. Fit Coin is a new app that allows users 
to monetize their visits to the gym. The mechanism is simple: the app is incorporated with 
popular activity trackers and wearables, and converts our heartbeats into a digital currency. 
Fit Coin’s founders hope that this currency can be used to buy exclusive goods from partners 
such as Adidas or to lower your insurance payments: ‘what was previously done for pleasure 
or merely to conform to social norms is now firmly guided by the logic of the market. The 
other logics don’t disappear, but they become secondary to the monetary incentive.’ 
(Morozov, 2015). The ritual of paying through a virtual currency materializes the game 
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through which the imperative for performance and productivity is ensured. However, 
pleasure is not enough and what holds the users (at least, in the hopes of the designers of the 
app) is that this pleasure is oriented by the capitalist fantasy for performance and money 
making. Whether the user’s libidinal investment is authentic or not would need to be 
confirmed through rigorous data but it is likely this game mechanic would generate over-
investment on this new logic of the market, just for making money out of their performances, 
rather than for the genuine pleasure of engaging in healthy sport activity.    
*** 
 
At this stage, before addressing the context of this study and exemplify how a better 
integration of affect and ideology might illuminate studies at the crossroad between 
organization and information systems, it becomes urgent to recapitulate the theoretical 
contribution. Some readers might feel puzzled by how many theories are brought together 
and may legitimately question how do these theories speak with each other. I have dedicated 
a whole chapter to Lacan and the centrality of Lacanian theory in this thesis is hard to deny; 
he clearly is, as well as his concepts, derived from the clinic, the centre of gravity of the 
theoreticians I have mobilized, hence his importance in this thesis. But as I said in the end of 
Chapter 1, this thesis is also an interrogation of the genre of practice-based studies, as 
conceptualized by authors who see the notion not merely as level of analysis but as a literary 
genre of conducting ethnographic work (Nicolini, 2012). Thus, another common point 
between the authors I have mobilized is that subjectivity is their main concern; they all 
describe various variation of a subject theory, although there is not unified theory of the 
subject. More empirical work needs to be done to demonstrate the ethnographic evidence of a 
subject theory and this will be the core of the next parts. Again, I would like to underscore 
that it is probably too early to dismiss the practice imaginary from which this work 
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originates; therefore, it is probably better to let the readers judge to what extent practice and 
subject theorists may engage with each other.  However, before digging deeply this empirical 
avenue, I will now recapitulate in the following table the theoretical frameworks which I have 
mobilized so the reader can immediately grasp why they matter for the study technology in 
organizations: 
Grand theory Core notions Organization and 
information theory 
Core notions 
Lacan Imaginary/Symbolic/Real  
Logic of fantasy / jouissance 
Materiality of the signifier  
Braverman Deskilling technology  
Althusser Ideological materiality 
Interpellation 
Davis 
Venkatesh 
Technology Acceptance Model 
Zizek Ideological fantasy Simon Design science 
Badiou Courage and Anxiety 
Superego and Justice  
Subjectivation /subject-effect 
Subject as ‘destructive 
consistency’ 
Destruction of the Imaginary 
Burawoy Informal game-playing   
Production of consent   
The Essex 
School (Laclau, 
Stavrakakis, 
Glynos and 
Howarth) 
Logics (social, political, 
fantasmatic) 
Regime and practice divide  
Ethical and fantasmatic 
divide 
Logic of difference and 
equivalence  
Materiality of the signifier 
Orlikowski Duality of technology  
Technology-in-practice 
Sociomateriality 
Pluth Subject as interaction 
between sexuality and 
language  
Nicolini Practice as the site of knowing   
Practice theory  
Butler Materiality of the signifier 
Materiality of the signified 
Revision of the theory of 
interpellation 
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Chapter 4: Context of the Study  
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Taking the previous chapter into consideration, much is to be gained if we apply a subject-
based view of ideology to the study of technology in organizations. Firstly, I will show that 
there is a need for research questions that address IS phenomena through a poststructuralist 
lens. Secondly, I will offer virtual gaming as the most relevant topic through which to view 
these phenomena. In particular, I will explain how and why virtual worlds are places where 
jouissance (enjoyment) makes a difference. Following this, I will provide some background 
knowledge on virtual reality and serious gaming, and then focus on the pioneering case of 
Second Life. Thirdly, I will show why design in particular is crucial to this apparatus, and 
why it is the strategic context for observing ideology-in-action.  
A new research opportunity  
Given what we have seen thus far, it would appear that there is a need for more research 
on how ideology is embedded in the machine. My intention now is to consider technology-in-
practice as an ideological apparatus, and show why it is more relevant today than ever.  
Literature gaps  
My initial attempt thus far has been to move away from positivist studies, technological 
determinism and the design science perspective and to review the literature on interpretive 
information systems by identifying two major problems. Firstly, structuration studies seek to 
move beyond the dualism between technology and human actions and organizations. Yet 
these studies still highlight symbolic and structural activity, and they downgrade the 
emergent capacity of sites, objects, bodies and infrastructures to organize what we do. 
Constructionism has attempted to articulate the discursive and the material under the banner 
of socio-materiality. Yet the place of embodied materiality and identity performances, the 
force motivating the ritualization of everyday practices, is under-theorized in IS. I have 
identified a neglect of affect in the IS literature; it is addressed in an ad-hoc way by the 
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positivist, motivation-based literature and largely ignored by the constructivist stream. Put 
another way, this neglect is also ontological: what is missing is a proper theory of the subject, 
a set of conceptual tools designed to capture the materiality of subjective processes, how 
subjectivity and collective subjectivity shape what we do and how we organize our relation to 
the machine. I have therefore reviewed the literature on subject theory, drawing on the theory 
of ideology in order to capture this process at an individual and collective level. This led me 
to switch from a socio-material ontology to the materiality of the signifier; the focus is no 
longer on the relationship between humans and objects, but between discourse and sexuality. 
However, it is not enough to say that, as the sceptics will immediately accuse me of 
marginalizing objects once again, and of reducing the agency of tools and machines to mere 
linguistic effects. Therefore, the crucial question now is to show, empirically: where is the 
site where the effect of subjectivity is most evident? Where is the site where I can see the 
work of jouissance in technological matters?  
Research questions  
What does a so-called ‘negative ontology of lack’ add to the study of technology in 
organizations? What do kneeling down at a religious celebration, saying a prayer and giving a 
handshake have in common with technology design and use? Most information systems 
actually depend on their ritualization to function. What would become of Facebook if users 
did not add pictures, or like and comment on activities? How could Airbnb survive if users 
did not enact properly the good old ritual of hospitality? The success of information systems 
increasingly relies on reputation, rumours and reward systems, with users rating each other’s 
behaviours and commenting on each other’s activity. With the maturation of the cyber-
economy, the skills and art of producing a ritual become as important as the technology itself. 
What designers have in mind is not so much technological performance for themselves, but 
the adoption and diffusion of patterns of use.  
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From a subject-based perspective, the software (the code) is important, but it does not 
determine social interaction; information systems are both a material and a figure of 
discourse, both a cause and a performance. Information systems are infused with narratives, 
ideologies and values. While the code is, say, the DNA of the digital world, it is first and 
foremost a symbol, a metaphor, a convenient way to describe social identities (avatars) and 
social relationships in socially-meaningful ways. It is true that the code determines how the 
game-based software will appear, the interface, but its force is all relative to the voices from 
which it originates, voices which mobilize and are mobilized, through rhetoric and fiction, 
voices which are the primary source of our knowledge of the code. Even claims for technical 
fact and objectivity are in fact coloured by their subjective and polyphonic constitution.11  
I have marked a distance with the neo-materialist movement, which focuses on the agency 
of artifacts, and I have emphasized the materiality of individual and social performances such 
as rituals. Thus, my research questions are as follows: How do developers lead users to adopt 
their technologies and to enjoy their tools unquestionably? How do they manage to design 
pleasurable technology and why do they aim at producing enjoyment in the workplace? How 
do developers manage to turn work into play- without losing work? How do they imagine the 
users' feeling and how does it affect their decisions? Finally, how do game developers cope 
with the affective environment in serious organizations?   
Game design as paradigmatic case study   
In this section, I will explain why the design of virtual gaming is a particularly favourable 
place to study the role of affect and ideology in IS matters. 
                                                          
11
 This paradoxical form or irony reminds us that the knowledge captured by psychoanalysis, the objectivity of 
the subject, has the structure of a fiction or a joke (Zizek, 1989). A good example of this is provided by Jeffrey 
Eugenides, in his novel Middlesex, where the hero, an intersex man (hermaphrodite) of Greek origin, says: 
‘Pardon me if I get a little Homeric at times; that’s genetic too’. This irony captures the attempt of the novel to 
divest genetic and scientifically-valid explanations of their force through the power of speech of his first-
person author, a character who ultimately decides to become a boy when the doctor wanted to ‘fix’ his 
ambiguous genital condition by making him a girl. 
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In a sense, my empirical proposal here will equate to jumping into the lions' den. Game 
designers and programmers are probably the most fervent supporters of artificial intelligence 
and machine learning. They are now experts in the art of fooling the users, designing hyper-
realistic bots and virtualizing sexuality. Virtualization and game technologies increasingly 
transcend the traditional boundaries of their medium, as evidenced by the growth of serious 
and pervasive games as an industry and research field. Virtual worlds constitute an exemplary 
case of these new forms of social computing, forms which are moving far beyond their 
gaming origins with unanticipated implications for how we work, learn, interact, use the 
Internet, shop and play. This phenomenon is captured by the notion of gamification, which 
has been defined as the use of game design elements and game mechanics in non-game 
contexts (Dominguez et al. 2013).  
Virtual worlds have typically been described as equivocal technologies, since they are 
accompanied by multiple and conflicting interpretations (Berente et al. 2011). Equivocal 
technologies are marked by information which is incomplete or highly ambiguous (Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997). The ultimate value of the innovation is always uncertain, and the 
condition of its long-term value is established through an ongoing sense-making process 
which involves the designers of these environments, their residents, commentators in 
organizations, academia and the media. Virtualization tools are incomplete technologies, and 
their uptake and use is iterative and experimental (Dodgson et al. 2013). 
In this thesis I will, in three main chapters, show how the typical topics of IS (adoption, 
acceptance, inscription etc.) can be better explained by using my approach than was the case 
previously. Focusing on ‘things in the middle’ (Bauman 1991), such as, for instance, 
intersexual or transgender individuals (Butler, 1990; 2001), renders evident the ideology 
sustaining gender categories. My approach typically focuses on cases where the established 
meaning of technology is unclear, and where the definition of its identity may be contested. 
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Thus, gamification will be studied as it typically resists classification; the process of 
mattering, its object-identity is hybrid– are virtual environments designed for fun or serious 
applications? What does it mean to gamify work? What does gamification stand for? Is it 
innocent? Are we not crossing a line?  
The key strategic move vis-a-vis the realist tradition is to switch the focus from objectified 
phenomena, which are contextually bounded by self-contained cases, in a medical fashion, 
comparable to the doctor treating the patient, to problematized phenomena. According to 
Parker, clinical psychoanalysts refer to ‘cases’, yet they know there is no such thing as a 
‘case’ at all (2005), nor a patient to be cured. Subject theory is a one-off, each time new, a 
singular explanation. In addition, the theoretical framework is there to map the field and to 
provide an account of what the parameters might be; there is an impasse of formalization, in 
the sense that the researcher should always be ready to mutate in the face of each new ‘case’. 
Moreover, I argue that computer game design effectively symbolizes the work of 
technology in organizations. Computer game design functions as a metaphor for a whole 
class of cases manifesting the place of ideology in the diffusion of information systems. 
Gamification is particularly emblematic for any hegemonic project attempting to extend the 
power of technology beyond its own technical and contextual boundaries. In other words, 
game design is a perspicuous site to explore, in the sense that it constitutes what Flyvbjerg 
termed a ‘paradigmatic case’12 (2001: 80) which comes to embody, in an exemplary way, the 
operation of ideology in the adoption, acceptance and functioning of information systems. A 
‘Paradigmatic case’ aims to develop a metaphor or establish a school for the domain that the 
case concerns (2001), and it highlights more general characteristics of the societies under 
                                                          
12
 A typical example of a paradigmatic case is Geertz’s study of the ‘deep play’ of the Balinese cockfight, 
whereas Foucault focuses on Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’ in order to condense a system of disciplinary and 
surveillance mechanisms that materializes the logic of disciplinary in prison, hospitals, schools etc. (Foucault, 
1977: 200-9). 
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study. Although this selection has been made strategically, it is never possible to determine in 
advance whether a given case is paradigmatic, as this will need to be validated in a 
universally acceptable way.  
Finally, the game metaphor has frequently been used by social theorists when studying 
ideology and affect. The most significant account is probably Bourdieu’s theory of game, but 
Laclau and Mouffe (1987) also draw on the metaphor of football to describe their own 
discursive approach. In the positivist tradition of design science, motivational studies on 
emotions at work typically draw on computer games as a perspicuous setting (Malone, 
Venkatesh). In the field of poetry, Mallarmé’s ‘Throw of the dice’ materializes the 
experience of radical contingency, which is not to be addressed as a random combination, but 
a poetic work on language through which chance is conquered word by word. The famous 
coup de dé is precisely what the CEO of Delta, one of the organizations observed during my 
ethnographic work, in his jargon, would call a game mechanic.   
What I am really interested in is game mechanics, and one of the main things about games or 
game design is that they generate a lot of game mechanics and a game mechanic can be just the 
idea of rolling a dice and see if you get a six. It could also be the idea of having a skill, it could 
be the idea of having funny apparel, it could also be the idea of a pack of cards- it’s just way 
which you create a structure within the game to achieve some particular goal. (David, my 
emphasis) 
Let us pay attention to David’s words which define game mechanics as ‘the idea of rolling a 
dice and see if you get a six’. First of all, David ultimately defines the mechanics as an idea: 
‘the idea of rolling a dice’, ‘the idea of having a skill’, ‘the idea of a pack of cards’ etc. Then, 
through a sliding which is particular interest to us as social scientists, David connects this 
notion to that of structure. If game mechanics is just one way of creating a structure within 
the game, the central role of enjoyment in human affairs is now becoming clear.   
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Virtual worlds as the privileged site of enjoyment 
In this section, I will explain how and why virtual reality and serious gaming are places 
where social interaction and jouissance (enjoyment) make a difference. I will specifically 
address the role of avatars in displaying subjectivity, and then explore more specifically the 
case of SL.  
Virtual reality, virtual worlds and serious gaming  
Virtualization technologies’ status remains unclear and is always ambivalent between 
playfulness and productivity. Some definitional work and historical clues are required. In this 
chapter, my aim is to describe the different notions covered under the virtuality umbrella and 
to provide the reader with basic background knowledge and working definitions.  
According to Zyda, serious games inherit primarily from earlier work in the virtual reality 
(VR) community, whose developers themselves drew on the field of visual simulation, a 
synthesis of interactive 3D graphics and user interfaces, and developed progressively more 
open technologies as well as a science and language in the field of 3D environments (Zyda, 
2005). Historically, the first encounter of the video-game community, which deals explicitly 
with entertainment, with the field of virtual reality took place in 1997 with the publication of 
a report by the National Research Council, entitled ‘Modeling and Simulation – Linking 
Entertainment and Defense’13. Since then, the VR field has been constantly influenced by the 
video-game industry and, in its turn, it itself is now shaping the video-game industry, a two-
way relationship exemplified by the success of the Oculus Rift.  
                                                          
13
 An emblematic and widely-used serious game is America’s Army, an attempt to broaden first-person-
shooter game engine reuse to other domains. A US Army captain who was asked to evaluate the tool in 2002 
asserted that it had the potential to be a recruitment tool, but there ‘was insufficient fidelity in the game for it 
to be of any use in training’. However, a sergeant and enthusiastic gamer decided to deploy the game on his 
own initiative and to bypass the Army’s official training procedures and formal studies. The game was then 
repurposed within the Army as a training environment for mission rehearsal, intelligence skills training, first aid 
and survival training etc. There is here a potential for highly-immersive, addictive ‘first person education’, a 
play on the phrase ‘first person shooter’. 
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Where do serious games sit compared with virtual environments? One way to differentiate 
between serious games and the virtual world is in terms of what scope of action the user has 
in each system, and how varied, numerous and complex are their goals. In a serious game, the 
scope of action is very limited; the goals and rules are clearly formulated, scripted and 
singular. One possible working definition of serious gaming can be read thus:  
Serious game: a mental contest, played with a computer in accordance with specific rules, that 
uses entertainment to further government or corporate training, education, health, public policy, 
and strategy communication objectives. (Zyda, 2005: 26)  
Put simply, serious games are games that do not have entertainment, enjoyment or fun as 
their primary purpose.  
Virtual worlds constitute the most advanced and open form of virtual environment; their 
range of actions is almost limitless, and there are no explicit goals. For Boellstorff et al. 
(2012) virtual worlds feature four characteristics. First, they are places and have a sense of 
world-ness, unlike social networks such as Facebook or Instagram, although those platforms 
can contain virtual worlds within them through third-party applications, such as YoVille, 
.Friends, or Farm Town. Second, they are multi-user in nature. Third, they are persistent and 
continue to exist even as participants log off, which is not the case with first person shooters 
such as Counter Strike or Halo. Fourth, they allow participants to embody themselves, 
usually in the form of an avatar, so that they can explore and participate in the virtual worlds.  
According to Dodgson et al. (2013), many virtualization technologies emerge from the 
computer game industry and they are commonly associated with play, making their 
immediate connection to productivity and efficiency less obvious as compared to other 
information and communication tools, such as computer-aided design or management 
information systems. The military have used game-like simulations for years, but they are not 
the only sector to be interested in virtual simulations and games. Virtualization technologies 
are increasingly being recognized as important organizational tools (Nevo et al. 2011) and 
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have been used in areas such as medicine (Arvanitis 2006), the design and operation of city 
systems (Gann et al., 2011), and new product and service prototyping (Brown, 2003). 
Computer games are now present in various institutional fields such as government, 
education, corporations and healthcare, and are designed even for political, religious or 
artistic purposes (Abt, 2002).  
Virtual technologies have progressively gained legitimacy. For example, IBM was one of 
the major business actors among the early adopters of virtual worlds. The company has 
enjoyed periods of great success, for example following the introduction of the IBM 
System/360 mainframe computer in the 1960s and the personal computer in the 1980s, but it 
also experienced near-bankruptcy in the early 1990s. IBM’s bureaucratic culture impeded its 
ability to explore new fields and to adapt (Gerstner 2002). Such a culture would not easily 
embrace playfulness, and Dodgson et al. (2013) assume that the promotion of the concept of 
play happened closely in tandem with IBM’s revival. In particular, they explain how the 
connection between gaming and leadership was progressively legitimated in the 
organizational discourse of the company. In 2007, IBM published a GIO entitled ‘Virtual 
Worlds, Real Leaders’, raising questions about the skills leaders would need in work 
environments that are increasingly virtual and distributed. IBM couched its use of virtual 
worlds in terms of ‘encouraging play’. This was not without causing internal controversies: 
the resonance of play with distraction at work generated an initial reticence toward embracing 
virtual worlds in certain quarters in IBM (King, 2007). However, in 2008, the IBM Academy 
of Technology held its annual meeting as a virtual meeting, using Second Life and a number 
of other virtual communication technologies. 
In sum, the fields of virtual reality simulations and video-games have progressively 
merged and grown in ambition. Furthermore, they have now gained legitimacy among 
organizations. These new technologies have problematized the distinction between play and 
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utility. Given this increasing ambition, the work of game designers is becoming a crucial field 
to examine.  
Performances and jouissance in virtual worlds 
How does enjoyment come to be so central in virtual worlds? What role does enjoyment 
play in cyber culture? Which forms does it take? The way users perform enjoyable acts and 
interact with each other is through the presence of avatars.  
IS researchers investigating the use of virtual worlds lead us to understand users and their 
avatars not as online representation, but as subjectivity and ‘living force’ (Bardzell and 
Bardzell, 2008). The success of the tool depends on the dynamism of social interaction and 
the enjoyment it produces.  As Orlikowski and Schultze put it:  
The immersiveness of the virtual world (its graphical 3-Dness) is only actualized when users’ 
avatars perform physically and narratively. It is the performance of bodily practices such as 
walking, sitting, talking, etc. that gives places, objects and avatars substance. (2010: 10) 
For these authors, a performative perspective posits virtual worlds and serious games as 
practices enacted by designers and users who perform in these worlds through their doings, 
movements and interactions. Thus, Morningstar and Farmer, the developers of Habitat, argue 
that a virtual world ‘is defined more by the interactions among the actors within it, than by 
the technology with which it is implemented’ (1991: 274). Social interaction does indeed play 
a central role in many virtual worlds, rendering the richness of graphics less important. Thus, 
while early notions of virtual reality were driven by a technological fantasy of realism and 
total sensory immersion, it seems that the success and duration of a virtual world such as 
Second Life is more due to the robustness of social interaction and the consolidation of 
identity and rituals than any renderings of the world. 
Recently, ethnographic research on the topic of virtual world cultures has surfaced in order 
to explore this performative avenue (Boellstorff et al. 2012). In the 1990s, a number of 
themes emerged, such as: identity construction (Bruckman, 1992; Turkle, 1995; Suler, 1996); 
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gender (McRae, 1997; Kendall, 2002; Schaap, 2002); ethnicity and race (McDonogh, 1999; 
Nakamura, 2002); embodiment (Stone, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Sunden, 2003) and the forging of 
community through speech, narrative and social action (Kolko, 1995; Markham, 1998; 
Cherny, 1999). A second wave of ethnographic research studied virtual worlds as specific 
spaces of play, raising further questions of identity, role-play and social interaction 
(Jakobsson and Taylor, 2003; Mortensen, 2003; Copier, 2005).  
In addition, virtual worlds are a place where jouissance is particularly evident. In 
particular, role-play, identity performances and rituals enacted in virtual worlds are embodied 
through avatars14. Schultze is interested in the embodiment and presence in virtual worlds 
which are afforded by those avatars (2010). The physical body plays a key role in 
communication and is the primary site of identity with markers such as sex, race, age and 
social class: we are our bodies. Avatars are not mere objects manipulated by their human 
owners, but they are also subjects in a socio-cultural world of meaning (Wolfendale, 2007). 
Avatars offer the possibility of embodiment, enabling participants to engage in ‘practices of 
the body’ (Taylor 2002) which are either physical (sitting, gesturing, smiling and touching 
objects or people) or social (wearing fashionable clothing, behaving in a way that recognizes 
a community’s logic of power and status).  
Avatars or profiles constitute representations of the self through which people interact 
with data, systems and one another in a computer-mediated system (Schultze, 2010). Both 
war-game scenarios and participating in diversity training require the use of avatars. Video-
game characters in World of Warcraft15 are new ways for users to present themselves 
                                                          
14
 The users of virtual worlds are represented by an avatar, a Sanskrit word meaning ‘a god’s embodiment on 
Earth’. 
15
 An emblematic multi-player online game directly inspired by fantasy imaginary is World of Warcraft, 
launched in 2004. Participants adventured in a medieval fantasy-themed world, slaying monsters, practising 
crafts and trading at an auction house. Activities such as raiding and fighting battles require communication 
and social interaction through text chat and voice. World of Warcraft includes game activities such as theory 
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rhetorically, to give an image of the self. Thus, Bardzell and Bardzell refer to the rhetorical 
dimension of avatars in the sense that people present themselves in a particular way. As a 
result, avatars are poor as literal representations of users, yet rich as performed expression of 
how users perceive themselves (2008). Culturally, it is worth noticing that this notion of 
avatar draws on the imaginary of role-playing games in the 90’s, such as multi-user dungeons 
in which avatars were textual representation of the self (Bardzell and Bardzell, 2008).  
Science-fiction and fantasy literature played a key role in shaping the cultural, affective 
and imaginary background of early online games and virtual worlds: they organized the 
jouissance of the users according to conventions derived from the video-game industry, role-
playing games and heroic fantasy literature.16 Furthermore, sexual imaginary plays a crucial 
role in producing jouissance in virtual worlds. In their account of the practice of 
sadomasochism in Second Life, Bardzell and Bardzell (2007) argue that this experience is 
different to mere pornographic observation in that users typically identify themselves with 
their avatars. The first time one’s avatar is chained by another without explicit consent, users 
report having experienced a sense of thrill or shock.  
The case of Second life  
Success  
Virtual worlds are not just about digital characters interacting with each other in a virtual 
environment. They also offer alternative means to communicate, collaborate and organize 
economic activities. Second Life (SL) is probably the most accomplished experimentation 
thus far.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
crafting (the mathematical analysis of game mechanics), modding (the creation and distribution of player-
created software extensions to the game, widely downloaded and used by players) and machinima (videos of 
edited recordings of game action). It also involves the writing of game guides and lively discourses about the 
game on blogs, forums, wikis and social networking sites. 
16
 Classic references in the fantasy literature include The Hobbit (Tolkien, 1937), The Lord of the Rings (Tolkien, 
1954) or the Conan series (Howard, 1932). 
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SL is owned and operated by Linden Labs, which is backed by a number of prominent US 
venture capitalists, including Benchmark Capital and Mitch Kapoor, the founder of Lotus and 
inventor of the spreadsheet. Users could initially obtain $9.99 monthly accounts, but after 
June 2006 it became possible to obtain an account for free. The enjoyment of designing is at 
the core of Linden Lab’s success on SL. Residents were able to, for the first time, shape the 
world around them, particularly their virtual property, which is located on simulators (or 
sims). They were able to write code to manipulate the environment, trade objects and land, 
design or purchase their own clothes, participate in group activities, work, explore, play and 
interact socially (Messinger et al., 2009).  
SL was deliberately incomplete, not a fully formed environment; the aim was to let people 
create things. Progressively, Linden Lab changed the focus to move towards more pre-built 
environments - so you go on SL and have things to do, but you do not have to create them, 
which is less interesting from the purist’s perspective. Furthermore, Second Life has been 
progressively ‘colonized’ by the corporate world. Developed initially as social places for 
personal enjoyment and relaxation, virtual worlds have attracted investment from companies 
such as Dell, Cisco Systems, Xerox and Nissan, creating their in-world storefronts and 
thereby demonstrating a desire to understand the value these environments may offer (Ives 
and Junglas, 2008).  
In Second Life there is a whole industry of independent designers creating new body 
shapes, clothes and accessories and selling them to users. SL’s interactive technology lets 
participants create virtual objects such as clothes or storefronts from scratch using building 
blocks known as prims, similar to Lego pieces. The trading of user-created contents is 
regulated by a system of property-rights policies (e. g. a system of protection regarding the 
replication of objects, devised by the creators of objects). Furthermore, SL features its own 
monetary system and virtual currency, the Linden dollar, which can be bought and sold for 
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real currency. In early 2007, the Linden dollar traded at about L$270 per $1 US$ (Green, 
2006; Hof, 2006). In 2007, Linden Labs estimated that virtual characters exchanged an 
average of $1,700,000 worth of transactions every day on Second Life (Bray and Konsysnki, 
2007).  
The existence of virtual currencies paves the way for the proliferation of real-world 
businesses within the virtual economy. SL is emblematic but not unique, as other virtual 
worlds also incorporate their own virtual currency. For example, Entropia Universe includes 
a virtual currency which is fixed (exchanging at 10 PED to 1 US$ in 2007) and is not floated, 
in contrast with the Linden Dollar. Another virtual world called Cyworld includes a virtual 
currency called ‘dotori’; virtual participants are encouraged to use their currency to purchase 
(mostly time-limited) virtual items such as clothing, decorations, musical instruments, songs, 
videos and other entertainment goods for their digital avatars. Cyworld includes 25% of the 
total population of South Korea as registered participants, with an average of 20 million daily 
visitors. Cyworld’s revenue was estimated to be around $300,000 per day in 2005 (Bray and 
Konsysnki, 2007). 
A good example of successful inter-world businesses, combining real-world and virtual 
world activities, is Weber Studio. Aimee Weber, a designer and artist, and her staff design 
and sell virtual products at locations on Second Life for real-world businesses that want to 
use SL for marketing, business, education etc. Their clients include the United Nations, the 
American Cancer Society, American Apparel and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. The studio has also designed a virtual line of clothing for virtual avatars. 
Other success stories include Anshe Chung, a resident who became the first millionaire in 
Second Life (in real US$). Anshe began with small-scale purchases of virtual real estate 
which she developed with landscaping and themed architectural builds for rental and resale. 
Her operations have since grown to include the development and sale of properties for real 
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world corporations, and have led to a real life corporation called Anshe Chung Studios, which 
develops immersive 3D environments for applications ranging from education to business 
conferencing and product prototyping (Business Week, 2006).  
According to Linden Lab (2013), by 2013 Second Life had approximately 1 million 
monthly users and 1.2 million daily transactions in virtual goods. The total transactions 
among users for virtual goods within the Second Life economy have now reached 3.2 billion 
dollars (USD). Yet this success remains relative, given the ambition and potential of the 
project. What are the reasons for the relative decline and strange second life of Second Life?  
Decline 
Second Life was publicly launched in 2003. By the end of 2008, SL had not met the 
expectations produced by the hype, and the corporations’ virtual storefronts were largely 
abandoned, and eventually Second Life’s growth slowed. How should we interpret this 
relative decline?  
This decline can be explained at a subjective rather than a statistical level, psychically yet 
also in economic terms. As noted by Dibbell17, in spite of this abandonment, the world keeps 
generating some activity, albeit far from the initial prediction of Newsweek (2007) that, by 
2011, four of every five people who use the Internet would be actively participating in SL or 
some similar medium. Linden Lab failed to reach the owner’s ambition to make a 3D Web in 
the vein of the Metaverse18 of Neal Stephenson’s ‘Snow Crash’ or other science-fiction 
                                                          
17
 800,000 monthly active users who generate more than $80 million a year, according to the latest estimates 
(Dibbell, 2010). A more recent anniversary infographic says that Second Life has overall amassed 36 million 
registered users, as well as more than 400,000 new accounts per month and ‘a million monthly-active users’ 
according to Linden CEO, Rod Humble. Those users typically rack up 1.2 million virtual goods transactions per 
day and have accounted for $3.2 billion worth of transactions over the life of the game. (Gamespot, 2013) 
18
 The term was coined in Neal Stephenson's 1992 cyberpunk science fiction novel Snow Crash, where humans, 
as avatars, interact with each other and software agents in a virtual reality-based successor to the Internet 
that uses the metaphor of the real world. For many virtual-world developers, both within and outside Linden 
Lab, it had become a given that one day we would all experience such a parallel, persistent, shared, 3D virtual 
and immersive world of concrete data, in which our bodies would move with the speed of consciousness, and 
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influences.19 A key reason for SL’s failure to go mass market is that they ignored what the 
overwhelming majority of the users were actually doing in SL, namely primarily using it for 
playful social activity such as roleplaying, virtual fashion, collaborative sandbox building and 
virtual sex.  
Dibbell asserts that playing is the human impulse at the origin of SL’s raison d’être, and 
not the utility that its creators were aiming for: 
Dressing up. Flirting. Philandering. Playing records. Playing house. Building castles and 
curiosities out of endlessly editable virtual objects (‘like the building blocks you had as a kid,’ 
one Life 2.0 protagonist tells us). Second Life as it is really lived doesn’t even gesture toward 
the broad utility its creators aimed for. It’s not the promise of the metaverse. It’s just a lot of 
people giving rein to one form or another of a basic human impulse: playing. (Dibbell, 2010) 
It was after opening a gap by empowering the users and the enjoyment of programming 
that the SL phenomenon suddenly emerged. Then, Linden Lab has progressively restored a 
more familiar fantasy of game, relying on directives and scripted tasks, thereby diminishing 
its power of innovation. As always, the problem pertains to the institutionalization of 
enjoyment: what purpose does this generation of enjoyment serve? Does the 
institutionalization suppress its necessary transgressive aspects? In any case, SL has failed to 
manage its transition from an exciting transgressive world into an institutionalized and 
mainstream environment.  
Linden Lab probably underestimated the non-intentional dimension, the opportunity for 
the users to co-create the world, to express their subjectivity without following a pre-written 
scenario. Gamification seems to be a winner, but when jouissance becomes an injunction, it 
betrays its promises, and is consequently abandoned. In contrast with Dibbell, I would argue 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
where much of our productive activity would take place (Dibbell 2010). The word ‘metaverse’ is a portmanteau 
of the prefix "meta" (meaning "beyond") and "universe". 
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 Similar metaphors include William Gibson’s “cyberspace” novels, the Wachowski brothers’ Matrix movies 
and the ethereal computerized realms of the 1982 Disney classic Tron. 
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that Linden Lab has not neglected the principle of gaming, but they have taken its imaginary 
too far, towards a disciplining version of gaming which forces their users to enjoy. Lacanian 
theory warns that one should be very sceptical about any social system that inscribes 
progress, growth or fun as the most advanced accomplishments into its discourse (Nobus 
2013). Thus, the failure of SL can be related to an unbalanced psychic economy where 
enjoyment is administrated without balancing its gains and losses.  
Virtual worlds are systems which need to be constantly rebuilt upon the foundations of 
incompleteness in which the hierarchical authority of the developers over the users’ 
enjoyment is balanced against a libertarian, open and communal culture of exchange.   
Game design and gamified IS  
Understanding the users’ experience of video games has itself become a substantial topic 
in the field of HCI (Human-Computer Interaction). What is game design? What are the skills 
and the art of generating persuasion and enjoyment? 
Zyda (2005) describes game design as a nexus of design, art and programming. The design 
team crafts the story, the game’s genre, style and component and the pedagogy of the game, 
all of which compose the cognitive frame of the game. Programmers build the infrastructure 
of the system and develop the code that runs the interface features, networking, scoring 
systems, AI scripting, game engine changes etc. The art team deal with the graphics, the 
game’s look and feel, by developing the immersive experience that engages the players’ 
emotions at a visceral level. They seek to create technologies that engage the game player’s 
mind via sensory stimulation, as well by adopting methods and tools to increase the sense of 
presence, such as computer graphics, sounds and haptics. The practice of game design can 
thus be summarized through three core aspects: infrastructure (technology structure), 
immersion (affective dimension) and content (imaginary dimension) as summarized in Figure 
3, below:  
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Figure 3. The art of game design 
 
 
Existing approaches have focused on how the design and governance of virtual worlds 
affect the social interaction within them (Mnookin 1996; O’Rourke 1998; Pargman 2000; 
Kendall 2002; Lastowka and Hunter 2004; Grimmelmann 2006; Balkin and Noveck 2006; 
Taylor, 2006b; Duranske 2008; Burk 2010 and Lastowka 2010). In addition, organizational 
ethnographies of the companies that create virtual worlds have already been conducted 
(Malaby 2009). Serious games also feature in their design an element of pedagogy, a sense of 
developing activities that educate or instruct. By mobilizing the enjoyment of the users, 
gamified projects affect subjects in a profound way. This research needs to address gamified 
systems as dynamic, open-ended apparatuses of bodily production, not as merely fixed and 
rule-based entities.  
Researchers have been developing methods and heuristics for the usability or playability 
of games (Bernhaupt, 2010; Sweetser and Wyeth, 2005). Thus, video games and aspects of 
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games have been studied in terms of their potential as persuasive tools which shape user 
behaviour in the directions intended by the system designer (Deterding, 2012; Lockton et al. 
2010) or to instil embedded values (Barr et al., 2007). Chen and Michael (2006) underscore 
that, although the expression ‘serious games’ may appear initially to be an oxymoron, there is 
no contradiction here: ‘not only are education and entertainment not in conflict, but there are 
many places where the two overlap and where each side can use the tools of the other to 
achieve their goals’. A growing body of research points to how constituted bodies of 
knowledge in game design patterns and game play experience can potentially be transferred 
to ’alien’ social contexts and the design of gamified information systems (Deterding et al., 
2011; Deterding, 2014). 
Designers of social software systems have employed aspects of gamification to incentivize 
repeat usage, increase contributions and to establish users’ reputations. Such incentives 
include points, badges and levelling that can help the player advance in status. In the 
workplace, game systems have been employed to collect information about employees or 
customers and to incentivize the employees’ contribution within the enterprise’s social 
software. Ultimately, gamification aims to create a sense of playfulness in non-game 
environments so that participation becomes enjoyable and desirable (Thom et al., 2012). Such 
design patterns have isomorphic counterparts in other domains that pre-existed gamification. 
Thus, existing popular applications such as LinkedIn or OKCupid which use goal-setting and 
quantitative feedback, have been retroactively associated with games by the gamification 
literature, although it is far from certain whether their designers were intentionally taking 
inspiration from games. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology used for data 
collection and analysis 
  
126 
 
In the following chapter, I will articulate my subject-based ontology with the particular 
methodological concerns which social scientists, when conducting ethnographies in 
organizations, have to face. I will begin by raising the problem of the ‘poststructuralist 
methodological deficit’ identified by Zienkowski (2012: 504). I will address the difficulties 
associated with the translation of Lacanian theory from the clinic to the study of 
organizational discourse and practice. Finally, the main point of this methodology section 
will be to give this concern regarding empirical deficit a twist. What if the multiplication of 
methods misses the point? Content analysis, surveys and statistical models can measure 
precisely what occurs in the data, yet they turn out to be powerless when one seeks to capture 
that which is missing from the data but however keeps structuring them in a way that 
produces excessive material effects.  
Design 
Overcoming the poststructuralist deficit 
The positivist belief in scientific validity tends to highlight the importance of method, 
clarity and order over chaos, ambivalence and absence. In this section, I would like to stress 
the risk of replacing the transformative power of speech (Parker, 2015) with an interpretive 
grid.  
As Jacob Torfing famously put it, in their attempt to differentiate themselves from the 
positivist approach to social phenomena: ‘discourse theorists have thrown the methodological 
baby out with the epistemological bath water’ (Torfing, 2005). Torfing invites discourse 
theorists to ‘critically reflect upon the questions of method and research strategy’ (Torfing, 
2005: 25). Structuralist and post-structuralist thinking is reduced by orthodox Marxists, 
positivists, critical realists or actor-network-theorists to a fashionable form of linguistic 
idealism, naively fascinated by the ‘free play of signifiers’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 125) 
and abstractly disconnected from the realm of materiality. This may be because there are 
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actually very few texts in the poststructuralist tradition that tackle the question of method, 
and the LCE framework is one way to address this lacuna. Glynos and Howarth present their 
approach as an attempt to address this methodological challenge: ‘as there are very few texts 
in the post-structuralist tradition that tackle the question of method and the nature of 
explanation in a sustained and philosophical way, we see our book as helping to fill this gap.’ 
(2007: 6) 
However, the methodological contribution of the book remains stated at a quite general 
level. In fact, the distinction between theory and method is disqualified by most Essex 
authors. Moreover, Zienkowski stresses the scarcity of case studies that explicitly discuss and 
illustrate the way post-structuralist notions such as empty signifiers, logic or nodal points can 
be identified and analysed empirically (2012). The lack of methodological discussion is 
particularly pregnant in the Essex Literature (Laclau, 1996; Howarth et al., 2000; Howarth 
and Torfing, 2005). In addition, the logics approach does not fully hold its methodological 
promise, as Zienkowski explains: ‘In spite of the fact that the logics approach to discourse, 
subjectivity and society constitutes an elaborate theoretical framework for analysis, it does 
not provide a heuristic for dealing with empirical data.’ (2012) What Glynos and Howarth 
propose is rather an ontological stance and grammar of concepts in order to articulate 
empirical problems with existing methods and instruments, which enables one to construct 
and furnish answers to empirical problems without falling into methodological arbitrariness, 
historical particularism and idealism.  
The first point of method here is to critically address the methodological imaginary, a 
fallacy which leads researchers to take the means for the end, without considering the 
ontological grounding of their study. In a provocative opus entitled After Method: Mess in 
Social Science Research, John Law contests the methodological instinct to clean up 
complexity and to tell straightforward stories. Doing so leads us to exclude descriptions that 
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are faithful to experiences of mess, ambivalence, elusiveness and multiplicity (Law, 2004). 
Law praises the selective nature of methods, and invites the presentation of alternative forms 
that acknowledge the researcher’s agency as a constructor of reality, and do not hide 
themselves between methods conceptualized as technique. In sum, according to Law and 
Urry (2004), methods in social science are constitutive rather than reflective of social reality. 
With a certain sense of provocation, Law reminds us that methods are the means and not the 
end of scientific research projects. 
In contrast, my aim in this thesis is to restore the leftovers of rationalist approaches, and 
bring to the surface ambivalent phenomena that the methodological instinct would exclude. 
The Lacanian corpus is well-equipped to address those deadlocks of perspective (Parker 
2010), and this methodology involves identifying those objects which precisely resist 
classification. Lacanian theory studies emotional language not in codifying affective realm by 
naming emotions, as some behaviourists do, but in acknowledging the ambiguity and 
singularity of certain emotions20. The Real operates at a point of trauma or shock that is 
rapidly covered over in order that it can be spoken of. Fixation around the meaning attributed 
to this trauma can have fundamental structuring impact on who we are and how we act. For 
example, what does gender signify? How does closure around this meaning affect our sexual 
or work behaviours? For this type of question, neither grounded theory nor hypothesis testing 
can help. As Nobus puts it, Lacanian theory is not about gains, benefits, acquisitions, yields, 
returns, dividends and credits, but is rather a theory of lack, loss, waste, deficits, debits, costs 
                                                          
20
 The novelist Jeffrey Eugenides does not say anything else in the following extract of Middlesex: ‘Emotions, in 
my experience, aren't covered by single words. I don't believe in "sadness," "joy," or "regret." Maybe the best 
proof that the language is patriarchal is that it oversimplifies feeling. I'd like to have at my disposal 
complicated hybrid emotions, Germanic train-car constructions like, say, "the happiness that attends disaster." 
Or: "the disappointment of sleeping with one's fantasy." I'd like to show how "intimations of mortality brought 
on by aging family members" connects with "the hatred of mirrors that begins in middle age." I'd like to have a 
word for "the sadness inspired by failing restaurants" as well as for "the excitement of getting a room with a 
minibar." I've never had the right words to describe my life, and now that I've entered my story, I need them 
more than ever.’ 
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and perditions. Are the methods themselves not inherently incomplete, deficient, lacking? I 
will suggest here, with a deliberate mischievousness, that the methodological deficit is not the 
limitation but precisely the seductive strategy of a post-structural approach, which seeks to 
highlight the gaps and the holes in the text, rather than multiplying the exterior signs of 
scientificity.  
Ethnography as a social science methodology  
Ethnographic research deals with the understanding of cultural contexts and thereby 
differs from the positivist account of social phenomena. In the next section, I will define and 
review different traditions of ethnography and examine how they have variously been 
deployed.  
This thesis is a contribution to the field of qualitative research, not in the sense of a greater 
reliance on interviews but through its ability to focus on actual practice in situ, looking at 
how organizations are routinely enacted (Silverman, 1998). In fact, ethnography21 cannot be 
understood, as a method, as part of the same categorical set as ‘interview’, ‘survey’, and so 
on. As Boellstorff et al. (2012) argue, referring to the Greek etymology of the word (ethnos 
‘people’, graphein ‘writing’), ethnography is ‘the written product of a palette of methods, but 
also a methodological approach in which participant observation is a critical element, and in 
which research is guided by experience unfolding in the field.’ In other words, it makes no 
sense to dismiss ethnography for it is a qualitative methods stricto sensu as qualitative and 
quantitative data can productively interact. For instance, sociologists from the Chicago 
School associated with Robert E. Park or Ernest W. Burgess drew on qualitative data 
(participant observation, interviews, mapping and diaries) in tandem with quantitative data 
                                                          
21
 The term grew out of disillusionment with the Enlightenment, and was coined in 1767 by Johan Friedrich 
Schöpperlin in the context of German Romanticism (Vermeulen 2008: 276). Ethnography is historically pitted 
against ‘encyclopedias’, which capture the Enlightenment ideals of standardization of all human knowledge, an 
opposition which precedes the one between the generalizable laws of positivism and the situated and detailed 
accounts which characterize ethnographies (Boellstorff et al. 2012). 
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such as census information. It is perfectly acceptable to use surveys or statistics to enhance 
the understanding of a phenomenon, although the use of sophisticated statistical modelling is 
not needed.  
A first key element of ethnography is participation. A founding figure of anthropology, 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), argued that the final aim of participation was to ‘grasp 
the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world’ 
(1922/1961:25). This view of the ethnographer going native was subsequently challenged by 
another influential ethnographer, Clifford Geertz, who chose to focus on hermeneutics:  
the ethnographer does not, and in my opinion, largely cannot perceive what his informants 
perceive. What he perceives – and that uncertainly enough – is what they perceive ‘with’, or ‘by 
means’, or ‘through’ or whatever word one may choose (Geertz, 1976/1979: 228).  
In other words, for Geertz, ethnography is about ‘searching out and analysing the symbolic 
forms – words, images, institutions, behaviours – in terms of which, in each case, people 
actually represent themselves to themselves and to one another’ (Geertz, 1976/1979, p. 228). 
For Geertz, ethnography studies the symbol systems of the informants.  
A second key element is the issue of observation. Geertz introduces the key concept of 
‘thick description’, referring to the account of behaviour which provides rich context. The 
strength of Geertz’s notion is to recognize that field notes are not a literal record but an 
interpretation (). Geertz borrows this notion from Gilbert Ryle and his story of three boys 
rapidly contracting the eyelids of their right eyes for different reasons, ‘involuntary twitch’, 
‘conspiratorial signal to a friend’ and in the third case as  a parody of the first boy. Ryle 
contrasts a ‘thin description’, which would consider these three contractions of eyelids as 
constituting the same move, with a ‘thick description’, which would account for different 
meanings. In Geertz’s words, the ‘object of ethnography’ is thus ‘a stratified hierarchy of 
meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of 
parodies are produced, perceived, and interpreted’ (Geertz, 1973:7). By highlighting the 
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mediation of interpretation, Geertz distances himself from the Anglo-American genre’s 
convention of ethnographic realism (as with Malinowski, Firth and Evans-Pritchard).  
Topics that ethnography seeks to understand are social processes, which do not lend 
themselves to the expression of testable hypotheses such as: identity, motivation, feelings or 
dream in the field of psychology; practices, rituals and beliefs in anthropology and sociology 
or ideologies, political events and historical trajectories in political science. In the early 
1990s, ethnographers collaborated with system developers, with a more particular emphasis 
on the areas of communication and computer science sub-disciplines, including human-
computer interaction, computer-supported collaborative work, computer-supported 
collaborative learning and ubiquitous computing. It has also been carried out in the more 
specific fields of social media and game studies (Boellstorff et al., 2012).  
In fact, the political nature of ethnographic work is hard to deny. The ethnographer as 
activist immerses him/herself into a multidimensional field and shifts in role and relationships 
between different sites following a personal trajectory of engagement (Hine, 2007). One 
original aim of anthropology is to legitimize ‘native’ culture; ethnographers from the Chicago 
School contribute, for example, to ‘giving voice to populations whose perspectives were 
ignored by institutions shaping their lives’ (Katz and Csordas, 2003: 280). The multi-sited 
ethnographer seeks out resonances among heterogeneous audiences such as peers, policy 
makers, funders, bosses and research contacts, people for whom the study will be recognized 
as having an adequacy to connect with their concerns. According to Boellstorff et al. (2012), 
ethnographers take part in the making of history and do not stand outside the trajectory of 
technology and the definition of what it is.  
Conducting case studies from a subject-based perspective  
In the next section, I will connect the post-structural form of ethnography that I am 
conducting to the tradition of case study in the STS and IS literature. More precisely, I will 
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eschew the natural scientific and hermeneutic models and propose a specific form of critical 
approach.  
Various case-study approaches  
There is an established (1) positivist case study tradition in the academic field of 
management of information systems (Benbasat, et al., 1987). Importantly, according to this 
tradition, the meaning of the word ‘scientific’ is the one embodied in the ‘natural science 
model’ which is widely accepted and legitimate among management researchers (Lee, 1989). 
The natural science model is primarily a model for testing theories, and is not intended for 
formulating theories. Finally, the use of words such as ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ implies the 
existence of an objective reality independent of social reality and the subject-independence of 
causality. In contrast, (2) interpretative case studies deal with the social construction of 
reality. According to Myers (2013), interpretive case studies typically attempt to understand 
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them. Broadly speaking, interpretative 
case studies define quality in terms of the plausibility of the story and the overall argument. 
Critical case studies add an element of (3) critical reflection on current practices and 
challenge taken-for-granted assumptions (Myers, 2013), although they share some 
similarities with interpretive research. Critical case studies typically consider the complex 
relationships between human interests, knowledge, power and the forms of social control that 
prevail in communities of assumptions. Some types of critical theory suggest individual 
emancipation and/or improvements in society. The critique of the status quo and a particular 
ethical stance mobilize the theories of critical theorists.  
Multiple Sites and Comparative methods  
Positivist researchers elaborate on the benefits of comparison when seeking replicability. 
From their perspective, theoretical sampling should aim to select cases which are likely to 
replicate or extend the emergent theory. For positivist researchers, numbers matter; therefore, 
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Eisenhardt suggests a figure of between 4 and 10 cases, albeit it in a rather arbitrary way, 
apparently guided by pragmatic (realistic) considerations, rather than scientific ones.  
In the interpretive field, studies have emerged that move beyond single sites and remain 
ambivalent about relevant locations. This has been called the ‘crisis of ethnography’, a shift 
from a traditional ontology where the object is bounded and integrated to a new ontology in 
which the object is dynamic and contested (Hine, 2000). Star specifically called for the more 
specific study of ‘infrastructures’, increasing the scope of ethnographic research beyond a 
singular event:  
Study an information system and neglect its standards, wires, and settings, and you miss equally 
essential aspects of aesthetics, justice, and change. Perhaps if we stopped thinking of computers 
as information highways and began to think of them more modestly as symbolic sewers, this 
realm would open up a bit. (Leigh-Star, 1999: 375) 
A multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; 1998) proves to be particularly relevant to 
address the circulation of objects, meanings and identities in time-space. Multi-sitedness no 
longer presupposes a preconceived system or context, but highlights the links between sites in 
order to trace the connections between them, rather than accepting field boundaries. As Hine 
puts it, there are many enactments or manifestations of what a given technology is and how it 
is bounded (2007). An iconic example of multi-sited sensitivity in the field of STS is the 
Zimbabwe bush pump, described by Laet and Mol as: ‘a mechanical object, it is a hydraulic 
system, but it is also a device installed by the community, a health promoter and a nation-
building apparatus.’ (2000: 252). This description shows how the bush pump is variably 
defined, with each definition relying on a highly contextual judgment. Where to start and 
where to stop in studying the identity of a technology cannot be anticipated. As Hine puts it 
with regard to the above example: ‘Had they set out with a defined idea of what the 
technology was, they would not have found what they did.’ The success of the bush pump, as 
well as any technology diffusion, is its fluidity. Researchers, rather than planning in advance 
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which sites to explore, should therefore engage with particular situations and follow the trails 
that they offer (Hine, 2007).  
From a perspective cashed out in terms of the logics of critical explanation, case studies 
are best used when articulated with comparative methods as part of an overall research 
strategy22. Case studies neither constitute the basis for the generation of hypotheses, nor are 
they self-sufficient entities that speak for themselves:  
Eschewing the extremes of ‘frictionless’ comparison (pure universality) and the impossibility of 
comparison (pure particularity), we develop a grammar of concepts and logics that enable the 
practice of comparison to be conducted and understood more broadly as a way to cast different 
perspectives on a problematized phenomenon. (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 207)  
In contrast with positivist multiple case studies collecting data from ‘large-n’ comparative 
studies, comparative research cannot short-circuit the concrete specificity of each case within 
particular historical contexts. Even when one seeks to identify similarities or common 
features between groups or various systems, one cannot bypass thick descriptions, including 
contextualized self-interpretations. Thus, comparison between cases is important in order to 
render the unfamiliar familiar and, conversely, in de-familiarizing the familiar by exposing 
invested presuppositions (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). The novelty of Glynos’ and 
Howarth’s framework is to aim at ‘the construction of a singular explanation of a 
problematized phenomenon’ (ibid: 208). A critical intervention is a one-off in the sense that 
the researcher is also a performer and his speech marks his audience, who are also subjected 
to the logical time of desire. The relevance of such an approach does not rely on the 
robustness of the methodological apparatus, but on the scientificity of the problematisation 
itself (Howarth 2005, Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). Finding links, gaining access to the 
                                                          
22
 The word ‘strategy’ is preferred to ‘methodology’ when designing a research agenda, as the term 
‘methodology’ connotes the search for clarity and neutrality, in the positivist fashion, an independence vis-à-
vis theory, whereas strategy better stresses the ontological and political presuppositions framing the logics’ 
approach (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) 
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field and recording and collecting data constitute active parts of the problematisation 
procedure, which follows its own logical chronology:  
From the discovery and the description of the problem, to the ethico-critical exploration of 
different possible political answers to the problem and finally to the necessary persuasion of a 
scholarly society or the respective society at large in relation to one’s account about the problem 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 208)  
In other words, this approach acknowledges the role self-reflexivity as a method in the 
practices of problematizing, analyzing, writing, and persuading - a process called 
‘retroduction’, which I will discuss in the next section. 
Sites explored during my fieldwork  
Site A:  
Delta Limited specialize in delivering innovative solutions in immersive learning, visual 
analytics, building visualizations and creating interactive virtual personalities (chatbots). 
Delta's national and international clients range from the private sector to central and local 
government, education, public safety and health, including the Ministry of Defence, the City 
of New York, Birmingham City Council and almost two dozen universities in the UK and 
abroad. Founded in 2004, Delta are based at Birmingham Science Park, Aston, in 
Birmingham UK, and they are members of Intellect, the Trade Association for the UK 
Technology Industry. I conducted firstly a 4-month ethnography (from October 2012 to 
January 2013) in a start-up (10 employees) at the Birmingham Science Park. The company 
specialize in immersive learning and training systems, built environment visualizations and 
data visualizations. Their immersive 3D-based solutions help organizations enhance and 
improve their business. On a daily basis I followed the design of a 3D data visualization tool 
mobilizing game technologies, the design of 3D Psychology Simulations run at Bachelor 
level at the University in Second Life and 3D Skiddaw- a simulated 3D environment 
reproducing Mountain Skiddaw for training PhD students and researchers in geology, 
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including the opportunity to pick hand samples linked to a virtual microscope, and I also had 
the chance to study rocks. As the picture below shows, Delta are also present on Second Life: 
Picture 1. Delta’s office on Second Life.  
 
During this ethnography, the use of game technologies for issues such as data science and 
data visualization was regularly discussed.  
Site B:  
I then conducted a second 6-month ethnography (from March to August 2013) shadowing 
collaborative projects taking place at the Coventry Innovation Village involving start-ups 
creating serious games and immersive role play simulations, as well as additional supporting 
learning technologies such as mobile apps and social learning networks.  
Gamma provide a comprehensive package of solutions to develop effective and engaging 
eLearning. As an eLearning provider, Gamma are committed to assisting their clients in 
succeeding in their goals and objectives. Through a series of innovative technologies, 
services and experience, Gamma work with their clients to build an enhanced learning 
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experience. They offer a whole list of solutions ranging from bespoke course creation, off the 
shelf e-courses, hosting, face-to-face training and access to their unique Learner Management 
Systems (LMS) to help clients to manage learners, with no programming skills required.  
Totem are developers of award-winning serious games and simulations as well as 
training simulations. Totem are industry leading experts in game-based learning for the 
corporate training and education sectors. Totem’s approach design blends learning solutions 
from the ground up to ensure they meet learners’ needs when it matters most. Totem’s blend 
includes: pre-assessment, mobile, serious games and social and e-learning, which are aimed 
at creating wider adoption, increasing engagement and reinforcing learning.  
Site C:   
In August 2013, I did a 5-day participant-observation of the Unite Event taking place at 
the Vancouver Convention Center. At each Unite, developers of the famous game engine 
Unity, experts and game designers around the globe come together to share their technical 
and business knowledge and creative visions. Unite 2013 was the annual event for Unity 
developers, publishers and enthusiasts to learn more about the market-leading platform for 
creating high quality video games, training simulations, medical and architectural 
visualizations and other interactive 3D content. 
Site D:  
Finally, I carried out a participant-observation of the International Conference on Games 
and Virtual Worlds for Serious Applications VS Games 2013 taking place in Bournemouth, 
in September 2013, where I  presented a poster-paper entitled: ‘Is serious-games design 
political? The competing logics in the choice and adoption of the game engine.’ Zyda 
mentions the creation of a science of games which he understood as a scientific and 
engineering method for building them and understanding and analysing game play (2005). 
Such ‘scientific’ ambition involves a theory and language for the deployment of games and 
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simulations for the purposes of education and training, human performance engineering, 
applications of games to health, public policy and strategic communication, game evaluation 
and serious game development. This method of participant-observation was justified, as game 
design seeks legitimacy at a scientific and academic level by calling itself a science of games.  
Data Collection 
Lacan outside the clinic: A critical ethnography    
In this thesis, I have mobilized an affective ontology to study organizational and systems 
practices by drawing more specifically on Lacanian theory. How and why this framework can 
be used ethnographically is far from obvious, and needs to be justified.   
My aim was to bring to the surface phenomena that are usually repressed in the IT 
literature such as speech, identity and affective issues which put ideology into motion. I 
thought this would help not only to better understand IT design and the work of 
programmers, but also to legitimize voices that are usually concealed behind technical jargon. 
I thought that programmers and systems designers had reached such a position of power 
currently that it was time to take their speech seriously and politicize their practice. In the 
English-speaking world, Lacanian theory is clinically disputed, yet theoretically vindicated 
(Nobus, 2013). In times of evidence-based treatment, health economics and cost-
effectiveness evaluations, the clinical practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis faces increasing 
practical difficulties.   
The application of notions derived from Lacan outside of the clinic is not obvious, and has 
generated controversy (Glynos, 2010; Parker, 2010). While the psychoanalyst has time to 
establish a long-term relationship with a patient and to generate very intimate data, the 
ethnographer in the field has much more limited means at his disposal, with interviews being 
conducted on a less regular basis. Interviews are central in subject-based ethnography, and I 
will return to this point later. Although organizations are not his primary concern, Lacan 
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alludes to the possibility of applying psychoanalytic principles to the corporation of 
psychoanalysis itself:  
As a method based on truth and demystification of subjective camouflage, does psychoanalysis 
display an incommensurate ambition to apply its principles to its own corporation – that is, to 
psychoanalysts’ conception of their role in relation to the patient, their place in intellectual 
society, their relations with their peers, and their educational mission? (Lacan, 1953: 200) 
Lacan considers his theory to be a symbolic resource that structures, albeit in a distorted 
form, the psychoanalytic institution, ‘its own corporation’ (ibid., p. 200). According to 
Parker, this mode of structuring is problematic and makes an organization amenable to a 
psychoanalytic reading (2013). Furthermore, the attempt to grasp the reality of 
psychoanalytic reasoning outside the clinic also needs to take into account the increasing 
psychologisation of contemporary culture (Parker 2009). The psychosocial turn of the 
psychoanalytic method requires that we take seriously the way that psychoanalytic language 
today inhabits and structures institutions and subjectivities, so that social context is treated as 
operating on already-existing, predisposing psychological factors (Parker 2007).  
Interviewing from a subject-based perspective  
The Lacanian insight from the clinic can also be very inspiring when conducting 
interviews and generating rich data for information systems research. In particular, the 
Lacanian notions of logical time and reconstruction offer a new angle from which to address 
the interviewing technique.  
The Lacanian notion of logical time needs to be taken into account not only during the 
ethnographic observation, but also specifically when interviews are being conducted and 
designed. This is in line with Schultze’s and Avital’s argument on interview design for 
information systems research, namely that data generated in an interview constitute narratives 
that are produced in the moment of the interview, and they do not necessarily have 
established stable meanings (Schultze and Avital, 2010). These narratives cannot be 
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dismissed because they constitute a one-off reconstruction in order to satisfy the researcher, 
potentially including bias, dramatization or prettifying. The interviewer should pay attention 
not only to the content, the linguistic symbols, but should also discern bodily cues, such as a 
compulsive gesture, an excessive facial expression, a tic, which signal the intensity of the 
Real of jouissance (Zizek, 1997). An acknowledgement of the affective realm requires the art 
of listening on the part of the interviewer, a form of detachment which is different from 
neutrality. In sum, interviewing as a data-generating method is an intersubjective process.  
The affective realm of the interviewee also encompasses a political function. Holding a 
political perspective on interviewing methods is not new. Silverman coined the notion of the 
‘interview society’ (Silverman, 1997) to designate a social world where interactions with 
journalists, talk-show hosts or during job interviews are deeply rooted in the contemporary 
mindset. As Alvesson describes it, interviews are not merely instruments but also platforms 
for political action, identity work and impression management, where interviewees find an 
opportunity to perpetuate a storyline or cultural script. Thus, according to Giddens, the 
interview becomes an integral part of the contemporary selfing project, where participants 
have an opportunity to perform and construct a situated version of their identity (1991). Some 
researchers go a step further, claiming that interviews increasingly serve as a medium for the 
constitution of modern subjectivities, as well as being a tool that legitimates and democratizes 
individual opinions (Gubrium and Holstein, 2002). Interviewing is not a mere instrumental 
practice, and it is not innocent; it also contributes to rendering certain speech legitimate and, 
taken seriously, it historicizes and materializes the subjective position of certain actors, 
making them matter of fact. The researcher is therefore complicit in authorizing the 
emergence of new subjectivities.  
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Researchers need to pay attention to the affective background of the interviewees. It 
transpires that the use of support and boundary objects such as pictures and tables has been 
useful in mediating the conversation when asking questions. 
Retroduction  
The very act of collecting research material is connected to this retroductive character of 
research. ‘Retroduction’ is conceptual novelty of Glynos and Howarth, which combines 
deduction and induction. It also captures the retroactive determination of meaning, which is 
the distinctive feature of an affective ontology and this temporal dimension of desire which 
makes it distinct from, for example, the principle of dialogical reasoning, as highlighted by 
Myers and Klein (1999) in their hermeneutic account of IS field studies. In other words, the 
task of the analyst is to identify social and political logics, retroactively, in speech activity, 
practice and discourse. This critical involvement of the researcher does not only constitute a 
moment in the research procedure, but should extend retroductively, in a continuous 
oscillation between all the stages of research. This process is understood in terms of the logic 
of retroductive explanation and theory construction, which involves a to-and-fro movement 
between the phenomena investigated and the various explanations that are proffered (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007: 34).  
What I did 
For the purpose of the empirical part of this study, I followed the trajectory of various 
projects of serious games design. I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews and gathered 
complementary data through documentary research (white papers, game engines community 
forums, marketing materials, websites etc.) Visual data were collected, such as storyboards, 
hundreds of photos and video clips of programmers at work, coding reviews or meetings 
testing demos. Techniques of shadowing and participant observation were also used. Overall, 
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the following cases offered fascinating vignettes of the current emerging issues around 
gamification and Big Data. 
Existing interviewing techniques, already in use in IS, were conducted to generate 
politically-invested emotional language, such as photo-diary interviews. In particular, I used 
laddering interviews in order to generate distinctions between three elements, inscribed onto 
index cards, upon which the researchers asks ‘How are these two elements similar to each 
other, yet different from the third?’ Interviewees were invited to elaborate on the meaning of 
these personal constructs by narratively forging links between them through how and why 
questions (Schultze and Avital, 2010). To which genre does the technology belong? 
Polyphony emerged from this debate, voicing various interests among marketers, artists, 
journalists and programmers. To problematize discursive construction, the word to the thing, 
I borrowed from the laddering technique the index card and the distinctions between 
elements, or what I would rather call technology genre, such as simulations, 3D visualization 
tools, 3D environments, serious games etc.  
Data Analysis 
I will now draw on the psychosocial methods derived from Lacanian theory, most notably 
in the work of Ian Parker (2005; 2010), to explore how a subject theory can enrich existing 
methods in order to cope with subjectivity and discourse in a way which is quite new.   
Judgement of the researcher 
How does the element of judgment that is involved in characterizing logics affect the 
relevance of this framework? What about the scientificity of attributing meaning to emotions 
and content to logics? It is hard to deny the role of subjectivity in naming, generalizing and 
justifying the logics. The researcher is not exterior to the transformative effect of speech; his 
explanation is singular and has the value of an intervention. The non-arbitrary dimension of 
judgment is acknowledged notably by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations: ‘if 
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language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions 
but also (queer as it sounds) in judgments’ (Wittgenstein, 1967: 242). Our agreement on how 
to use words, classes and categories and then apply them in various contexts stems from our 
immersion in a particular language or form of life in which we learn its particular practices 
and rules. The judgment of the researcher is thus fine-tuned through an immersion in the 
theoretical and empirical corpus.  
The historicization of socio-technical facts  
In particular, Lacanian discourse analysis differs from hermeneutics primarily because of 
its temporal dimension and retroactive determination of meaning. In Lacanian terms, there is 
no fact unless it is said – and neither sexual nor sociotechnical facts are exceptions.  
The Lacanian notion of ‘logical time’ (1991) highlights the pivotal role of affect, and helps 
to understand how master-signifiers23 are constructed through the retroactive determination of 
meaning (Parker, 2010). The fixation of meaning through the repetition of certain signifiers 
or metaphorical substitutes in their function as quilting point or master-signifiers does indeed 
operate retroactively. As temporal awareness is at the core of Lacanian teaching:   
What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history —  in other words, we 
help him complete the current historicization of the facts  that have already determined a certain 
number of the historical ‘turning points’  in his existence. But if they have played this role, it is 
already as historical facts, that is, as recognized in a certain sense or censored in a certain order. 
(Lacan, 2006: 217) 
The traumatic of the Real, the nonsensical, is something that is constituted after the event 
through speech activity as an attempt to give sense to an event that could not be 
comprehended by the subject, as a ‘retroversion effect’. Accordingly, ethnographic work, the 
choice of the interviewees and the time for interviewing are not arbitrary or systematic, but 
                                                          
23
 In Lacanian theory, knowledge does not exist per se, but is invested with power through transference 
towards a ‘subject-supposed-to-know’ (not clear). In other words, master-signifiers are privileged discursive 
elements invested with affect. 
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rather depend on this historicization of facts and the identification of ‘turning points’, which 
can then be a motive for specifically-tailored interviews during the ethnography.   
An ethnographic work inspired by Lacan should pay attention to the advent of events, the 
consolidation of master-signifiers and their historicization. The temporal order is a crucial 
borrowing from the Lacanian corpus, and this logical time is spelled out by Lacan in the 
following way:  
I demonstrate here that it is the certainty anticipated by the subject  in the ‘time for 
understanding’ which – through the haste that precipitates the ‘moment of concluding’ – 
determines the other’s decision that makes the subject’s own movement an error or truth. (Lacan, 
2006: 237) 
The discourse analyst should therefore scrutinize how the punctuation of a sentence 
retroactively determines what that sentence will be understood to have meant, and so the 
temporal logic of apparent cause and effect is, in a Lacanian reading, reversed. An analyst of 
discourse will point at the anchoring points serving as the conclusion of a sentence and only 
at this ‘moment of concluding’, the analyst will be able to posit retroactively their own 
original starting point. This is why the reading of the unconscious always escapes the subject, 
and it requires an analyst to un-organize the text and re-establish its continuity. This 
retroactive effect of signifiers fundamentally distinguishes Lacanian discourse analysis from 
any form of predicative study of language and behaviours. The reading of a text is always 
provisional, not merely determined by the last signifier, but also potentially determined by 
the signifiers and new potential anchoring points that will appear later and may reconfigure 
the signification of the text.  
Why subject-based analysis differs from hermeneutics  
In his research, Myers tries to overcome the limitations of interpretation by introducing 
dialectical hermeneutics as a theoretical framework to study IS implementation, drawing on 
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Gadamer, Ricoeur and Habermas (Myers, 1994). Myers’ notion of dialectical hermeneutics 
seeks to combine the interpretive and critical ambition:  
The hermeneutic dialectic perspective, therefore, as an integrative approach, emphasizes both 
the subjective meanings for individual actors and the social structures which condition and 
enable such meanings and are constituted by them (Myers, 1994: 57).  
Myers’ dialogical approach simultaneously underscores the importance of subjective 
meaning for the individual actor and the social structures, which condition and enable such 
meanings, as well as providing a new approach to research on the social aspects of computer-
based information systems.  
However, the subject theory adopted in this research differs fundamentally from 
‘hermeneutics’ (Lacan, 1979: 8 quoted by Parker, 2005). The hermeneutic interpretation 
indeed ‘consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the 
levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning’ (Ricoeur, 1974: 13). In contrast, Lacanian 
formal analysis is preoccupied with working on the line of the symbolic within (not beyond) 
the domain of the text (Parker, 2005). An affective ontology pays attention to the way 
subjects develop, feel and speak, an idiosyncratic dimension which is different from 
unearthing what interviewees really feel, and from colonizing the text with assumptions, for 
instance that the interviewee is lying (Parker, 2010). In Glynos’ and Howarth’s words (2005), 
the hermeneutic tradition falls into subjectivism which covers the unconscious nature of 
subjectivity under overly descriptive and particularistic descriptions. Although the 
contextualized self-interpretations and intentions of the subjects comprise an indispensable 
element of any explanation in the social sciences, a balanced explanation should necessarily 
integrate the non-intentional dimension.  
In sum, it is the materiality of the signifier which is of interest to the discourse analyst, not 
the illusion of finding a right explanation concealed ‘behind’ the text (at the level of meaning, 
intention, knowledge, interpretation, interest).  
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An impossible empirics: unearthing the unnamable   
The study of the unconscious in discourse is a moment-by-moment reconstruction of 
consciousness and what has been unavailable to it. Lacanians share with pragmaticians the 
analytic shift from content to formal qualities of the text.  
In the analysis of the text, the researcher should not so much organize the content of the 
data under themes and subthemes, but rather ‘bring out irreducible, nonsensical – composed 
of non-meanings – signifying elements’ (Lacan, 1979: 250 quoted by Parker). For each 
subject there is a Real, namely a signifier which is ‘irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning’ to 
which they are ‘as a subject, subjected’ (Lacan, 1979: 251 quoted by Parker). In contrast with 
‘conversation analysis’, which aims to carefully re-describe only what is present, Lacanian 
discourse analysis shows how the text is organized by what is absent, which is why evidence 
is always retroactive. Those points in a text that indicate something unspeakable and un-
representable can be interpreted as a point of encounter with the Real. They are organized 
around the object cause of desire, absent from the text, yet having empirical effect, which 
Lacan names object petit a.  
Thus, the object petit a is the Lacanian notion which designates the object cause of desire, 
the desire for an objectified small other. The object is not empirically real, but is a useful 
device to capture the orientation of a speaker. Typically the object petit a is not named and is 
absent from the text, but operates as the object cause of the dialogue precisely because it is 
not named. To name the object would disrupt the communication. Object a operates as the 
gravity in the field of discourse, and this device is used to trace patterns in discourse. This 
failure of agreement constitutes the deadlock of representation necessary for communication 
to work, rather than any attempt to cover that disagreement. In sum, the analysis of what is 
‘unconscious’ to the subject in a piece of text is an analysis of the ‘gaps’ and the ‘holes’ 
where what is said at any moment presupposes that something else cannot, or will not, be said 
(Billig, 1999). 
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*** 
To some extent, for Lacan, affect is a matter of timing. Lacanian theory is crucial here to 
reconstruct the chronology of the text, its historicization and the particular chronology 
through which the subject develops, feels and turns around the void of his/her desire through 
speech. Lacanian theory suggest that we should analyse emotions and feelings without falling 
into subjectivism and interpretation of what the subject is assumed to feel, but rather by 
paying attention to the logical time, and how the desire of the subject is retroactively 
determined by the logical sequence of the signifier. This process is always provisional and 
contingent, and may potentially be challenged by further signifiers. Discourse analysis 
focuses on the norms and logics (social, political, fantasmatic) which organize the 
construction of discourse and its formations. I believe the LCE framework, by highlighting 
the problem of articulation, the identity trouble generated by the eruption of the real of 
novelty, has great potential to enrich the field of the sociology of innovation.  
  
148 
 
Table 2. Ontologies in the social sciences. 
 Positivist Ontology Realist Ontology Affective Ontology  
Streams  Critical Realism 
ANT  
Hermeneutics 
Phenomenology 
Logics approach  
Lacanian discourse  
analysis  
Focus   Case study  Objectified 
Phenomenon  
Problematized 
Phenomenon 
Description Thin description  Thick description 
(interpretation)  
Historicization  
 
Temporal  Predictive  Descriptive Retroactive  
Logic  Deductive  Inductive  Retroductive  
Scientificity Scientific fact is 
measurable 
Scientific fact is 
socially constructed 
Scientific fact is 
what is said  
Truth Testable/Verifiable Out there/ Can be 
traced (artefacts, 
enunciation)  
Out there/ Can be 
traced 
(performances, 
narratives and 
jouissance) 
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Chapter 6: Adoption as a practice of hegemony  
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In this chapter, I will consider more specifically the adoption of the game engine. In 
particular, I will look at how Unity3D, one of the major actors in the market, have been 
broadly adopted and mainstreamed. The chapter is organized as follows. After describing the 
aims of the chapter and problematizing the phenomenon of adoption, I will then focus on the 
discourse of Unity’s strategic actors, and I will mobilize discourse analysis to show the logics 
sustaining their discourse and how this strategic communication secures Unity’s hegemony 
and mainstreaming practice. Then I will move my focus to different corporate events and 
rituals, namely the Asset store, the Unite event and the community forum. In the final part of 
the chapter, I will examine adoption within the online community of users, specifically within 
a start-up which is using Unity, although it is not related to the game engine firm.  
Aims of the chapter 
What does the customer truly want? A core challenge for adoption scholars is to 
understand how and why innovative products get to be adopted collectively and 
mainstreamed. Existing studies have highlighted the role of adoption decisions (Rogers), 
fashion (Czarniawska) and interessement (Callon). 
A traditional way to address this issue is to understand adoption as a rational decision 
(Rogers, 1962; Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 2003). Rogers’ diffusion model seeks to measure the 
adoption rate of a product, namely the relative speed with which the innovation is adopted by 
members of a social system. From this perspective, research questions typically address 
different configurations of the s-shaped diffusion curve, such as how the earlier adopters may 
differ from the later adopters of an innovation, or why the s-shaped diffusion curve takes off 
more rapidly or slowly.  
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Continuing the direction of Tarde’s seminal work The Laws of Imitation, published in 
1903, Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) move away from rational decisions and isolate two 
complex translation mechanisms, namely fashion and institutionalization. Rather than being 
diametrically opposed (frivolousness and temporality of fashion versus seriousness and 
stability of institutions), these factors are interdependent. Thus, the function of fashion is not 
so much to revolutionize, to bring about master ideas, but rather to revitalize and thereby 
sustain the institutional order. Fashion also functions as the adopter’s release from the 
responsibility of individual choice. 
Akrich et al. (2002) argue that the success of an innovation is motivated by ‘the art of 
interessement’. As an innovation’s success necessarily involves unexpected turnarounds and 
resistance, the so-called ‘classical’ models and their curve derived from economists of 
innovation are hardly an effective representation of reality. Diffusion models and their curves 
ignore the context within which technical innovation is inserted. Thus, Akrich et al. (2002) 
offer the art of interessement as a way to bridge the gap between the technical object and its 
socio-economic environment:  
The model of interessement sets out all of the actors who seize the object or turn away from it 
and highlights the points of articulation between the object and the more or less organized 
interests which it gives rise to. 
In other words, the success or failure of an innovation depends on its capacity to interest a 
network of allies.  
My aim in this chapter is to propose a political view of innovation and technology 
adoption which can shed light on the strategic nature of this art of interessement. Technical 
decisions are not innocent. In addition, artifacts are also a place of contestation where 
innovators seek to build coalitions of interests, rally masses through universality claims 
about, for example, the use of their innovation, such as the QWERTY keyboard design 
(Rogers, 1983) or the use of a web browser (Faraj et al., 2004). Whether the particular (the 
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firm’s product) and the universal (market) get to be coincident or not, conditions the success 
of any innovation. Further, this coincidence is both necessary and ultimately impossible: the 
product, once universalized, necessarily maintains a remaining trace of particularity. 
Empirical work is required to clarify this issue: through which operations do master ideas 
become the locus of hegemonic effects? 
Framing the case 
This analysis mobilizes ethnographic methods to examine the takeover of the game engine 
Unity 3D and the process through which the existing regime which orders the game industry 
has been contested and confronted with an alternative.  
Why Unity?  
The game engine has been chosen because it is a master signifier in computer game 
design: it is the software that interacts with the hardware of the target platform on which the 
game will be played. The ‘game engine’ translates the digital object, referred to by game 
developers as assets, from the format in which they were initially developed into a code that 
can be run on the game platform. For example, Panourgias et al. (2013) consider the tension 
between ‘creativity’ and ‘programming’ and identify the game engine as the ‘key 
technological artifact that conditions the creative autonomy of game developers’. 
Furthermore, Hudlicka (2009) argues that the gaming community focuses on the development 
of affective game engines in order to facilitate the development of affect-adaptive and 
affectively complex and realistic games.  
This chapter tackles more particularly the takeover and adoption of a particular game 
engine, namely Unity3D, rather than its competitors OpenSim and UDK, to name but two. 
Unity provides a straightforward editing environment where 3D models are dragged and 
dropped into the editor and then positioned in a sort of 3D game world. The major strength of 
Unity is that this process is very intuitive. Unity is the market-leading platform for creating 
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video games, but also training simulations, medical and architectural visualizations and other 
interactive 3D content. The potential ubiquity of Unity is underlined in the marketing 
material: ‘Unity supports the creation of almost any 2D and 3D interactive content 
imaginable, including non-game apps for gambling, simulation and training, virtual reality 
and the automotive, architectural and advertising industries.’ On the corporate website, 
Unity’s users are described through an affective rhetoric: ‘They are using Unity to build a 
livelihood doing what they love: creating games that hook and delight players on any 
platforms.’ According to an unreleased McKinsey report (and as Unity state in their own 
publically released data), Unity 3D is the market leader, and covers 45% of the game engine 
market shares versus 17% for the closest competitor (unreleased McKinsey report, 2015).  
Elements of context 
The research strategy adopted here is to focus both on the role of Unity’s project in 
challenging and re-structuring the gaming industry as it was organized in the 1980s and 
1990s, wherein entertainment was but one element in an overall hegemonic project designed 
to diffuse a new technological configuration, and on the local dynamics through which these 
new ideas and practices are installed in the start-ups themselves. In particular, I am concerned 
with the discursive formations and the logics traversing the discourse of strategic actors and 
users of the software. What logics play out in the adoption of a game engine? What are the 
discursive formations that are empirically detectable at the local level? What logics transverse 
the discourse of actors? How do they produce hegemonic effects?  
Data regarding strategic actors were collected through press interviews given by David 
Helgason, the CEO of Unity, as well as an in-depth, three-hour, semi-structured interview 
with Gary (pseudonym), Unity’s Director of Support and Documentation, which I conducted 
at Unity’s UK office in Brighton for the purpose of the ethnography. A six-month 
ethnography was conducted in a start-up at Birmingham Science Park in order to examine the 
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process of adoption more specifically at a local level. To complete my knowledge of the 
industry, participant observation was conducted at the Unite community event in Vancouver 
and at a specialized academic conference of game developers.  
The fieldwork revealed a tension between the established regime oriented towards the 
market of console games for entertainment and the new emerging regime of mobile apps. The 
mass of the game developers who met at the Unite event or the VS-Games conference were 
actually thinking beyond the traditional modes of the video-games business on consoles; their 
approach to games was driven by the opportunities offered by new platforms such as social 
media, tablets and mobile phones. Glynos and Howarth connect the macro-micro contrast 
with the distinction between regimes and practices, although the precise elements of these 
contrasts depend on the specific problem being investigated (2007). In the case studied here, 
let us fix the notion of regime at the level of the designers embodied by Unity’s organization 
and their strategic actors, and practices at the level of the users, namely the game studios 
using the tool, which I will exemplify specifically through an ethnographic study conducted 
in a start-up designing visualization tools.  
Discourse of Unity’s strategic actors 
In this section, we analyse the vision and contextualized self-interpretations of key 
organizational members from Unity, namely the Chief Executive Officer and the Director of 
Support and Communication. More specifically, we will shed light on how Unity’s 
developers strategize and how they talk about the adoption of their product. When do 
software designers such as game developers act politically? How and why do they contest an 
existing regime?  
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Unity’s assemblage of political logics 
In this section, we will identify the assemblage of political logics – gamification, 
democratization and subjectivation – in the discourse of Unity’s strategic actors which, 
articulated together, enable to characterize the emergence of Unity’s regime.  
Logic of gamification  
In the words of Gary, the emergence of the mobile market transforms the market not only 
in terms of the format, but also in terms of richness of the content, the size of the teams, the 
product quality and the technical expectations regarding the game engine. Thus, according to 
Unity’s Director of Support, designing games for consoles is explicitly contrasted with 
mobile game development:  
Making games for consoles take a lot of people and a lot of time, so you need a very big budget, 
very deep pockets to make a console title (…) the success of  a game can’t be guaranteed- you 
might have a really good sport game, it might be liked by people who preview it, it might get to 
the market two weeks after a similar game gets published and nobody buys your great game 
because they just bought the other game, two weeks ahead, so there is a lot of risk in game 
development- almost every publisher of games in the world sees console development as risky, 
whereas mobile game development is infinitely easier and cheaper. 
Let us call social the logic of game design which typically organizes the industry of game 
development on consoles through a particular recognition scheme (e. g. AAA games being 
the most visually appealing). This social logic involves expectations about important actors in 
the field, with ‘very deep pockets’, dominant platforms such as the PC platform and video 
games consoles, the recognition of an order of things and the hierarchy within social actors 
and institutions. These practices of gaming for entertainment, are considered social insofar as 
they are established, routinized and not yet contested.  
Further, the re-articulation of the practice of game design, from games for console to 
mobile gaming, also requires a redefinition of game. Thus, the signifier ‘game’ is invested 
with a new power of transformation. Games are not regarded as mere autonomous software 
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designed for entertainment, but as bearing agency in shaping the structural features of 
information systems: 
On the web people are spending so much time playing games now. The recent stats that people 
are spending more time on the web playing games than using email was kind of cheating 
because it doesn't take into account people communicating more on social networks. But one 
thing that I think is a true statement is that Facebook may have made games on the web happen 
in a new way, but games also made Facebook happen in a new way. 
Another rhetorical trope through which this re-articulation is enacted is through the 
figure of the chiasma (chi means x in Greek). The structure of the chiasma can be read thus: 
Facebook => ‘games in a new way’ => games => Facebook ‘in a new way’. After suggesting 
that the identity of the indie developer could be labelled differently from the way Nintendo 
did, the CEO also attempts to transform the meaning of the word ‘game’ itself by drawing 
equivalences with other genres of social communications, such as email or a famous social 
network. We call here logic of gamification this attempt to hegemonize the label ‘game’, to 
catch up other social space and to posit a well-known social network and the genre of gaming 
along a logic of equivalence.  
In the following extracts, Unity’s Director of Support adapts the definition of game into 
something which can cover entertainment, simulation and training, virtual reality and the 
automotive, architectural and advertising industries. But the largest markets beyond 
entertainment are the military and gambling:  
We have been quite successful in the traditional games market, now there will come a time 
when we spoke with the game publishers, spoke with the developers, our ability to make money 
from that space will start to flatten as any business. We’re looking more in Asia and South 
America where we have got great penetration, so you know those are markets where we can 
continue to grow on gaming traditional business so beyond that we need to consider sort of 
virtual markets, so one we are running to at the moment, one is in the gambling space which 
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confusingly in the US is called gaming, that’s selling our products to companies that make slot 
machines or online gambling. 
The social logic of the ‘traditional games market’ occupies a space which ‘will start to 
flatten’. The search for growth leads the firm ‘to consider sort of virtual markets’, a new field 
of possibility. To articulate the logic of gamification, Gary adopts a rhetorical twist. The 
gambling space is also called gaming in the US. The Director of Support mobilizes this 
polysemy to facilitate a strategic turn of the company. Such speech acts also have the 
function of guaranteeing the coherence of the strategy vis-à-vis an audience, here instantiated 
by the interviewee (myself). In fact, the meaning of the word ‘game’ becomes metaphorical, 
and this is part of a broader strategy of producing ‘game’ as an empty signifier.  
Logic of subjectivation 
Expression such as ‘happen in a new way’ presupposes the emergence of an event which 
Helgason describes in the following extract. Thus, the CEO’s interviews also confirm the 
shift foreseen during the fieldwork, and the emergence of another work identity: 
We didn't think about mobile until 2006 and then the Nintendo Wii came out, which we decided 
to go to for two reasons. We thought it would be a really open platform and it turned out to not 
be as open as we'd hoped. When they spoke of 'indies' they weren't lying, they just had a very 
different definition of indies than we had. 
In the sense that the construction of new forms of subjectivity, here that of the Indie 
developers, conditions the success of novel ways of acting, we will call this process logic of 
subjectivation. In this extract, the CEO seeks to render visible the classification behind the 
industry’s situation by endorsing the role of an ingenuous designer (‘we thought it would be a 
really open platform’). However, he is progressively contesting this social logic by offering 
an alternative meaning (‘very different definition’) to the indie identity, a re-labelling of their 
work practice, in a way which tends to dismiss traditional game design as an elitist practice 
(‘not be as open’) open only to accredited developers. David Helgason historicizes the 
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strategic turn of his company and his decision to differentiate his activity from traditional 
institutions (Nintendo) and the established formats (Wii) of the console market.  
Thus, the game designer keeps endorsing an ‘innocent’ reflexive standpoint: ‘the recent 
(…) kind of cheating’, by taking a critical distance (‘it doesn’t take into account people 
communicating more on social networks’) with arguments which might serve his own 
rationale. This rhetorical twist renders the statement (‘games also made Facebook happen in a 
new way’) strong and consequential. Once more, the political re-signification is softened 
through the rhetorical device of the preterition signalling his awareness of negotiating with 
existing power relations and the recognition of the audience (‘one thing that I think is a true 
statement’). In either case, Helgason is not so much concerned with rationalist explanations, 
but with the subjective consolidation of a regime of truth. This euphemism (‘they were not 
lying’) reveals that he is positioning his speech within an existing, symbolic, rapport-the-
force with major actors in the field. Once again, the truth manifested by the CEO is opposed 
by negative attitudes (‘lying’ or ‘cheating’).  
Logic of democratization 
A third political logic, which appears explicitly in the rhetoric of Unity’s actor, is the logic 
of democratization. Let us examine Gary’s views when I question him about the notion of 
democratization as specified in the marketing brochure and Unity’s website:  
Democratization just means we want anybody that’s got an idea to make a game, to have the 
tools to make the game. And then you know the players of that game, you know the game-
playing population in the world, can decide which games succeed, and which ones don’t, so it’s 
not who’s got the best tool, who’s got the best ideas, it’s really, anybody who wants to make a 
game can; that’s my view on the product, anybody who wants to make a game could use that 
tool. When we say anybody, literally anybody in the world, we mean anybody that’s got some 
technical skills, some understanding on how games work, could make a game. 
Unity’s Director of Support elaborates on the concept-word of democratization through 
the topic of universalization. An expression such as ‘the game-playing population in the 
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world’ clearly posits the belonging to the game community as a form of citizenship, 
metaphorically related to a belonging to a nation. The hyperbolic style is also similar to 
political discourse and the tone is voluntarist, therefore the technical constraints are 
undermined: ‘literally anybody in the world, we mean anybody that’s got some technical 
skills’ 
Rituals and ideological fantasies  
In other words, these discursive formations are grounded on desired-based narratives 
which enable their materialization through speech acts and rituals. There is a gap, due to 
individuals’ fantasmatic susceptibility, between the high-level strategy and eventual adoption. 
We propose to fill this gap with the logic of fantasy, namely the mechanism through which 
users’ and designers’ energy is provided with a direction and a force.  
Heroism: the myth of self-made indie developer 
The fantasmatic logic is rendered manifest through a set of fantasy scenarios and desire-
based narratives which emerge during the interviews of the strategic actors as well as game 
designers that we met during the Unite event. Let us keep quoting Gary, for example: 
Very small teams- two, one people could make a game for mobile phone by themselves 
in the bedrooms, and become very, very successful-so that’s far more sort of Indie, 
independent game-ended market. They are called indie because they are independent; 
they haven’t got a publisher funding them to make the game, so there have always been 
indies working on games. 
Indie developers typically enact a different mentality, exemplified by the beatific narrative 
of successful entrepreneurs, one or two programmers becoming rich by developing an app in 
the intimacy of their garage on a very small budget. In particular, Gary reports the story of a 
programmer who made some tools to help people with some 2D artwork, sold on the assets 
store a product called NGui, claiming that he had made US$300,000 from selling this 
160 
 
product. Game designers systematically share these stories via blog posts or during 
socialization rituals, such as the community events of the company and the online forums.  
Such success stories and scenarios operate as fantasy frames, structuring the desire and 
identity of most indie developers. Some renowned historical 3D artists (in this picture, 
Richard Garriott de Cayeux, the creator of the series Ultima, a very successful role-playing 
game in the 80s) also contribute to the show. They constitute charismatic figures in the 
entertainment software history, generating the promise of a return to primordial enjoyment. 
Unity is a symbolic construction, and what gives an imaginary consistency to this discursive 
construction is the fantasy which promises our encounter with the fullness of enjoyment, 
supposedly located in the historical roots of game design. These performances help to 
legitimize the takeover of the product, reinvigorate lost pleasure and inscribe the software 
within a historical chronology. 
Picture 3. Unity 2013. 
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Community spirit: the ‘game playing population of the world’ 
The performance of CEO David Helgason, not unlike the ones of Steve Jobs, generates the 
energy and the mobilization of jouissance. Such stories operate as fantasy frames which 
structure the desire and identity of most indie developers. The thrill of these narratives is 
organized around the obstacles to the realization of this fantasy which encompass institutions 
(big studios, publishers), accreditation (triple A sponsors) and costs (associated with 
commissioning an artist): in other words, all the intermediary layers between the customers 
and the emerging market of service companies. Furthermore, the myth of the independent 
developer presents as a reminiscence of the golden age of the independent studios in the 80s, 
before the hegemony of the major game studios, embodied through the performance of a 
historical figure and gaming guru who devised highly-creative games from scratch. The 
pictures above, taken during the Unite Event 2013 in Vancouver, show ideological fantasy in 
action, the rituals through which these stories are embodied and enacted via the intervention 
of a guru and stars. This process is quite similar, although of course, at a different scale and 
with different aims, to the one sustaining the discourse of nationalism.  
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Picture 4 and 5. Unite 2013. Helgason’s speech.   
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Unity’s regime among the users  
In this section, we will address how Unity’s political logic tends to be associated with 
specific subject-based fantasmatic logic, among the community of Unity’s game designers 
and among the members of a start-up adopting Unity3D.  
The online community 
How do Unity’s ideas get adopted by, and translated within, members of their community 
of users? In this section, I will analyse the discourse of game designers in Unity’s forum, and 
I will discuss the differences between Unity and an alternative engine known as UDK.  
The Cadillac Escalade (logic of democratization/ community spirit) 
The analysis of the community forum reveals that UDK and Unity are, in the perception of 
some users, reproducing the line of antagonisms between the challenged regime and the new 
regime. UDK is considered as having many AAA titles under its belt. It's industry-proven and 
intended for larger specialized teams and bigger budgets whereas Unity is tailored to the 
market of mobile apps and entrepreneurs who do not necessarily belong to major studios. In a 
metaphorical fashion, WinningGuy explains the difference as follows:  
Unity is the Cadillac Escalade. Decent torque. Roomy, and can be used for a variety of 
purposes. Pick up the kids. Lug a bunch of baggage. A road trip with all of your buddies. And it 
can go decently fast. If something goes wrong, it's fairly easy to fix. Unreal is a Ferrari. You 
can't bring your friends on a road trip. You can't pick up the kids. You can't lug a bunch of 
baggage. But if you want to go fast, you can go really, really fast. If something goes wrong, it's 
really hard to fix. 
This quote reveals the metaphorical dimension of hegemony, namely that the game 
designer draws a logic of equivalence, and to secure the pervasiveness of ideology key 
signifiers need to be emptied of their characteristics and opened to another kind of 
identification. In particular, WinningGuy mobilizes the metaphor of the car. UDK is more 
demanding and awkward to use but is higher-performance and is metaphorically described by 
WinningGuy as a ‘Ferrari’. In addition, it embodies a typical traditional elitist engine, 
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commonly used for designing triple AAA console games (although most major studios 
develop their own tailored game engines for major games), more suitable for 360 or PS3, and 
perceived by publishers as being less risky. 
Typically, UDK follows the ‘industry-proven’ social logic of game design for pure 
entertainment. In contrast, Unity is described as a ‘Cadillac Escalade’, easy and suitable for 
self-funded and/or an indie or small company, and which is thereby following a political 
logic of democratization. In a sense, the fantasy narrative of the family trip provides the tool 
with a guideline as to how to desire the tool. It has the function of mobilizing affective 
attachments to the tools. These stories pertain to two distinct ways of enjoying game design, 
metaphorically embodied by the Cadillac and the Ferrari: utility and performance. This is, in 
fact, more than a metaphor. My neighbour during one of Unity’s tutorials in Vancouver was a 
father learning how to use Unity to design games for his children. Another similar metaphor, 
one that is crucial in contributing to the production of the empty signifier, is that between PC 
and Mac software.  
The same can't be said of the Unreal editor. Epic should hire some interface designers, because 
working with the editor is much more painful than it needs to be. Still, if I wanted to make a 
high powered FPS, I'd use Unreal. I just wouldn't enjoy it! :wink: 
According to another forum participant, Unity’s interface is simple, clean and uncluttered. 
It is relatively intuitive, whereas working with Unreal’s editor is more tiresome, it combines 
the pain of programming but without the enjoyment. In the above example, the actor’s 
subjective identification with UDK is typically inauthentic, complicit with its own subjection, 
which precludes to the decline of Unity’s rival.   
‘am not a modder’ (logic of subjectivation/ heroism) 
The use of Unity also involves identity issues, as a game developer takes pride in using 
Unity by defining himself as a programmer, and by stigmatizing the figure of the modder. 
The practice of modding refers to the creation and distribution of player-created software 
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extensions to a game, widely downloaded and used by players. UDK is here associated with 
the modder whose identity is relegated to the less professional and less legitimate role of the 
bricoleur. Thus, in the words of Tatoforever:  
Without sources, I don’t see any interest on UDK, you don’t have the same low level of access 
as in Unity. Sure, Unreal modders will be happy now. But am not a modder, am a game 
programmer. 
The issue of modding involves questions of legitimacy, in the sense that knowing who ‘owns 
the mods’ constitutes a crucial and political question par excellence (Kow and Nardi, 2010). 
However, in the same thread of the forum, another developer ridicules this elitist attitude: 
That's actually quite a failure at an elitist attitude. You should realize that working with mods 
and UDK is game programming and there is no difference between that and modding. I've 
worked in the industry for quite some time now and you rarely see any high level game code in 
C++ so does that mean that every single game you build is modding and not programming? Of 
course not! 
The situation is problematic here, especially for the non-initiated reader! Tatoforever’s 
comment regarding the modder versus the programmer is in fact symptomatic of this change 
of regime. In the past model, the programmer is working on the source code of an existing 
video-game- this is essentially his job. Designing a game through UDK means that 
developers work on and modify the original source code of the game ‘Unreal’, which is itself 
a first-person shooter (FPS) whereas Unity is designed as a generalist engine. Unreal has 
been used for AAA games, whereas Unity has not. In the old regime, triple AAA games were 
the reference of elitism and professionalism. However, in the new regime, it is not the 
accreditation (social logic) which matters for Tatoforever, but the fact that working on UDK 
implies modifying and working on a pre-existing virtual template based on early version of 
the video-game Unreal, which is itself a first-person shooter. What used to be an opportunity 
has now become a constraint, a restrictive generic template. Yet the programmer’s sense of 
pride shows how the change in the nature of the job is ascribed an imaginary surplus. From 
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this perspective, his overinvestment in Unity’s fantasy narratives makes him vulnerable to 
blowback from the peers.  
Unity’s regime in a start-up 
We will now look at the local dynamics through which Unity’s logics were installed in a 
start-up. In particular, we will consider the adoption of Unity 3D and the abandonment of 
OpenSim, which occurred in the context of the design of a 3D visualization tool. The choice 
and adoption of the game engine is a crucial moment, in which a dominant work practice of 
scripting can be protected or challenged. 
‘Avatars are still a turn-off’ (logic of gamification/community spirit) 
DataVisu is designed to maximise human analysis by optimising the display of data, 
enabling the user to take up a wide variety of viewpoints from both inside and outside the 
data. DataVisu is built on the Unity game engine which enables the application to offer both 
3D immersion and multi-user collaboration. One of the key design decisions was whether or 
not to include avatars to enhance the sense of immersion. Thus, in the marketing materials, 
DataVisu is presented as ‘A Virtual world for your data’: 
We thought long and hard about this tag line, just as we did about whether or not to have 
avatars. We didn’t put avatars in the single user version since we felt that (…) for most 
corporate users we spoke to avatars are still a turn-off and too closely associated with gaming 
environments. However “virtual world” (most emphatically in lower case) did seem by far the 
most appropriate way to describe what you can create with [DataVisu], a virtual world 
populated solely by you and you data. 
Among the users of Unity and even more, among their clients, scepticism prevails. A sense of 
detachment emerges from the discourse, especially with the CEO who directly copes with 
decision-makers and business actors. The logic of gamification is toned down; the emphasis 
of its rhetoric is genuinely acknowledged and a desire of openness prevails (‘avatars are… 
too closely associated with gaming’).  
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An epiphany (Logic of democratization/ heroism) 
Whereas the company traditionally had used OpenSim, an engine derived from Second 
Life, Unity’s choice appears to be the best option for designing DataVisu. When I asked 
Tony how and why they had decided to switch to Unity, the programmer described the 
discovery of the new possibilities offered by Unity: 
We made the decision about building the sceneries ourselves, the realization, and it was an 
epiphany because we had not thought about it ourselves before that, we were stuck in the 
mindset of what we’d done on OpenSim before and suddenly we realized that if we did that it 
not only freed up the user to do whatever they want, it actually made our lives easier because we 
don’t have to put in these pre-made scenarios, and handle each of them separately, and it was bit 
scary at the time but it was one of the big decisions that we made.  
Emotional language use such as ‘epiphany’ or ‘bit scary’ reveals the thrill of jouissance, the  
sudden emergence of novelty, an empty space open to new acts of identification to new 
signifiers and new discourses. Unity is experienced as a new object of attachment, providing 
a liberating and fantasmatic screen, whereas previously programmers ‘were stuck in the 
mindset of what [they’d done] on OpenSim before’. The discovery of an innovative idea – the 
emergence of political/innovative logic – is experienced by the programmers as an 
emancipation (‘freed up’). OpenSim also involves a certain physical limitation, as the 
programmer works on a prebuilt environment, which also serves as the platform for Second 
Life. In contrast, Unity empowers the programmers, through the figure of the emancipated 
indie developer, and it enables them to create functionality from the beginning and to create 
‘whatever they want’. The strong emotional language provides us some guarantee of the 
spontaneity and authenticity of the programmer’s enjoyment.  
‘As  a programmer design on Unity is better’ (Logic of subjectivation/ community spirit)  
The ethnography enabled me to distinguish conflicting logics between Tony’s feeling of 
empowerment and the end-user dimension of the artists, based on a representation of the 
physical world. Another programmer, Rob also suspects Unity to be written for programmers, 
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whereas OpenSim and Second Life would be written for artists, end-users or modders who 
enjoy building the model, or freely modifying graphics and the existing environment. As Rob  
subsequently recalls:   
Second Life is very much modeled on the physical world. Unity comes from a different 
perspective, Unity comes from a programmer perspective. So in Unity it doesn’t matter how far 
away two things are, if you want them to talk, they can talk; so it doesn’t try to impose physical 
limitations on what you do. As a programmer, design on Unity is better 
The choice and adoption of Unity is here directly justified through the mobilization of work 
identity, namely the programmer versus the artist. This is typical of the employee, working at 
a cynical distance, ‘if you want them talk, they can talk’. The programmer’s ideologically 
conceals the contingency- here the primacy of the maths over the physical and aesthetic 
concerns. The game engine actually imposes a particular ideological structure, a certain right 
way to do the job, and a new pattern of rules of professionalism. It transpires that the 
programmer’s identity is clearly secured by working with Unity. 
‘More interesting than games’ (Logic of gamification / heroism) 
The political logic of democratization is fundamentally materialized through the 
promotion and institutionalization of the particular mode of enjoyment of the programmers. 
How does the programmer intimately enjoy his/er work? What fantasy organizes the 
jouissance of the programmer? Interestingly, when I asked the CEO of Delta about his initial 
motivation to design visualization tools, he revealed how the ‘enjoyment of playing’ conceals 
a more confident and more powerful ‘enjoyment of programming’:  
I suppose because I was interested in science-fiction, things like that, I thought it was quite 
interesting that you can actually create a 3D visualization just from a few lines of code and you 
can actually sort of share and explore that. (…) I can remember I used to have games; some of 
them you can break into and see the codes that is used to make them work, I was finding this 
more interesting than the game. (my emphasis) 
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The illicit enjoyment of ‘breaking into’ the code constitutes a more intense excitement than 
the ‘official’ pleasure of playing. The political enjoyment and its erotics of transgression 
materialize the ideology of the programmer and its particular mode of identification. The 
fantasmatic logic which is revealed here, through the detour of science-fiction, helps us 
understand that the game functions not so much to entertain the users, but as an alibi for the 
programmer to design other kinds of software. What truly matters for him is the code making 
the environment work. This political logic is thus sustained through the fantasy-scenario of a 
programmer/demiurge. By confessing the biographical truth about himself, underneath the 
gamification rhetoric, the CEO clearly adopts a position of authenticity.  
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Table 3. Assemblage of logics presiding over Unity’s adoption  
Logics Social Political  Fantasmatic  
 Institution 
(accreditation, big 
publishers, high 
budget) 
Elitism (elitist 
practice of game 
design for 
entertainment with 
high budget, 
performances required 
and artistic costs). 
 
Gamification (adoption 
of new practices: 
simulation and training, 
virtual reality and the 
automotive, architectural 
and advertising 
industries, military and 
gambling) 
Democratization 
(Anybody with a 
minimum of 
programming skills who 
wants to make a game 
can) 
Subjectivation (work 
identity of indie 
programmer) 
 
Community spirit 
‘game playing 
population of the 
world’ 
‘Cadillac Escalade’ 
Heroïsm 
Success narratives of 
the heroic Indie 
Developer who 
bypasses institutions. 
Programmer as an 
all-powerful architect 
of its environment 
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Table 4. Comparative table of Unity and its competitors (Opensim, UDK)  
 UDK OpenSim Unity3D  
Subjectivity Modder/Programmer Artistic  Programmer-centric  
Genre Unreal/First-person 
shooter 
SL/Virtual World  Defines itself as 
visualization tool 
Accessibility Elitist/hard to 
use/Expensive  
Graphics skills/ Edit 
the world  
Cheap/easy to 
use/Drag and drop 
Politics Game Industry-
secured / Big 
publishers 
LindenLab has 
control over the 
world  
Start-ups/ 
Programmers have 
the control over the 
world  
Usage  Entertainment games 
(triple A), especially 
first-person shooter 
SecondLife, 
simulation and 
training, corporate 
virtual environment 
(IBM Virtual 
Universe 
Community) 
Entertainment, 
gambling, simulation 
and training, virtual 
reality and the 
automotive, 
architectural and 
advertising industries 
Affects UDK perceived as 
efficient but cold and 
painful to use (socio-
ideological axis) 
SecondLife has a 
strong ambivalent 
connotations towards 
sex, community life 
Unity intersects the 
pain for utility 
performance and the 
appeal of an easy 
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and freedom, 
exciting but 
somehow deviant 
(socio-ideological 
axis) 
interface  (politico-
ethical axis) 
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*** 
In this chapter I have drawn on a multi-sited ethnography to show how change has 
occurred within the gaming industry, and to demonstrate how Unity’s regime has 
progressively transformed the meaning associated with the practice of game design. Looking 
specifically at both the strategic actors’ discourse and the rituals of Unity’s community, I 
have shown that this process is not innocent, but in fact reveals the emergence of a political 
logic which is articulated against the existing social logic of game design. Unity deploys 
itself beyond entertainment in areas including gambling, the military, architecture etc. This 
political logic contaminates other spheres of discourse, including the members of the 
community and the start-ups adopting the product. Finally, I have demonstrated that adopting 
Unity secures and strengthens both the mode of enjoyment and the fantasmatic logic of the 
programmer over the 3D artists.  
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Chapter 7: The Problem of Acceptance   
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How do designer imagine the users? How and why may certain assumptions about 
technology use be accepted or rejected? In this chapter, I will address how game designers 
deal with the problem of acceptance by examining the case of a serious game designed for 
elderly people, namely Elder Move. Elderly people constitute a new market for game 
designers, and it is unclear whether, at this age, they would opt to play the game and enjoy it 
as young people do. I will first describe the aim of the chapter by positioning my framework 
within existing positivist and constructivist views on acceptance. Then, I will address the case 
of Elder Move, designed by the firm Totem, and the failure of the design team to gamify the 
product. Finally, this case renders visible the point that technology functions not so much as a 
technical issue, but as an empty signifier.  
Aims of the chapter 
Using my framework, my aim in this chapter is to demystify the practice of design, which 
is here understood as shaping a user’s experience in a way intended to conform him/her to a 
particular set of expected design patterns. While existing approaches adopt a positivist 
standpoint or a constructivist/institutional one, I will argue that design is rather an unstable 
arena involving speech, affect and identification.  
The scientific approach to design holds that ideal game design features can be empirically 
tested, predicted and then applied. This heuristic approach is well exemplified by Malone’s 
PhD thesis, published in 1980, entitled ‘What makes things fun to learn? A study of 
intrinsically Motivating Computer Games.’ Malone was a social psychologist from the MIT 
who was interested in developing a heuristics for the design of computer games by focusing 
on three specific features, namely challenge, curiosity and fantasy. This is also the ambition 
of the TAM model (see above).   
A less predictive way to conceptualize technologies and the process through which they 
are accepted and institutionalized is by constructing an organizing vision. From this 
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perspective, game designers envision (in their heads, on computer screens and on paper) the 
machine-to-be (Bechky, 2003), around so-called ‘organizing visions’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997), which can be defined as focal community ideas for the application of IT in 
organizations. The development of the organizing vision is motivated by institutional forces 
and, among these forces, the community’s discourse plays a dominant role. In contrast with 
the scientific design approach, these authors shed light on the impossibility of predicting the 
future of these evolving technologies and of foreseeing the applications and situations which 
might emerge from the use of these technologies. Nevertheless, the notion of organizing 
vision, while acknowledging the social construction of design, still assumes that institutions 
producing visions have control over the actors.  
In contrast, the subject-based approach to agency helps us to capture phenomena that are 
pre-institutional, psychosexual forces which are not yet symbolized. Design is enacted in situ, 
and unexpected forces emerge it is the designers’ job to assign them a meaning. Reframing 
how designers conceptualize technology acceptance involves looking at design as a more 
unstable micro-political scene involving power relations, identification and affect. In contrast 
with the scientific design or sense-making approaches, the Lacanian theory of act suggests 
that this process is driven by unconscious psychosexual events which are retroactively 
assigned meaning by designers. How do particular terms come to be ordered in sequence, and 
how does a particular signifier come to gain a position of mastery and change the sequence of 
order? Members of a particular community or organization accept or refuse representations 
offered by important others. How and why does this hierarchization take place? How does the 
construction of master-signifier preside over the process of acceptance?  
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Framing the case 
What is Elder Move? 
There are several reasons why elderly people are reluctant to travel or walk; the elderly 
tend to lack the confidence to cope with physical impairment, the fear of being lost and the 
feeling of insecurity. Even easy tasks such as purchasing a ticket for public transportation, 
withdrawing money from a cashpoint or paying for daily shopping (the bakery, supermarket, 
doctors, pharmacy) can be perceived as a risk or a danger. The project does not propose 
solutions to reduce physical impairments such as innovative wheelchairs, for instance, but 
seeks to provide home-based physical and cognitive training in order to increase the elderly’s 
self-confidence when addressing those everyday issues of life outside the home.  
Elder Move do this by providing contextualized help, based on innovative gaming 
platforms such as the Wii and the Kinect, and specifically develop mini-games based on the 
game engine Unity3D. Solutions to track user behaviour and movements on different 
geographical scales (e.g. public transportation access and usage, etc.) are made available, as 
well as improved social inclusion and accessibility through Web 2.0 technologies and tools. 
Social networks, chat, voice communication, professional aid/support and other relevant 
services (e.g. theatre ticketing) are also made available. 
I shadowed the development process of an EU-funded project featuring serious games 
designed for the elderly and using the Kinect with a threefold purpose: 
1 To inspire confidence in users so that they are able to achieve and manage limited 
physical movement.  
2 To inspire confidence in the users’ mental ability by asking them to perform cognitive 
agility activities, and by providing positive reinforcement via verbal and visual feedback.  
3 To inspire social confidence to encourage users to go outside their homes and interact 
with other people both inside and outside their social circle.  
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Finally, user acceptance appears to be a crucial challenge in this project because of the age 
of the target audience, a generation which is not necessarily technologized and are more 
vulnerable to the safety implications of using the Kinect for physical exercise. Hence, the 
project also features the issue of acceptance by medical staff and home care providers.  
Elements of context  
Various elements of context regarding this participant observation are now required. 
Although I gained access to the field thanks to a contact inside Totem, the serious games 
specialist, two different entities were working together on this project from the same office 
located at the Coventry Innovation Park: namely Gamma (the project manager and the 
programmers) and Totem (the instructional designers and the 3D artists). In this context, 
members of these two organizations present their work to partners and consultants of the 
project. Thus, the case indirectly involves employees from a third company, namely the 
partner Omega, which is an Austrian company with a focus on providing learning and 
knowledge solutions, including consultation, training and guidance, as well as developing 
training content materials. Omega was mobilized to examine the social aspects of the Elder 
Move project and the human interface of devices.  
I will therefore follow the process through which this signifier Elder Move is invested in 
by various actors of the firms and beyond the firms. In particular, my aim is to understand 
this signifier as the site (objective) where the designers’ rapport-de-force (subjective) takes 
place. How do designers imagine technology use (Imaginary)? How can subject-based 
analysis be used to identify when gamification dysfunctions, when it does not work and when 
it resists predictions (Real)? Why do assumptions about users come to be rejected in fine 
whilst others are accepted (Symbolic)?  
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A failure at gamifying  
As I highlighted in ‘Methodology used for data collection and analysis’, the Lacanian 
approach to ethnographic observation should pay attention to the trajectory of the signifiers 
and the chronology of meaning. I will therefore analyse the findings according to the three 
phases which I have identified. Phase 1 includes the primary construction of the concept 
design and the demo release – at this stage, communication with the partner is non-existent. 
We can label this mode of attachment of the designers to their product and its technical 
properties as imaginary. Then, the meeting involving the partners in Austria transpires to be a 
‘turning point’ towards a novel approach – phase 2 where the Real emerges, an event and 
even an act which produces social actors as subjects. Phase 3 is the consolidation of this 
novel way, the inscription of the product within the symbolic and its acceptance by the group.  
Phase 1: Before the meeting: imaginary identification with the thing  
Retrospectively, it is possible to describe the programmers’ decisions as imaginary, as 
they designed the software according to an image of what they believed to be the video-game 
required by the European Union.  
They have not yet entered the symbolic register of social relationships and confrontation 
with the Other. They still follow, literally, the guidelines of the EU, or more precisely their 
interpretation of these rudimentary guidelines, namely, to design: ‘missing quote’. In the 
Concept Design document as presented to the client, the thematic of Elder Move is organized 
around the topic of ‘Park Life’, and the art style is introduced as such:  
Preference for a specific art style for this project that is not hyper realistic. Would prefer to have 
something that is cell shaded. The look and feel needs to be friendly and cheerful.  
Moreover, John, the young project manager, describes the park to me as follows:  
We could have several environments to choose… we thought a park was a good one as it’s not 
an intimidating atmosphere and we can do all sorts of things in there, really, targeted towards an 
older generation. If we chose something like a street, it gets more difficult 
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A key element of the instructional design pertains to the environment in which end-users are 
expected to evolve. The environment is set in a park, where the user will be able to explore 
and launch ‘mini games’ which are each designed around Physical, Cognitive and Social 
aspects. The following map of the park was drawn by the instructional designers:  
Picture 6. Map of Elder Move’s park 
 
The choice of a non-realistic art style was made to protect the elderly from anxiety by 
featuring a less intimidating or threatening atmosphere. Louisa, a 3D artist, describes it as 
cartoony but not patronizing: in her words, ‘not kids’ cartoony’: 
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We tried to keep things quite simple… wasn’t a harsh environment, wasn’t too threatening to 
them so we used, it’s not a cartoon style, it’s just more, it is cartoony, it’s just quite soft, it’s not 
like kids’ cartoony, simple colours and quite non-fashion, like for example the carnival part of 
it, the hoopla game, I was doing a really old-fashioned like carnival style. 
The following dialogue, captured from the intranet of the firm, shows the debate about how 
the design choice, including colours and style, (game versus corporate) was derived from an 
assumption about what the users would be willing to accept and assumptions about how the 
users would experience the colours emotionally. Hence, for one of the partners, red is harsh 
and it symbolizes danger.  
Picture 7. Instructional designers discussing colours on the intranet.  
 
During my ethnographic observation, I found the art style a bit childish for elderly people, so 
I asked one of the programmers about this and he did not see it as a problem. More precisely, 
he didn’t want to think about this pessimistic scenario, which is typically the sign of an 
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alienated desire or, to put it simply, Chris was blindly following the majority without getting 
involved personally.  
RESEARCHER: Do you expect to meet resistance among the users? They might find it 
childish?  
CHRIS: We haven’t really talked about that. We kind of mentioned the idea that, how if they 
just outright, reject, all of the Kinect controls, we haven’t really talked about that very much 
because it’s not a situation that we want to, oh yes that’s totally gonna happen, then we’ll design 
everything (laugh). 
Retrospectively, we can say this is an imaginary speech act, as it misrecognizes itself and 
overemphasizes the agent’s own potency (‘we haven’t really talked about that very much 
because it’s not a situation that we want to’). The laugh, as we shall see later, shows the 
overconfidence of the designers. The irony expresses a sense of self-detachment, which is 
symptomatic of a cynical lack of involvement.   
Yet, in a conversation thread on the intranet of the project, one of the instructional 
designers, Jessica, had an early intuition that the art style might be too flowery, and asks her 
male colleagues whether it was too feminine or not: 
JESSICA: Chris it seems you have nicely combined everyone’s feedback here! Can I just ask 
the male members of our team if it appeals to you? (sorry ladies… I’m just wondering if it’s a 
little feminine/flowery for our whole audience). If the guys say yes, then it’s a goer for me.  
JOHN: I like it. I don’t find the flowers particularly girly.  
CHRIS: Jessica I really like the logo(s) and feel they are fairly gender neutral. Ideally we will 
want to run them past a focus of the target audience though.  
JOHN: Top middle for me as well.  
Jessica acts within the symbolic as her intervention asks for, and takes into account, the 
desire and the gender of the others (the ladies and the guys). Another interesting aspect is that 
she also speaks from an ambiguous androgynous position (‘sorry ladies’). Her sexual 
ambiguity will be of importance later on, when the roles will be reconfigured within the team. 
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However, her feeling is still not recognized at this stage, and the males of the group keep 
blindly following the imaginary majority.  
The demo was designed based on the above instructions and decisions before being 
presented in Linz to the partner Methodica. Prior to the meeting, the demo was presented 
online to the partners on several occasions, so they knew about it and what the designers were 
doing. However, on the day of the actual meeting in Austria, one of the partners saw it for the 
first time and made a wholesale objection, as reported by John: 
His negative attitude was directed towards us because he thought we were working in our little 
world. It was quite a frustrating meeting. We need to make sure there is more communication 
between the different partners. We realized there is not enough communication between the 
partners and it’s resulting in all different parts of the projects looking at different things 
The issue here is presented as an issue of communication. John clearly acknowledges the lack 
of communication, a lack of symbolic exchanges, of integration of the Other, of the others in 
general. They were working ‘in their (own) little world’ – in their imaginary world, so to 
speak.  
The shift from imaginary identification to symbolic integration by the Other functions 
through the emergence of the Real, a shock within the team, which will re-articulate and 
sediment the symbolic network organizing the group.  
Phase 2: During the meeting: emergence of the Real 
The Real can be described as a psychosexual event in which the subject experiences 
him/herself as a subject of jouissance. From this perspective, the acceptance of design 
features is seen as the subjection of technology designers to important actors. 
When presenting the project to the partner, the biggest criticism comes from the loudest 
voice in the group, a partner who tries, and manages to, get everyone else onto his side:  
Within 20 seconds when going into the game, the first thing… one of the particular partners, a 
guy, he’s very sort of the strong character of the group, he’s not the leader of the group, but he’s 
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a very strong character, he’s the loud voice of the group, he kind of saw it as a kids’ game; his 
words were ‘kindergarten’. At this point, we were literally just going into the park, we hadn’t 
done anything onto the games 
The style of the partner contrasts with the style of the game itself, as he is perceived as a 
masculine and intimidating figure. John describes how he was impressed by the masculine 
characteristics of the man (male, very strong character, loud voice) whose role is unclear, as 
he is not formally a leader. The character stands out as ‘one of the particular partners’. In this 
case, one signifier emerges that is going to organize the sequence. Thus, John is still puzzled 
by the meeting and retroactively reconstructs the trauma as such: ‘he kind of saw it as a kids’ 
game; his words were ‘kindergarten’. The Real can be described as a trauma in the sense that 
the realm of sexual relationships is always a traumatic experience for the subject. John 
encircles the void of the shock, retrospectively reconstitutes the scene and remembers the 
exact words chosen. The use of the foreign language – here German, but that is not the point 
– fosters the feeling of entering into another territory which is not familiar and is less safe. 
The words ‘at this point’ show that John retroactively posits the signifier ‘kindergarten’ as a 
point the capiton which preempts the practice of visualizing the game (‘we hadn’t done 
anything on to the games’). In Lacanian analysis, the endless movement of signification is 
halted by the predominant role attributed retroactively to master signifiers such as 
‘kindergarten’.  
Yet this is not enough. The word ‘kid’ is double-edged. To comprehend John’s sense of 
castration which is at stake here, we need additional signifiers. While subsequently 
interviewing Jessica, the instructional designer, it emerges that John was not an experienced 
project manager, and that this was his first experience of project management:  
This is a really bad thing, what I am going to say, but before John doing the project we were two 
other people that did that role. Consequently Mark came in part of the way through; he’s not an 
experienced project manager, it’s the first time he’s said he’s done it, he hasn’t received any 
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training or anything so he’s sort of thrown in and then consequently because of that situation we 
ended up with an ineffective brief (Jessica) 
The reference to the kindergarten resonates also because of his obvious and unspoken lack of 
maturity contrasted with the realism of the decision-maker. Fortunately for us, Jessica is here 
to break the code and make that unconscious truth explicit: ‘This is a really bad thing, what I 
am going to say (…)’ This self-transgressive enjoyment is not without a connotation of 
sexual domination; she knows it is a bad thing, but nevertheless she is indeed doing it and is 
obviously enjoying it. Not surprisingly, John is described as a ‘virgin’: ‘it’s the first time he’s 
said he’s done it; he hasn’t received any training or anything so he’s sort of thrown in’ John 
was ‘thrown in’, so to speak, like the baby out with the bath water.  
Now, another set of questions emerges. Why does Jessica feel the need to recuperate the 
signifier ‘kid’ as constructed by the ‘man of Linz’? After all, she could merely defend her 
colleagues and their teamwork to which she too has contributed. Moreover, one can also note 
that Vicky’s version of events contradicts the dominant position that Jessica seeks to endorse:  
I think they were really shocked that they had that kind of reaction. They were expecting to have 
a much more positive reaction than that, so it’s very weird, Jessica did actually take this guy 
side and just said quietly to him: ‘We have shown you all of the documents.’ (Vicky) 
Whereas Jessica rationalizes the trauma by justifying this failure through John’s lack of 
experience and maturity, Vicky describes Jessica as being shocked in front of the man of 
Linz, saying to him quietly: ‘We have shown you all of the documents.’ The emergence of 
the Real is experienced by subjects as an affective trouble, something very strange, and which 
impels subjects to identify with a new or old signifier. Jessica also describes this situation as 
an unusual feeling: 
So he really highlighted that this one guy, first of all the visual style doesn’t blend with the rest, 
secondly the look of how you play it, doesn’t feel quite right. 
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It seems that the first phase of the design practice does not tick right any more (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007). How then shall we understand Jessica’s shift? The missing details appear 
quite clearly later in Jessica’s interview, when she emphasizes the fact that John had 
requested her help in order to mentor him:  
Today for the first time since Linz we might sit down and make some progress, relooking at the 
project you know, I mean, I have been helping John because I’ve got a lot of experience in 
managing European projects that he hasn’t, so he asked me to mentor him. I’ve been doing this 
for 20 years: many, many different projects, different kinds, you know- I’ve got that experience 
That experience which was lacking in ‘the kid’ John is now filled by Jessica’s excessive 
(‘many many’) jouissance. Moreover, Jessica ambiguously endorses a symbolically 
masculine role (she has the experience) in this phallocentric reconfiguration of power, which 
also confirms her earlier fear of having a game too ‘girly’.  
Interestingly, John did not mention to me that he had asked Jessica to mentor him, but 
never mind, as the subjection to the partner had already operated within the team. As we have 
seen with Jessica’s promotion, affect-laden recognition subjects people to power, but also 
enables them by facilitating negotiations among new positions (Kenny, 2012). After the 
shock, the roles were re-articulated, and John accepts, not without frustration, the new 
relationship of domination:  
He’s just sort of a consultant in the project; the meeting was in Linz and he lived in Linz and he 
was like the man of Linz, he was comfortable in his own environment, he was ‘a big man of that 
town’, but he did certain good points, but he was very negative on his feedback, he wasn’t really 
constructive, whereas other people liked what we did. 
Now we can understand the big picture. The man of Linz, fantasized by John through the 
highly politically-charged metaphor of ‘a big man of that town’ or the ‘man of Linz’, who 
has no specific formal power over the team, simply posited ‘the kid’ as a key signifier in 
order to obtain a position of mastery. Interestingly, employees from Totem never articulate 
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his name specifically, yet adopt an affect-laden identification to designate him: ‘this one 
guy’, the ‘man of Linz’, ‘a big Man’ etc...  
In sum, Lacanian analysis demonstrates the articulation of a new law of desire, the right 
way to enjoy, subjecting designers in a new way as well as producing very concrete objective 
effects and new technical features incorporated in the new realistic art style. 
Phase 3: The symbolic map after the meeting  
The new art style is now extremely realistic and connected to a ‘”Street-view” type of 
animation’ with geo-localization tools, GPS or satellite images. The system is now very 
detailed, including a timetable and an exact position on the platform. The following extract is 
an example of a scenario as imagined by the team after the decisive meeting.  
 
An example of scenario  
There is that concert in this new event venue, Fred ‘our’ senior has wanted to visit for a long 
time. Tickets can be booked online and are sent by email. Nothing new for someone, who has 
dealt with online shopping and secure payment most of his life. But the city has changed, 
traffic is more intense and louder than ever and everything has become more confusing over 
the years. The system not only shows the distance to the location, but also suggests a safe and 
quiet way to reach it. Fred has developed problems discerning sounds and is often startled by 
cars and bicycles rushing by. So, the system suggests a route along the river, which might 
take a couple of minutes longer, but is much better suited for people like him. In a ‘Street-
view’ type of animation, the system shows Fred the way to the new concert hall on his big 
TV-set. Fred, like in an engaging video-game, can navigate with his hands and choose 
between alternatives routes suggested by the system. If there is public transportation 
involved, the timetable is shown and the exact position on the platform is marked, where the 
‘easy-access’ door is located, when the tram stops. The system precisely shows every detail 
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of the route. It choses the ‘right’ side of the street, where the sidewalk is wider and is not 
shared with a bicycle lane. It shows the exact location of zebra crossings and if a button needs 
to be pushed to get a green light. Planning can be done in cooperation with friends attending 
the same events. They can share their routes, give each other suggestions and even fix 
meetings places on the route, from where on they will walk together. 
 
The identification of the software with the genre of video-games has now switched from an 
imaginary identification to a symbolic or metaphorical one (‘Fred, like in an engaging video-
games’). After the meeting, the CEO rationalizes the software as a construction with a more 
adult feel, a more legitimate mode of jouissance.  
I think it’s going to be something along the lines of… something based on transport. Some 
viewers got an adult feel to the game, that it doesn’t feel patronizing anyway ‘cause I think 
that’s one of the things they picked upon because that style of graphics, they felt like it was for a 
younger audience, so you know I think it needs to be more adult in feel. 
The outcome of this intervention is a switch from a cartoon lifestyle to a realist lifestyle, and 
from a serious game to a transport simulation. Officially, this is because they wanted to avoid 
the graphics appearing to be patronizing, and to avoid the resistance of any users who might 
regard themselves as infantilized. However, this decision was made before any focus groups 
occurred, and was still subject to change in the later phase of the design, following my 
ethnography.  
In fact, the CEO is not overly interested in the genre that the software belongs to. The 
CEO is engaged in another symbolic battle, at an institutional level. The content of the game 
does not matter for him, and this can be camouflaged via different discourses, depending on 
who the target audience is. Nathan does indeed use different rhetorical strategies: when he 
talks to elderly people, he emphasizes the fun element; when he targets care-home managers, 
he emphasizes the medical aspects: 
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You can camouflage that in a game or a simulation or fun, the words you use are different to 
different audiences, so if I was selling this sort of game to an elderly person, I would say “come 
and let’s have some fun…blah blah blah”. If I sell this simulation-game to an institution, I 
would say “look, this can really help with the cognitive element, you can do some movement 
with the body, you can develop your social skills, yeah, yeah, there is a little fun to it”. The 
main objectives are there to add some different environment, but it’s always different to 
different people, whoever you speak to. (Nathan, CEO) 
Here the CEO mobilizes a functional discourse signalled by the word camouflage. It is not 
clear what the real designed object is, whether this is a game or simulation etc. It is posited as 
a fantasy object in order to seduce one audience or another. Here we can sense that the CEO 
is camouflaging himself under the Machiavellian logic of cynicism. Yet this would be to 
forget that the CEO himself is a subject with his own logic of desire, as we shall subsequently 
see: that is nothing more than an object cause of desire, an empty space, invested by different 
fantasy scenarios. 
Elder Move as an empty signifier  
In this section, I will demonstrate how the conceptualization of the software is shaped by 
various perceptions of the tool, differing according to the role endorsed, namely the 
instructional designer, the project manager and the CEO. In other words, the software is 
polysemic: it is an empty signifier, a place open to various forms of identification and modes 
of enjoyment. 
Jessica, the instructional designer, sees the game as a personal development tool tailored to 
elderly people, and she has the idea of motivating users by using a wheel of life, a device she 
borrowed from the coaching literature and which includes rating tools. The following two 
pictures are extracted from the scrapbook mock-up: 
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Picture 8. The wheel of life. 
 
This is related to Jessica’s biography, as one of her previous job was in training 
development, mentoring people who wish to start their own business or disabled people who 
want to start a new job. She had specific expertise in personal development, motivation and 
confidence building. Her experience in training and her qualification in life coaching and 
performance coaching was then rolled into some of the concepts of the game. The wheel of 
life helps identify areas of life where users can improve or do some work. This classification 
tool was discussed by the designers and finally tailored to the context of the elderly: 
What we’ve done is say ok, our target audience is not going to probably be working so career, 
we scribbled that off, cause we know they are not interested in that, so there are quite a number 
of things in there that we felt that perhaps they wouldn’t be so interested in, we ended up by 
simplifying and super write down to these social, physical, cognitive ideas, which is almost 
where we started 
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Some criteria, such as career, are ‘scribbled off’ and the wheel of life is translated to the 
context of the elderly. The wheel of life is a self-report system which ostensibly helps the 
users to engage in self-reflection. The pictures below represent the wheel of life as well as the 
scoring mechanics used, namely a 3-star system inspired by Angry Birds, a successful video 
game on smartphones, and probably unknown to the elderly.  
 
Picture 9. Scoring and feedback mechanics.  
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Picture 10. Happiness.  
 
The interface of such self-reflection is typically presented as a mirror-image: ‘Be honest with 
your reflection’. At this point, it seems that everything is conceptualized as a genuine 
reflection of the user with himself.  
John, the programmer, is designing a fun game for educational purposes with the 
possibility of networking and comparing scores, and thereby creating a sense of competition 
as in World of Warcraft. Another technical feature of the Elder Move project is that it can 
potentially be connected to a learning system which enables one to track how people are 
progressing with the game, whether they are scoring well etc. The learning system operates in 
the manner of a social network, or a form of social base multiplayer environment:  
There’s been a sort of shift from hitting a button to move to next page of content to more game 
reacts- you have to do the interaction and the game reacts and if you take from different ways, 
trying different scenarios and it can report back the information to say a learning system for 
people to track how you are doing within the game. There is lot more of that rather than game 
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before you were playing in your own virtual world and no one was involved. Rather, now you 
can have people interact with an administrator or something who is like the teacher or the 
trainer, it’s not only about you being on your own in the game, you can interact with a number 
of people. 
The users, instead of being in a virtual world on their own, can interact with an administrator 
or ‘something’, which could be the teacher or the trainer. Here the scoring mechanics and 
chat between users is used to increase the pleasurability associated with the competition. In 
contrast with the self-reflection tool above, the idea of tracking the data and comparing data 
from one user to another is here explicitly mentioned. This is presented as a game-react 
mechanics to create a ‘sense of competition’.   
The CEO is not directly involved in the project, and has in mind other issues of large-scale 
data collection, wherein the game is only a means. Game is the practice through which data 
are collected. From the CEO’s perspective, the scoring mechanics have here a different 
meaning, as they can operate as a tool for data collection. Data are collected in order to make 
the tool more legitimate, and to generate evidence to support the fact that it has a positive 
impact on people. For him, game mechanics are not so much oriented towards the pleasurable 
experience of the users, but more towards the collection of data which enable the legitimation 
of the game towards medical institutions. His concern is more about how much data users can 
get out of this game; if this game is produced and thousands of users are using it, it can 
generate some meaningful data which can be benchmarked and analysed: 
This is my vision: we have this game in thousands of places and data collected and data 
analysed to where people are, that’s what I want to do in terms of the data is to analyse this, but 
also give feedback as well, so the people are moving up the scale, down the scale, and build up 
the evidence to say how good the game is- so we got the variables, we do the benchmarking, 
collecting the data, is there  pattern there, is there a pattern with different people around the 
world, is there a pattern in terms of age, in terms of when it’s played in their home or in their 
care home? The patterns that may come out from the game- that’s my vision. (Nathan, CEO) 
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Here the game mechanics are provided with a very different meaning from that of Jessica and 
others; they are here associated with feedback, benchmarking and evidence building. Thus, 
the firm can gain some legitimacy and evidence to identify patterns of usage, how people’s 
social, physical and cognitive developments are progressing and with different people around 
the world. This is why Gamma’s CEO is working with the Warwick Institute of Digital 
Health: to gain legitimacy, to obtain the evidence from the data that they extract from the 
game. The words ‘That’s my vision’ constitute not so much a vision shared within the 
organization, rather the enjoyment of the CEO in enacting the role of cognitive mastery 
associated with his position in the firm.  
Furthermore, a crucial aspect is that this process is never global – the CEO is not pulling 
strings. In other words, the CEO is not manipulating his employees towards a big data vision. 
Furthermore, in a way, it would be impossible to do so without breaking the comedy 
sustaining the practice of game design, and the economy of enjoyment sustaining the project 
would collapse. There is no organized ideology; or, if you prefer, there is no organized 
vision, since we know that this process has much to do with institutions. There is no 
sensemaking either, as different layers of rationality co-exist, different ideological 
interpretations accorded to the different roles; their effectiveness depends on how they can be 
condensed and given an imaginary substance through the production of the empty signifier.  
In sum, Elder Move is again the empty signifier at the crossroads of various interests and 
various trajectories of meaning or fantasy scenarios. It is not merely equivocal, it is the place 
of a constant misunderstanding. Whether this is the site of local dispute and rapport-de-force 
between John and the Man of Linz, a personal development tool for Jessica or the CEO’s 
Trojan horse for the expansion of the collection of strategic data, the game is irrespectively 
the fantasy object mobilizing enjoyment and energy. It is the object cause of desire around 
which the economy of enjoyment of the organization is organized.  
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As can see from the picture below, where designers test the product, using the Kinect, one 
might ask: Who is the puppeteer? Is the human or the game itself fascinating and seemingly 
hypnotizing the users? Naturally, the object does not really have agency, but its fantasmatic 
appeal, the idea it constitutes in our psyche, does have very effective material consequences. 
 
Picture 11. Using the Kinect.  
 
*** 
In sum, in this chapter I have described a case where gamification dysfunctions, where the 
gaming features get eliminated for being too naïve and childish. I have demonstrated that 
design decisions are neither planned nor applied by institutional vision, but rather emerge 
from the interaction of discourse and psychosexual events. In particular, where gamification 
is intended to generate trust and diminish anxiety among the elderly, it paradoxically 
generates the exact opposite effect: anxiety and coup de force among the design team itself, 
and a redefinition of the project and attribution of roles within the team. Finally, the design of 
Elder Move appears not so much as a technical debate, but more a rapport-de-force and battle 
for recognition over the attribution of meaning around the key signifiers.  
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Chapter 8: Inscription of Ideology  
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In this chapter, I will look at how ideology is inscribed in the technology, and particularly 
at the role that the notion of genre plays in this process. I will study why it is meaningful to 
name a work practice a ‘game’ or not, and what the implications are for the programmers and 
for the clients. In particular, I will consider two projects of the same company, Delta. The 
first project deals the visualization of data in 3D, and gives us insight into the centrality of 
enjoyment/excitement in the analysis of an increasingly huge amount of data, a phenomenon 
usually known as ‘big data’. The second project is a virtual world designed for teaching 
geology and conducting virtual fieldwork with PhD students. This project involves 
geologists, but also includes some earth scientists who are against technology and defend true 
fieldwork in the curriculum.  
Aims of the chapter 
In this chapter, I would like to problematize the notion of inscription. The design of 
computerized systems has often been conceptualized as classification work and, from this 
perspective, IT and systems developers can be seen not merely as designers of technical tools, 
but also as architects of organizations themselves.   
Existing debate in social theory addresses the role that categorization plays in the struggle 
over the control of social identities (Sacks, 1979). Sacks looks at how persons assigned to a 
place in a system of categorization, imposed from outside, engage in acts of resistance by 
developing categories for themselves (in Sacks’ example, ‘teenagers’ develop the category of 
‘hotrodders’ as a revolutionary act). Implications of this debate in information systems 
research have lead researchers to study how the inscription of formal representations in 
technical systems contests how our relations to each other are ordered and by whom 
(Suchman, 1993). Sacks’ hotrodders or the users of THE COORDINATOR in Suchman’s 
study are tied together by the belief that they must be brought into compliance with a 
particular conventional order.  
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The link between inscription and classification is, for example, offered by Bowker and 
Star: ‘What a difference a name makes: The classification of nursing work’ (1999). The genre 
is a particular mode of classification. Work classification systems are central in management 
and their development is the contested site of a quiet politics of voice, work and values 
(Bowker and Star, 1999). In their study of a system for classifying nursing work, these 
authors describe the process through which a Nursing Interventions Classification (NIC) were 
designed by asking nurses to describe what they do, so that it could be classified, 
standardized, and integrated into a billing system. The nurses’ list of interventions includes 
beyond the usual practice of nursing, less expected situated and subjective action such as 
humour:  
How can one capture humour as a deliberate nursing intervention? Does sarcasm, irony or 
laughter count as a nursing intervention? How to reimburse humour, how to measure this kind 
of care? (Bowker and Star, 1999) 
Now that computer developers have the power of classification, do they have the 
temptation to exert power on embodied behaviours, to mobilize their power of compliance in 
order to serve specific ends, usually disguised under apparent value-free imperatives such as 
utility or productivity?  
Van der Heijden (2004) applied the distinction between hedonic and utilitarian products to 
classify information systems. Van der Heijden argues that hedonic systems seek to provide 
‘self-fulfilling value to the user, in contrast to utilitarian systems, which aim to provide 
instrumental value to the user and increase efficiency.’ In its purest form, interacting with 
hedonic systems is designed to be an end in itself. Literature inspired by motivational 
perspectives has acknowledged the problem of consent in the playfulness (or intrinsic 
motivation) associated with managerially-imposed games (Mollick and Rothbard, 2013). 
Thus, the cognitive labels or script associated with the task (play versus work) also affect 
intrinsic motivation (Cellar and Barrett 1987). For instance, Vinkatesh measured the effect of 
199 
 
game-based learning on perceived usefulness (extrinsic motivation) to account for cases 
where users would dismiss game-based learning for being ‘just a game’.  
In this chapter, my aim is to interrogate the work/game distinction which operates no 
longer as a contradiction in terms, but as the programmer’s act of cultural inscription, where 
work constitutes the Real, the psychosexual contingency, to which the meaning ‘game’ is 
attached. What cultural regime arranges the interaction between technology and body, and 
what interventions into this ritualistic repetition are possible? How do we struggle with the 
categorization? Under which conditions do we forget the category associated with 
technology? When do we ultimately feel immersed in the game?  
Framing the case 
What is DataVisu? 
DataVisu is a data visualization tool designed by developers from Delta, and it is based on 
the game engine Unity3D. DataVisu is designed to maximize human analysis by optimizing 
the display of data: it is a virtual world for visualizing, which means that users can navigate 
inside the data, move around and through the data and view them from a wide variety of 
viewpoints, either from the inside or out. The use of a 3D environment significantly increases 
the amount of information that can be sensibly displayed, and the sense of immersion appears 
to help the brain to identify any patterns, clusters and anomalies in the data. 
Thus, the visualization tool is designed not so much as a serious game but as a more 
engaging way of looking at the data. It is not an automated analysis tool although it can be 
used to visualize the outputs of such tools. The multiple datasets are plotted in the same 
subjective space. The tool enables one to import and to plot large amount of data, rising to 
over 1 million points, derived from web services such as RSS, Twitter and other feeds and 
real-time data. It also enables to dynamically map and re-map data parameters onto plot 
features. 
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What is 3D Skiddaw?  
3D Skiddaw is another project from Unity’s developers. It reproduces the geological 
fieldwork experience in a 3D immersive digital landscape created using real world data from 
the northern Lake District in the UK. The experience is focused on the rocks around an 
outcrop of the Skiddaw granite, and takes the form of an investigation into the 
metamorphosis that has affected the landscape. It is the subsequent re-shaping of these rocks, 
in terms of their structural features, which occurred 400 million years ago, that is of particular 
interest to geologists.  
The developed software is a browser-based 3D simulation using Unity software. Geology 
researchers insist on keeping this simulated world open to external, legitimate sources of 
knowledge, such as the virtual microscope, data from the field by integrating real pictures, 
sounds (one geologist has recorded the sound of the wind and birds in Skiddaw) and specific 
features such as various maps, including geological or metamorphic views. 
Picture 12. The aureole of the Skiddaw granite (based on Eastwood et al., 1968). 
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Exploring Big Data through DataVisu  
Competing forms of enjoyment  
As an alternative to the established practice of visualizing data in 2D graphs, the 
developers propose a practice which is supposed to replace the previous one and provide it 
with an emotional appeal. 
DataVisu provides an easy way to use immersive 3D environments in which users can 
visualize and interact with data from almost any source, from financial Excel spreadsheets to 
live social media feeds, including Tweeter or Facebook. Here, the ideological process 
consists of using a signifier which connotes administrative and bureaucratic boredom: the 
spreadsheet. In order to mobilize users, programmers make jokes (interviewees are here 
usually smiling or laughing) that using DataVisu is more exciting and ‘cooler’ than using a 
spreadsheet. This complements the serious argument that a spreadsheet displays data as lines 
of information, making it easy to miss key information. In contrast, 3D visualization tools 
offer a different way to explore, visualize and see the data, i.e. to understand the story of the 
data: 
I love the product I think it’s really cool. It kind of gets you excited about data (laugh) which is 
not something a spreadsheet does. I think 3D environment gets you excited about things 
(Programmer) 
It’s a different way to explore your data and visualize and see it because sometimes spreadsheets 
for example, can be you can miss key information because it’s just in lines of information 
(Programmer) 
Any kind of data that you have, numbers, and you try to understand the story of the data, what 
the relationship might be (Programmer) 
This rhetorical and performative operation typically shows the work of subjectivity. At a 
technical level, the product is described as ‘subjective space’. A spreadsheet (which typically 
refers to well-known competitors such as Excel, Tableau or the statistical mapping tool R) is 
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a boring way of looking at data and a 3D environment is an exciting way: after all it is like a 
video-game. We know that this is not the case, and looking at data whether in 3D or 2D will 
always be, ultimately, a painful, analytic process (this is indicated by the moderator ‘kind of’ 
and the laugh after: ‘kind of get you excited about data’, which show the self-transgressive 
ironical distance). This is especially true when dealing with serious purposes such as medical 
or climate data. However, here the ambiguity of using game technologies is used to provide a 
connotation of pleasurability. The operation of the game engine here is not so much technical 
but affective; the signifier ‘game’ is the mask preceding the technological change, namely 
from the practice of visualizing data in 2D to 3D. A mode of enjoyment is competing and 
potentially substituting the other, potentially generating not only the emergence of new 
practices, but also the consolidation of a new habitus: 
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Pictures 13, 14 and 15. Marketing materials of DataVisu: 
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Of course, the emergence of new ways of feeling and acting, the destabilization of existing 
institutionalized feelings, is far from obvious. It involves taking the risk of bizarre acting out, 
dealing with ambiguity and disharmony, experimenting with emotions which have never been 
displayed and for which we do not necessarily have a word. For example, let us consider the 
excitement of displaying data in 3D via DataVisu, which tends to be somewhat overplayed by 
the marketing team in the following extracts, taken from the marketing Facebook pictures 
above, where a manager comments on pictures of the software:  
and at a touch of a button we can make the red spheres totally invisible so only the auto-tag 
tweets show! Making it easier to spot the weather stations. Lol. Latest tweet closest to the map. 
capturing live tweets in 3D around the west of England on datavisu  #3D #datavisualization 
spotted more weather stations! More pics to follow ☺ 
and another – being able to make sense of unstructured data like Twitter can sometimes be great 
fun! 
These examples are excessive, even ‘nerdy’, but render visible the overall project, namely the 
replacement of one mode of enjoyment over another. They remind us that affect is different 
from emotion; it is always ambiguous, resisting the work of categorization, and the attempt to 
orient its force and provide it with a language is the ideological intervention par excellence.  
In fact, the function of the signifier, in Lacanian semiotics, is that of a metaphor. It is like 
a video game. The experience of designing a 3D environment is connected by the developers 
to a network of inter-textual references to pop culture, for instance first-person-shooting 
games such as GTA, Doom, Wolfenstein or RPG, or role-playing games like Ultimate on the 
World, Final Fantasy 7, World of Warcraft or science fiction movies. In the words of the 
programmers, the navigation metaphor is similar to a videogame:  
The navigation metaphor is like in a video game; it would become a game or a serious game if 
we started giving you points for zapping things and they disappear, that would cross the 
boundaries for being a visualization to be some sort of serious games. 
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Interestingly, this quote exemplifies the rhetorical twist used by Delta’s programmers by 
using of a formal (and therefore imaginary) definition of game (a game typically requires a 
win or lose condition; there are points in a game). On the one hand, this definition functions 
as an impossible horizon, in order to reinforce the public prohibition supporting the law of 
desire: ‘This is not a game’. On the other hand, it provides the tool with the legitimacy 
necessary to convince the business and scientific decision makers about the relevance of 
adopting a 3D world for their work practice.  
In a sense, the social game is closer to what a game really is; because of illusio, the 
ignorance of acting within a pre-established field is stronger. More than a category inscribed 
in the machine, the game is the metaphor of the 3D visualization, and it sustains the fiction 
enacted by the developers. 
The spectacle of enjoyment  
The practice of 3D visualization is described as a fiction, not an instrument. Data are 
described as something to look at, rather than something to read. If looking at the data is 
more entertaining, it becomes easier to spot trends and associations.  
However, at a more informal level, which Facebook materializes very well, the smileys or 
abbreviations above show not only the visible enjoyment but, in their excessive over-use, 
they show the desire to exhibit the enjoyment seductively, the provocative meaning of 
jouissance. Enjoyment is something that is stolen from the Other, jouissance is the byproduct 
of the subject and the big Other: it is what is stolen by the subject from the gaze of others. 
This is why, when it is displayed, it is fascinating and repulsive, as it constitutes a scandalous 
‘theft of enjoyment’. The excessive aspect and the ridicule or bizarre effects it generates, 
however, are also the sign of a process that is too conscious of itself; in Lacanian terms, a fall 
into the imaginary register, which is the other side of the coin of taking gamification seriously 
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and making it systematic. In fact, these computer games designers are in the process of 
‘getting it’ (Nandakhumar et al., 2013). As a programmer puts it: 
I think it is more immersive. It makes you feel like you are actually involved in something. I 
think it helps you retain it because it’s something to look at rather than just read, I would say, a 
sheet of paper or rather a book, pretty much really, especially on the training side of things. It 
makes you feel you are actually living through the experience of actually doing it, rather than 
just watching a video or reading through the exercise. It helps you judging completely and 
actually makes you feel you are actually experiencing it in real life. 
Here we might question this imaginary power of technology: Why is reading a book less 
exciting than using an immersive environment? Does this all depend on our investment, the 
way in which we engage with these two activities? In fact, the programmers seek to 
seductively mobilize the users’ subjectivity, to capture their enjoyment, to provoke them by 
showing them not so much the content on the screen, but by showing them how they perform 
and enjoy themselves using the tool; they want to understand that feeling:  
So the thing about the client is that a lot of the time, they want to understand; even if you take 
them, yes this is on his way we are working on this, they won’t really understand until they see 
it on the screen themselves. 
It has to be realistic, exciting and believable. We know perfectly well that it is fake, but we 
keep acting excessively, we pursue our action as if it was serious. This libidinal excess 
requires necessarily an element of comedy to be articulated: after all, the programmer uses 
the metaphor of the spectacle (to look, etymologically). 
During a meeting, developers raised the point that while algorithms get democratized, data 
science tools might replace data scientists before this field has even taken flight – a 
prolongation of the classical deskilling literature in organizational studies. In fact, data 
science is neither a science nor engineering: it is a spectacle. Machines never have the deep 
understanding of the tools of data science, machines never enjoy the tool, they do not 
experience the frustration and thrill of displaying data in 3D. The practice of data science 
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involves a libidinal mode of investment which makes the tool material, bringing it to life, 
although this truth will never be admitted officially in fine.  
If you put that into DataVisu it gives you the ability to see in holding light and maybe spot in as 
you might miss stuff when you only go through a list and part of my job is try to make people 
see that. 
I think it’s much better if you are a creative person, because it takes creativity to do something 
in a 3D environment. If you’re not very creative, you gonna fight, you gonna struggle to display 
the data that you have in an interesting way. 
People found it easier to spot some features, and also were less stressed when doing research. 
That looks like the physical world and the brain find it easier to cope with that. 
The aesthetic and pleasurable makes it less stressful to look at data. This is the reassuring 
function of fantasy, in that this storyline conceals the radical contingency associated with the 
exploration of big data. In the current context of increasing amounts of data and information, 
data analysis is a material practice involving aesthetics, subjectivity and enjoyment – not an 
automated process, a certain pain that becomes pleasure, the enjoyment to be rewarded for a 
pain. The programmer stresses the creativity required to display data in a 3D environment, 
but also the idea that work is a drama, a hand-to-hand fight with the machine: ‘You gonna 
fight, you gonna struggle to display the data’. Thus, designers do not use categories to 
inscribe fun properties into the game, but to metaphorically perform the ‘theft of enjoyment’ 
which hooks the clients not so much to the imaginary content on the screen, but to the 
visualization practice itself. 
This case manifests a classic configuration between programmers and potential clients in 
various spheres; the machine may challenge the work of the data analysts, but this is not so 
much addressed here. More work needs now to address the resistance of those clients who are 
losing skills, and how this is addressed.  
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Table 6. Existing organisational fantasy and alternative ideological fantasy  
 Existing Routinized activity  Alternative Fantasmatic Frame  
Data  2D data visualization  3D data visualization 
Software Excel, Tableau,  DataVisu  
Associated emotions  Administrative, boring  Creative, fun, exciting  
Mode of enjoyment Read/functional  Look/pleasure 
Logics Social Political  
 
3D Geology Fieldtrip 
From fieldwork to 3D simulation 
In parallel to the ethnographic work I conducted with the design team, I conducted 
detailed, semi-structured interviews with the clients, who were researchers and geologists 
from a well-known university with strong distance learning curricula. The aim was to 
understand the perceptions from their (the academic) side.  
One of the earth scientists, Sofia, makes a distinction between the users’ and the 
programmers’ perspective: for a programmer, she argues, a box with shoe written on it would 
be technically correct; but for the users, this is meaningless, and this is not related to real 
experience. In her words, the design of Skiddaw’s user experience is above all the design and 
features of a particular feeling, in her words, a real-life feel: 
It is much closer to the real-life experience, and the whole idea behind this geology trip is that 
you are bringing in a real-life feel for people who cannot go for a real trip. They come and get 
an almost real-life like experience, therefore you have to use features and design which are very 
similar to real life. 
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Of course, the first question that comes to mind here is: who has the authority to say what a 
real-life feel is? Who decides and counts what really matters? What is the material experience 
of being a geologist? In fact, this question is far from innocent, but is rather the locus of the 
Real, a fundamental schism -very similar, metaphorically, to the metamorphosis’ which 
transform our landscape- around which the geologists’ discourse about Skiddaw is 
constructed. As Thomas, another geologist, put it:  
I think much professional scientists, they love fieldwork, they’re coming to sciences because 
they love going outdoors, looking at rocks and doing fieldwork. 90% of the professional 
scientists explicitly value that, so the problem is that you often have a loyalty to fieldwork, I 
suppose. You have invested a lot of your career in fieldwork, and you feel instinctively, you 
learned a lot of geology through fieldwork, you realize that this is a valuable, very rich learning 
experience. You also have a suspicion that sometimes it is hard to pin down exactly why, but 
you think that some of the learning achieved through fieldwork would be very difficult through 
a distance learning environment. 
The main resistance (the ‘problem’) emerged from these ‘90% of the professional scientists’ 
who love fieldwork and ‘feel instinctively’ that this should be the right way to practise and 
learn geology. The real work associated with fieldwork and structuring the discourse of the 
geologist is located beyond consciousness, and always escapes representation: ‘Sometimes it 
is hard to pin down exactly why’. We are confronted here by the impossibility not only to 
capture work, the idiosyncratic experience of being a geologist, but also to talk about it 
meaningfully, as it is a profoundly subjectivity experience. In the following part of the 
interview extract:  
There are a lot of people for whom fieldwork is quite daunting; some people literally do not like 
going outside at all. This is a revolution for most scientists- they cannot imagine people 
unfamiliar with the outdoors, wouldn’t enjoy or even be quite daunted or scared by going 
outside and looking at the natural environment, particularly kind of rocky mountains areas. 
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The emotions traditionally associated with the real of jouissance emerge as a locus of 
excitement/thrill or anxiety which can be accepted or rejected, as some people ‘wouldn’t 
enjoy or even be quite daunting or scared by going outside’. The Real manifest itself is a 
dislocation (‘this is a revolution for most scientists’) where existing professional identities are 
threatened (‘they cannot imagine people unfamiliar with the outdoors’) and new forms of 
identity are legitimized and rendered possible. 
Although the Real is described as an impasse of representing what it means to be a 
geologist, this lack produces logically an ideological attempt to cover over this lack. 
Antagonistic forces emerge around the dislocation of what it means to be a geologist: 
Others are still very entrenched, very traditional views, and they are much more focused on 
trying to keep real fieldwork in the curriculum, as opposed to designing online experiences 
which kind of mimic or replace that. And I would say that that split occurs across any 
institutions, regardless whether it is distance learning institutions or not. 
The design of Skiddaw can be read as the replacement of a privileged mode of enjoyment by 
a new one. This is a war of positions between two camps ‘entrenched’ in different positions, 
two conflicting social and political logics. Deciding whether to keep fieldwork in the 
curriculum is also a highly strategic decision, involving choice over the kind of jouissance 
which is promoted and institutionalized. In the words of Thomas, there is a ‘split’ between 
this position and a new generation of geologists who find fieldwork dangerous, and prefer to 
familiarize themselves via online simulation. The debate is about what is painful and what is 
pleasurable, what is exciting and what conversely provokes anxiety. Thus, the design of 
Skiddaw is the arena of a rapport-the-force and political struggle over the legitimate way to 
enjoy geology, to feel like a scientist and to enact a scientific identity.  
This promotion of a new form of enjoyment associated with geology is not limited to the 
controversy which is inherent within an academic institution, but also involves the 
programmers working on the project.  
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The problem of the genre  
The second step of my research strategy was the shadowing of the design of the storyboard 
of Skiddaw until its presentation to the clients. Many of the design decisions were made once 
the clients had been exposed to this initial 3D boarding. On the 18th of October, the CEO 
gathered the development team, the 3D artist, two programmers and the project manager to 
discuss an early sketch of the storyboard, prior to meeting the client. To extend the metaphor 
of the spectacle, this is the last rehearsal before the show. In particular, the introductory 
section of the game is discussed, including the choice of avatars and the kit selection (boots, 
compass, glasses, hat etc.) before starting the excursion.  
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Pictures 16 and 17. The storyboard 
 
PROGRAMMER: Here we are 
bordering the line of gamification   
CEO: I know, but if they want more 
they have to pay for that  
PROJECT MANAGER: Some boobs 
might help (joke)  
PROGRAMMER: We could also 
randomize the weather to give some 
rationale. Then they can select a t-
shirt or a sweatshirt and decide 
which one they want to wear  
CEO: Yes but they will have to pay 
more  
PROGRAMMER: How about the 
items on the table, is that too gaming, 
not too gaming?  
CEO: I would prefer not too much.  
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In the dialogue transcribed above, the schoolboy enjoyment of the programmers is 
confronted by the neutral tone of the CEO of the development company. The CEO enacts and 
instantiates the superegostical formal Law of the programmer, the usufruct (you can enjoy, 
but not too much) guaranteeing the distribution of jouissance. He does so in a way which 
combines financial imperatives and ideological consistency as intended by the use of the 
word ‘gamification’. Thus, the notion of ‘bordering the line of gamification’ clearly places 
gamification as an imaginary horizon, an ideological fantasy, an asymptote towards which the 
affective enjoyment of the programmers is directed, but also limited.  
On the 24th of October, the team finally presented the final version of the storyboard to the 
clients. When addressing the kit selection, the client asked for reasons and a rational scenario 
behind the choice of items, such as, for example, meteorological conditions and safety 
procedures. The idea of adding a sequence of a car park boot to the storyline for introducing 
the trip is discussed by the clients, but the CEO found it very expensive. Aesthetically very 
similar to the genre of adventure video game or RPG, the visualization also fitted the real-life 
feel expectations of the client. Clients found it not to be artificially gamified. In the course of 
the meeting, the CEO compared the 3D images with photographic imagery from Google 
Earth to confirm and compare the level of realism between Unity and the real world.  
This meeting reveals a core opposition around which the debate is organized. Sofia 
explicitly theorizes (let us not forget that she is an academic!) the ‘tension’ between a ‘logic 
of immersion’ which pertains to the integration of ever more game mechanics within the 
software and to what is intended by the programmers – and a ‘logic of openness’ which 
pertains to how users actually use the software and enact their own methods. She clearly 
adopts the second stance. It is vital to understand that the site of the contestation here is not 
so much the technical features, but the genre of the software itself, the game as a signifier, the 
game as an ideology, so to speak. In the following excerpts from interviews, we can observe 
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how the programmers encircle the Real, how they struggle to name the product, how they 
make sense of this dislocation which Sofia has theorized as a tension. 
At an official level, the description of the finished product on the website does not 
mention the genre of game, but rather defines the product as 3D simulation.  
The use of floating questions marks…that’s an element of gamification because it’s something 
that has a connotation with something like World Of Warcraft, so we decided to use quite 
generic floating marker, rather than something that has a connotation towards a game. 
The navigation metaphor is like in a video game; it would become a game or a serious 
game if we started giving you points for spotting things. You could zap and they 
disappear- that would cross the boundaries for being a visualization to be some sort of 
serious games, but just because it’s not a game doesn’t mean you don’t have fun. 
Based on the above, although some ‘connotations towards (sic) a video-game’ are 
progressively deleted, game mechanics and scientific features keep co-existing. For example, 
the ‘navigation metaphor’ or the ability to teleport an avatar from one geographical site to 
another, the ability to fly, are not even contested by the clients. The checklist of tasks is also 
maintained. In fact, the game-like element needs to remain double-edged, between the lines 
of classification, as words such as ‘metaphor’, ‘connotations’ or ‘it seems like a game’. They 
are residual, in excess, elements of jouissance, side-products of the categorization. The focus 
is largely on the learning, on the serious side of it. This includes supporting materials such as 
a geology guidebook about the learning activity, the speaking voice of the teachers to make it 
more interactive and providing advice about safety procedures and ‘a good way to teach in 
light touch’ (Thomas). 
In fact, Sofia is an active user of Second Life, and praises the community angle of virtual 
worlds, as opposed to the closed nature of a scripted video-game. When asked about the 
genre of the game, her position is very strict:   
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It’s not a game (assertive). There are no gaming elements, there isn’t a sense of competition, 
there isn’t a sense of a number of points: the only motivational tool is that you are given a set of 
tasks to do. So each side of Skiddaw in this 3D environment you are given a set of tasks and you 
have to complete those tasks; you are supposed to complete those tasks, but it doesn’t mean that, 
if I leave two tasks, I may be digging less points than my fellow students, it’s not driven by that. 
Her rhetorical twist here is a metonymic sliding by providing the signifier game with a 
restricted content, such as ‘a sense of a number of points’, a ‘win or lose condition’ or the 
thrill of ‘competition’ which is, after all, only one of the many angles from which to define 
the word. This discourse tends to rationalize her initial anxiety towards competition, and 
makes sense of it retrospectively in a less traumatic way. Sofia’s interview also reveals her 
belief in the fantasy of community life associated with Second Life. The assertion “It’s not a 
game” typically depicts the structure of the law which is an enunciation, a speech act which 
turns an impossibility (of the direct access to the thing of jouissance) into a prohibition. 
Scientific training for PhDs will always involve painful analytic processes and cannot be just 
a game; however, the interdiction opens an ambiguity, organizing the scientific logic of 
desire.  
Thus, the antagonism between the programmers and the geologists does not really lie at a 
technical or generic level, but symbolizes a more fundamental dislocation, a more 
foundational traumatic truth. The scientific law distributes its specific modes of enjoyment 
and organizes its self-transgression. From the perspective of the geologists, it is not the 
programmed enjoyment in the interface which should be promoted, but the one enacted 
during the teaching experience by Thomas:  
Whenever I design teaching resources, the distance students in particular here, I try to inject a 
little bit of humour or surprise, that kind of just wakes them up, trying to make the interface, or 
the assessments, or whatever I am doing, slightly more enjoyable. (…) We had an event where 
we were demonstrating some of the open science lab in which 3D Skiddaw had some part of 
that. And the guy who is director, he came and said, you know we need a bit more fun in it, he 
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said, exactly what my attitude is, try to inject a bit more fun into it, the humour, the game aspect 
if you like; it’s not integrated, it’s a little bit of a distraction.  
Here the game-like element is introduced in a much more informal way; it is vague, as 
indicated by markers such as ‘if you like’. In fact, there is metaphorical sliding operating here. 
It is open to subjection and subjective appropriation, and so it is literally ‘not integrated’ as 
traumatic, real, pre-symbolic enjoyment. The mode of enjoyment remains a self-transgression 
of the scientific Law: a distraction. Gamification is seen either as a threat (Sofia) or ‘It is a 
bit silly (laugh)’ (Thomas), not so much due to its intrinsic features, but because it covers an 
ideological attempt to substitute the programmer’s Law for the one organizing the scientific 
enjoyment. The question of the genre leads us to see categorization not merely as that which 
structures and classifies, but more fundamentally as that which creates prohibition, a site of 
punishable pleasure, that which organizes new modes of libidinal investment.  
As we can see from the final description of 3D Skiddaw below, references to on-site 
fieldwork as well as gamification are absent, vanished into oblivion, yet structuring the 
description of the product through its metonymical redistribution: 
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This leads to the contamination of the discourse of the geologists by one of the 
programmers – a passage facilitated by Sofia. The practice of doing fieldwork is replaced by 
a ‘real sense of presence for the user’ and a high ‘sense of immersion’. While these attributes 
are highly-contested within the field of geology itself, this gap is, of course, concealed in the 
discourse. The discursive formations of the geologists are confusingly maintained as being 
equivalent to their original experiences, such as ‘sketching rocks, describing hand specimens 
of rocks, checking the regional context of the sites’. Of course, the hand specimens are not 
hand specimens any longer, as this would involve the sensory experience of seeing, touching 
and smelling, but a continuation with the previous discursive genre of geology teaching needs 
to be maintained. While the trace of the game engine is not even mentioned (it’s been literally 
crossed-out), its effects are present everywhere: ‘3D immersive digital landscape’, ‘digital 
elevation model’, ‘textual imagery’, ‘augmented with in-built Unity terrain and flora’ and 
‘3D virtual geology field trip activity’.  
*** 
In this section, I addressed the issue of inscription. My aim is to problematize the 
inscription of genre into technology-in-practice. What are the implications of calling the 
designed technology a game or not? What does Glynos’ Lacanian reflection on ideological 
fantasy bring to this debate? Then, I turned to classification, stating in essence that if people 
know that an activity is labelled a ‘game’, it does not work: it breaks the fiction of ideological 
fantasy, which has strong implications for those who call themselves gamifiers. I showed a 
case where new affects are promoted to visualize and enjoy data, because the promotion of 
enjoyment is a condition for big data analysis to function. In the second case, I show the 
opposite, namely how old affects are destroyed and rendered obsolete. What is at stake is the 
reproduction of the institutional fiction of what it means to be a geologist through other 
means and other tools. This is a political and affective process, in the sense that it may 
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involve the destruction of existing work practices but also the destruction of specific 
emotions.   
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Chapter 9: Discussion  
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In this thesis, my aim has been to look at the relationship between people and information 
technologies, from a subject-based perspective, which means an approach that highlights the 
materiality of affect and ideology. In particular, I have addressed three issues pertaining to 
game design, namely the hegemonic adoption of the game engine Unity3D, the acceptance of 
the graphics design of a serious game for elderly, and the inscription of the programmer’s 
ideology in visualization tools used by data or earth scientists. The ideology of the 
programmer’s is viewed not merely as the mastery of a technical know-how acquired and 
then translated to other contexts, but as a force which is never more powerful than when 
people have forgotten that they are unconsciously subjected to it.  
Discussion: Adoption as hegemony process:  
From a hegemony perspective, adoption of IT depends on both a practice of coalition-
building but also a capacity to provide subjects benefits and enjoyment which bind them 
affectively to certain software by leading them to reject others.  
How Unity got mainstreamed 
The fieldwork revealed a tension between the established regime oriented towards the 
market of console games for entertainment and the new emerging regime of indie developers.  
A key finding of this investigation is that the game industry is characterized by the 
unevenness of (financial and institutional) power between major studios and publishers of 
accredited video-games for consoles one the one hand, and a bundle of small entrepreneurs 
with low means developing mobile apps, on the other hand. Put it another way, institutional 
Goliaths such as Nintendo, Sony, Electronic Arts or Ubi Soft compete with the emerging 
masses of small and medium enterprises and independent developers of social and mobile 
gaming. As several indie designers confessed during the ethnography, nowadays 
programmers and artists quite often design an app or an asset and then sell themselves as a 
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service company to big studios. This asymmetry is the starting point which conditions the 
study of the articulation at stake in hegemonic relations and the reconfiguration of the market. 
For carrying out this extension and hegemonise the demands and identities of new 
markets, Unity needs to mobilize forms of resemblance between such demands. This occurs 
typically through metaphors. Where metonymies highlight a logical relation between two 
elements, metaphors imply a relation of a subjective kind. Thus, metaphors play a role in 
partially condensing such demands into a more universal cohesion. In other words, metaphors 
aim at creating points of attachment that grip the subjects in particular ways. Central here is 
of course the metaphor of gaming (while there is no logical link between gambling and 
gaming, there is a metaphorical one). Unity’s hegemonic strategy functions through a 
constant negotiation between the particular (game for fun) and the universal (Game, with a 
capital G, as a structure for social action such as playing, learning and visualizing). 
Hegemonic relations presuppose the product’s incarnation and adaptability in local situations. 
Reversely, no product can ever turn mainstreamed without being the locus of universalizing 
effects. 
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Figure 5. How Unity’s regime reorganizes the industry 
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Why the strategy holds together?  
We will now address the second affective dimension of hegemony which makes the 
innovative regime sustainable over time. The energy sustaining a new work practice depends 
on the successful knotting together of specific political and fantasmatic logics. 
Firstly, a central point is that Unity seeks to construct and install the work subjectivity of 
the indie developer. The logic of subjectivation seems here positively articulated with the 
logic of heroism through success stories and invocation of historical entrepreneurial guru and 
stars. Ideological narratives seductively reinforce and secure the modes of enjoyment of the 
programmers- also at a community level. Yet this articulation is not without encountering 
deadlock and contradiction, such as when a programmer takes pride not being a UDK 
modder- a ‘heroic’ identification which is contested by another designer. In fact, the 
fantasmatic logic of heroism contradicts the political logic of democratization, as elitism is 
not so much a democratic value. It also ignores the perspective of the 3D artists who may 
Unity’s Regime  
Political: gamification, 
democratization, subjectivation  
Fantasmatic: community spirit and 
heroism 
Game design as 
institutionalized 
practice reserved to 
an elite of 
publishers, 3D artists 
and accredited game 
studios   
Innovative Practices/ 
Game design should 
be easy, democratic 
(small team, cheap 
budget) and 
extended to other 
context of use   
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typically praise the elitism of the old regime versus the poor quality of graphics in the new 
mobile gaming generation designed through Unity.  
Furthermore, the link between the logic of subjectivation and community spirit also 
produces considerable enjoyment-value among the corporation of indie programmers. Unity’s 
fantasy-narratives provide programmers with greater autonomy and transfers the creative 
agency from the artists to the programmer. This is evident when a Tony from Delta explains 
that he feels more comfortable with Unity because he is a programmer and not an artist. Such 
identity claim shows how the product sustains the ideological fantasy of the corporation of 
the programmer, seduced by Unity’s discourse, using it as a way to secure their own 
attribution of jouissance at a local level. This reproduces the politico-ideological axis with the 
risk of overinvestment and deception- as manifested by criticisms coming from other 
designers. The political logic of subjectivation, at a fantasmatic level, mostly disregards 
contingency, embodied by the 3D artists or other recalcitrant programmers. 
Secondly, Unity’s logic of democratization is authentically connected to the logic of 
community spirit as indicated by the affectively-charged metaphor of the family car for 
children and friends: anybody in the world could design a game, including a dad for his 
children! This contrast with the coldness of UDK which designers use without enjoying it. 
Paradoxically, the logic of democratization can also be articulated with heroism, thanks to the 
true sense of empowerment via Unity- Rob’s account makes it clear that he is genuinely 
subjugated by the new possibilities offered by the tools. His enthusiasm is hard to deny and 
this sudden sense of empowerment can be called heroic at an affective level. In either case, 
the two logics of fantasy are registered within the politico-ethical axis which is more 
susceptible to foster sustainable innovation.  
Thirdly, the logic of gamification is not as fantasmatically-charged as one might expect. 
At an affective level, it functions more as Unity’s developers’ ‘dirty secret’ than a coherent 
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ideology. It typically functions well when articulated with the jouissance- the guilty pleasure 
of the programmer and its demiurgic fantasy. However, the political logic of gamification is 
not articulated with the fantasmatic logic of community spirit mainly for a reason of 
credibility; it is seen sceptically by the adopters and even rejected by the decision-makers. In 
contrast with early adopters of Second Life, Unity’s users are here at the right distance from 
the fantasy associated with the political logic of gamification and thus genuine in their 
identification.  
Political logic  Fantasmatic logics  Enjoyment-value 
Subjectivation  Community spirit Overinvestment 
Subjectivation  Heroism  Overinvestment  
Democratization  Community spirit Authentic investment   
Democratization  Heroism  Authentic Investment  
Gamification  Heroism Authentic Investment   
Gamification  Community spirit   Authentic Investment    
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Eldermove: a case of resistance   
In the study of the design of Elder Move, I have mobilized discourse analysis for 
discussing the conceptualization of the content of the medical serious game. The designers 
finally rejected the initial gamified art style and adopted a restorative logic in its design.  
Disorganized vision 
The Elder Move case contributes to the literature on the conceptualization of technologies 
in organizations. From a subject-based approach, the design of technology is viewed as a 
contingent, historically and culturally located configuration of sexuality and language, where 
particular acts subject designers in a new way. Further, the findings of the study challenge the 
argument that designers imagine in their heads the machine-to-be, from so-called ‘organizing 
visions’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Although business actors of course mobilize such 
visions, ideologies are always subjected to psychosexual forces which constantly destabilize 
them. Practitioners are neither in control but nor are they naïve. Their job consists in 
managing the tension between the emergence of subjective processes and their own 
conceptualized aspirations. The orchestration of events is akin to an open art style where 
various actors seek to displace the center of its poetic emergence, the locus of agency. Such 
material-discursive processes are not driven by rational or institutional sense making but by 
affective and unconscious rapport-de-force. 
Metaphorical causality 
This study has enabled to trace the chain effect inaugurated by the vanishing term. A 
finding of this study confirms Contu and Willmott’s point (2006) that organisational actors 
invest the technology with fantasmatic properties that far exceed its concrete materiality. For 
instance, the developers think about designing a park which isnot threatening, not 
intimidating, etc. Later, the man of Linz will precisely intimidate John who uses threatening 
political metaphors to describe the Austrian consultant. There is, so to speak, contamination 
between the technology features and the designers’ emotive language, as if the object was the 
227 
 
prolongation, the prosthesis of the affects of the speaking subjects. Further, affect-laden 
recognition mediates the circulation of signifiers between the software and the people. Some 
particular signifiers are invested with excessive enjoyment-value. Specifically, I have 
demonstrated how terms such as ‘kid’ provide certain subjects (Jessica and the consultants) 
with a position of mastery (Parker, 2005). Affectively charged processes articulated with 
gender, geographical, professional and age connotations constitute the symbolic field of a 
battle of recognition during which some ideas get dismissed and others promoted. The 
contents associated with the graphics style’s features (cartoony or realist, feminine or 
masculine, Austrian or English) do not preside over design decisions. Their integration is due 
to their subjective articulation with key signifiers, depending on contextual (e. g. the 
distribution of roles within the firm) and biographical (e. g. Jessica’s previous job; John’s 
lack of experience because of his age but also because he only worked on e-learning project 
so far) explanations.  
Annulment of the vanishing 
The case of the Man of Linz exemplifies how a subject-based theory of the act highlights 
the primacy of affective component of agency over structure in organizations. Thus, agency 
is here located at a pre-symbolic and pre-institutional level: the man of Linz is a consultant 
and has no formal authority over the design team. He is hardly a partner of the project. 
However, his act has the effect to re-articulate the structuring properties of technology-in-
practice. In its turn, the subject-effect has an impact on other signifiers and produces its 
environment through the following metaphorical sliding: Jessica as a male, John as a kid, and 
the Man of Linz as a big man. To use the Lacanian metaphor, while the game seemed already 
played (the framework of the European Union explicitly made a call for a gamified medical 
training software), the man of Linz’s act has thrown the dice anew and subjected John and 
Jessica in a new way.  
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In Badiou’s terminology, the Man of Linz embodies and instantiates the annulment of the 
vanishing which leads to the return of the repressed heterogeneity: the serious of ‘serious 
game’.. The emptying of the genre of medical training from its realistic and serious attributes 
generates the lack of lack of anxiety: gamification turns from being desirable to being the 
exact opposite, namely to generate anxiety. Thus, the subject-effect is this unpredictable 
bifurcation which appears in second place (Badiou, 2009). The Man of Linz knows 
intuitively that the only chance of success of the software is to break with the project of 
gamification itself; the only chance to provide the product with a decisive force, is to act, to 
cut, the project from its original trace. Thus, the subject of anxiety throws the dice anew.   
When anxiety closes the possibility, the metaphorical sliding, either the project fails or act 
of courage occurs which reinvigorate it. Is this not the same with the Man of Linz? Then the 
Real (contingency), the acting out emerges, under norms and images. Let us summarize: the 
man of Linz is acting with courage (he is not in a formal position of ascendance) and 
throwing the dice anew. Like any act of pre-symbolic jouissance, the fullness emerging from 
the lack of lack bears a mixed element of joy and destruction, and John is symbolically the 
victim of this emergence, through the metaphoric operation of the signifier ‘kid’ or the ‘big 
man of this town’ (John is symbolically sacrificed and shortened). The symbolic violence 
imposed on John (and metonymically his version of the project), turns his symbolic 
destruction into the cause of a new chain of signifying effects, sustained by Jessica’s excess 
enjoyment to take the lead on the project. That self-destructive episode provides the 
employees with a new energy towards the design of the software.  
Foreclosure  
The efficacy of the turning point ‘kid’, consists in transforming the impossibility of 
identification with the lost fullness of enjoyment – the fantasy-kindergarten – into a 
prohibition: this is now serious stuff, this is not touchy-feely nonsense, kids are not any more 
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in charged! Access denied. Importantly, there is no primordial foundation of the law outside 
the subject. It is like that, because the man of Linz says so and the others obey the law that he 
instantiates in this context. Kindergarten is also a translation which leads to the subsequent 
question: what is lost in translation? In Lacan, the ‘lack in the Other’ is before all the lack of 
jouissance (Stavrakakis, ), a lack of a pre-symbolic real enjoyment always posited as a lost 
fullness- i.e. the part of ourselves that is sacrificed and castrated. ‘Kindergarten’ functions 
typically as the halting-point, the foreclosure through which the consultant’s claim is 
accepted. It is the null object reducible to its sonority haunting John’s memories (evident 
when he emphasizes dramatically: ‘his word was Kindergarten’), the subtractive object 
(enabled by the linguistic switch from English to German) which materializes the fact that 
there is something unconceptualisable – the Real of the subject.  
To summarize, I have represented in the following table the chain-effect of the subject, 
namely the chronological sequence of the signifiers used to describe the software. The first 
column shows the vanishing of the genre of medical training software. As we have seen, 
there is metonymical/metaphorical causality in the sense of a signifying displacement 
between the designers’ affects and their tools. The second column addresses the annulment of 
the vanishing leading to anxiety… and the restorative courage of the Man of Linz. The third 
column designates the term the foreclosed term, materializing the presence of the subject. 
The turning point is in bold. The vanishing terms are crossed as such. Finally, the foreclosed 
terms are also crossed out – like this. 
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Figure 6.   
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Game of science  
In a way, the Elder Move project never overcomes lack of lack, resulting in anxiety and 
resistance. What, then, makes ideology consequent and durable? Delta’s programmers were 
definitely more cunning. Working with scientists, they knew that the inscription of ideology 
was not a positive inculcation of norms and values in the minds of geologists or data 
scientists, but a process of self-effacement, of setting the stage for the abolition of the trace of 
lack.  
Destruction and lack  
The case of Skiddaw adds a level of complexity because it involves a third actor, another 
dialectics within the scientific corporation of the geologists – between those academics who 
are pro and those who are anti-technology. The practice which is here contested is the ‘real 
experience of doing fieldwork’ and its associated skills (going outside and looking at the 
natural environment, including dangerous mountain areas). Fieldwork is now associated with 
negative emotive language on the part of the new generation of geologists (daunting, scary, 
not enjoyable, not comfortable) and this discourse is also taken up by the liberal cost-
reduction policy within the British education system (‘that is becoming more and more 
costly’). Delta’s CEO attributes the deskilling/degradation of such work not so much to the 
intrinsic effects of virtualization, but to the gaming element itself: ‘They (sic) are some of our 
clients and their users, when you gamify things, it does denigrate it, it reduces it’. Sofia 
avoids this difficult question and takes pride in designing a ‘real-life feel experience’. The 
way she mobilizes her identity as a geologist versus programmer is through this idiosyncratic 
feel, which does not require going to the field any longer and no longer contests the reality of 
the virtual experience.  
As we have seen through the study of Skiddaw, Datavisu or Unity, existing routinized 
practices (looking at a 2D graph on Excel or Tableau and spotting trends and correlations, 
going to the field to collect data or manipulating a slot machine in a casino) are first 
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abolished and then substituted with computer interaction. Here, the latter becomes 
metaphorical of the former (although we do not need a slot machine technically, we keep the 
signifying practice to maintain the specific enjoyment associated with the ritual of gambling 
in the imaginary decorum of the casino). In the case of Skiddaw, the experience of ‘going 
outdoors’ is annulled by the introduction of a virtual practice which is a substitute for the 
‘real fieldwork’ a ‘real-life feel experience’ of looking at rocks through a virtual microscope; 
in the words of Sofia, real fieldwork experience (real-life feel experience). In fact, the 
successful integration of ideology requires an element of forgetting. The passage of the force, 
the ideology-effect, involves the destruction of previous practices – loss which turns lack into 
a cause and provides a new emerging practice with its consistency.  
This element of destruction leads us to understand the pivotal role of lack in the relation 
between human agency and materiality; it radically challenges the way these notions have 
been conceptualized in IS studies (e. g. Leonardi, 2011). Virtualization technologies 
transform the materiality of fieldwork, not in the sense of magically converting the material 
into the virtual (even virtual network as such requires huge data centres and high energy 
consumption to function, elements which are heavily material and environmentally harmful), 
but in displacing the Real of work: its subjective kernel. Skiddaw not merely simulates the 
original feeling associated with fieldwork, but more fundamentally constitutes a threat in 
terms of the disappearance of a traditional feeling and mode of acting – the sensory aspects of 
going to the field, developing relationships and group cohesion, etc. Logically, anxiety 
emerges primarily among the defenders of traditional fieldwork in the curriculum, ‘very 
traditional scientific, very entrenched’, who are more virulent in criticizing the project. This 
anxiety results from being suddenly confronted with the lack inherent in the practice of 
geology, and with the disintegration of one’s fantasmatic frame, coinciding with the feeling of 
a ‘loss of reality’ (Zizek, 1997).   
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The design of Skiddaw involves a conflict over who organizes affectivity: whether it is the 
tutor using the software in the classroom, or the programmer making assumptions about the 
users, and over who controls the production of institutional identity and thereby excludes or 
includes the right way to enjoy. Skiddaw renders visible the ideological assumptions 
constituting what it means to be a geologist. Drawing on a Lacanian metaphor, Skiddaw 
constitutes a fault (in a geological sense) in their work identity; a slip between different land 
masses or tectonic plates, a point at which various subjectivities have broken apart. The 
geologists throw the dice again over what it means to be a geologist – they joyfully take the 
risk of ridiculing themselves and losing legitimacy. Skiddaw is located at the crossroads of 
antagonistic subjectivities – between the clients and the programmers, and between the highly 
conservative scientific views on fieldwork and those scholars who are more open towards 
technologies. This war of position over the law has at stake the attribution and distribution of 
jouissance, namely the abandonment of previous affects associated with a practice such as the 
excitement of ‘going to the field’ (e. g. touching the rocks, smelling the grass, seeing the 
views etc.).  
Yet the destruction of previous skills is in fact an affective realm, not a functional one, and 
this by no means should be confused with the end of work and a twilight replacement of 
people by machines. In the case of Datavisu, the boredom associated with using a spreadsheet 
is replaced by a 3D environment which is cool and makes you excited about reading data. 
This is inarguably related to the Big Data debate: judgment vs. automation. Can algorithmic 
data science tools replace data scientists before this field has even taken flight? Data analysis 
is neither a science nor is it engineering (Forbes, 2012): it is a subjective process.  In the 
current global context of increasing amounts of data and information, data analysis is a 
practice involving aesthetics, subjectivity and excitement – it is not an automated process. 
Consequently, destruction only applies to the boredom of reading a spreadsheet where you 
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might miss key information, because it consists only of lines of information. Far from being 
replaced by automatic software, Big Data requires, in contrast, a libidinal surplus, a 
spectacular element to understand the story behind the data, an increased believability. I 
propose naming the type of materiality discussed in this chapter enjoyment-in-technology, 
and in the next section I will discuss how it is produced and structured.   
Gamification as fantasy-in-technology  
Social fantasy reveals the ambiguity of ideology: it is motivating to a certain extent, which 
is the beatific side of gamification; yet there is also a horrific dimension to it, when the genre 
threatens our desire by getting too close to it. This study confirms what was previously 
foreseen, namely that genre does not function as a category-structuring communicative action 
(as in Suchman, 1994; Yates and Orlikowski, 2002), but as the object-cause of desire, the 
signifier whose retroactive effect on developers organizes the fantasy that sustains the 
emerging political logic. A video-game is a provocation, an excess-enjoyment which must 
remain non-official, between-the-lines and inherently transgressive of the law, to displace the 
line of what is pleasurable and what is painful. In other words, the genre functions as the 
‘deadlock of perspective’ (Parker, 2010): the place around which everybody turns tacitly, the 
unspoken, scandalous idea that scientific research can be just a game. The genre of game 
works as a parody of scientific training, in the Butlerian sense (1990); it is a signifying 
practice which destabilizes and makes apparent the ideological assumptions about real work. 
I have shown how the marketing team of Delta makes strategic use of social networks such as 
Facebook to promote this parodic acting – experimenting more or less convincingly with new 
ways of enjoying data visualization through images of Datavisu. The parodic repetition of the 
original work practice (doing fieldwork in situ, visualizing data in 2D) turns out to be nothing 
more than the parodic repetition of the idea of natural work. 
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Yet there is a limitation to this process. Institutionalizing the categorization ‘game’ or 
‘gamification’ would disrupt the necessarily imaginary communication taking place in a 
scientific setting. Although an element of self-transgression (and even, as we have seen, self-
destruction) is necessary in order to engage people; it is necessary to keep jouissance secret, 
because disclosing it would break the comedy that sustains the logic of the scientific 
narrative. The problem here, as we know, is that desire is ontologically characterized by lack; 
it is impossible to fulfil, and when it gets too close to our fantasy it generates the threat of the 
extinction of desire (lack of lack). As I have demonstrated, this element of fear associated 
with the signifier ‘game’ also emerges within the business decision-makers, in the words of 
Delta’s Director: ‘putting the word “game” frightens the decision-makers’.  
More fundamentally, naming the excessive force would transgress the (scientific or 
business) code and it constitutes an identity threat for the scientists or the managers. In fact, 
the possibility for scientific jouissance is conditioned by the preservation of the scientific law 
which is never guaranteed. Consequently, Sofia strongly rejects the categorization, calling 
Skiddaw a serious ‘learning environment’, using her own exclusive definition of what 
‘games’ mean: ‘There are no gaming elements, there isn’t a sense of competition, there isn’t a 
sense of number of points’. In particular, Sonia embodies the prohibition (‘It is not driven by 
that’ or her anxious intonation when she asserted ‘It’s not a game!’) which organizes the 
desire of scientific ideology. In addition, Thomas claims, ‘it can work to a certain extent but 
after that he can see it is a bit silly (laugh)’. In sum, gamification is the encounter of the skills 
of game designers and the organizational fantasy of business, medical and scientific practice, 
the unconscious motivation of their work. This means that fantasy differs from an organizing 
vision structuring the learning experience, but contrastingly works as a between-the-line 
discourse, non-official, surfacing but never legitimized.  
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The passage of force 
In the above section, I showed the destruction involved by the introduction of game 
mechanics into scientific practices, such as data visualization or geological fieldwork. I 
showed how the discourse of gamification sustains an organizational fantasy 
parodying/transgressing the scientific law, generating not only enjoyment, but also anxiety. 
Because the signifier ‘game’ is the sublime object -excessive and traumatic-, its vanishing is 
also required in order to facilitate the passage of force (Badiou, 2009) from the social to the 
political logic. This is also the precondition for the geologists to ‘traverse the fantasy’ which 
structures jouissance in a way which keeps us attached to the Master-programmers and 
makes us accept the framework of the social relationship of domination (Zizek, 1997). This is 
also what the programmers mean when they talk about ‘bordering the line’ or ‘crossing the 
boundary’ of gamification. This crossing is condemned to fail unless - and this is the 
Lacanian twist - its origin vanishes once again. Thus far, I have identified the genre as the 
object-cause of desire; the ideological fantasy needs to be performed ambiguously, in the 
sense that programmers seductively empty the categories of their programmer-centric 
significance. It is because the genre is vanishing, because of its forgetting, that we can 
become fully immersed and release ourselves to Bourdieu’s illusio. Yet the difference with 
Bourdieu is that this process is double-edged, and the actors are not naïve about the 
implications of their collaboration. Neither are they unharmed: anxiety, jouissance and 
courage materialize the subjective drama between people and technology-in-practice. This is 
also the key difference between Bourdieu’s game-in-itself (the game as an objectified set of 
rules) and the game-for-itself (the game as subjectively appropriated and forgotten by 
people). 
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Figure 7. The never-tied Lacanian knot.  
 
The passage of the Real gives us an insight into the symbolic integration of the 
programmers’ ideology, how the destruction involved in the re-articulation from a fantasmatic 
frame to an alternative one is accepted by the scientific community and made consequential. 
Now what the data makes apparent is that this process cannot be the work of programmers 
alone: they need allies, namely those earth scientists who are technology-friendly. The 
abolition of the trace of lack will be sustained and legitimized by the geologists. As a result of 
the annulment of the first vanishing of geological fieldwork and its collateral anxiety (starting 
from Sofia’s assertion: ‘It is not a game’), ‘game’ becomes the second vanishing term, 
sustaining the function of causality. One geologist mentions how he uses the game-feature to 
generate a way of teaching with a light touch, or to maintain a positive informal atmosphere: 
‘I try to inject a bit more fun into it, the humour, the game aspect if you like, it’s not 
integrated, it’s a little bit of a distraction’ (my emphasis). A succinct discursive trace of this 
Lacanian knot also emerges from the mouth of a programmer: ‘It’s not because it’s not a 
game that you don’t have fun’.  
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Let us summarize the findings now. The study of ideological displacement has shown that, 
although it had been accepted to move from outdoors to virtual fieldwork, the switch from 
science to gaming had been rejected. The following figure summarizes the chain of causality:  
Figure 8. 
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Overall contribution  
Contribution to paradigms in IS research  
In the following table, I have summarized chronologically and topically the contribution of 
the main paradigms to the field of IS research. I have detailed in the table the research areas, 
the phenomena under study and the agency. This historical account is also motivated by my 
will to render visible the coherence in this evolution, and its underlying emancipatory logic 
through an extension of human agency, from the machine to the structures (organizations, 
institutions) and finally, from the practice to the subject.  
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Table 7. A paradigmatic contribution to IS studies.  
Paradigms IS research areas Phenomena Agency Key studies 
Positivist Technological 
determinism. 
Design science 
Technology 
Acceptance Model 
Planning, Designs Designers Malone (1980), 
Davis et al. 
(1989) 
Venkatesh 
(2000) 
Constructivist  
(structuration 
studies) 
Duality of 
technology 
Virtual structures 
emerge from these 
interactions and 
shape users’ 
behaviour 
Users appropriate 
or not designers’ 
assumptions 
Technology 
structures, 
organizations, 
institutions 
Mainly 
designers 
Orlikowski 
(1992) 
(DeSanctis and 
Poole, 1994) 
Jones, M. and 
Karsten, H. 
(2008) 
 
 
Constructivist 
(ANT) 
Enactment 
perspective. 
Technologies-in-
practice and 
enactment shape 
social processes and 
orders 
Socio-materiality. 
 
Practice-based and 
object studies. 
Symmetry 
between the 
humans and the 
non-humans 
Networks 
of users, 
designers 
and objects 
Orlikowski 
(2000) 
Nicolini (2010, 
2011) 
Jones (2014) 
 
Critical Affective turn. 
Materiality of the 
signifier and 
inseparability of the 
affective and the 
political 
 
Subject-based 
studies, rituals, 
logics, materiality 
(sexuality) 
Decisions 
made by 
people 
assuming 
position of 
mastery 
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Contribution to hegemony studies  
Another key contribution of this thesis is to complement the theory of ideology and 
specifically hegemony studies by offering a response to criticisms regarding the 
‘poststructuralist methodological deficit’ identified by Zienkowski (2014: 504). II have 
demonstrated through ethnographic methods that politics and hegemony operations operate 
silently in contexts such as technology design, which does not necessarily invoke public 
contestation and radical demands (West, 2011). Furthermore, the study highlights the 
centrality of IS design in current hegemony practice in parallel with, say, governments or 
banks. Yet the transition from the field of political to innovation studies is not obvious, and 
requires a careful adaptation of the vocabulary to the context of the study – for instance, what 
does an ‘oppressive regime’ would mean in the context of software innovation? The point is 
not to offer paranoiac interpretations of IT phenomena but to recognize that their effect is not 
merely technical and restricted to the programmers but bears social and political implications.    
Subsequently, another crucial point here is that, in technological matters, the acceptance of 
ideology does not manifest itself through the threatening language of oppression and 
domination, but through a soft rhetoric which involves a more sophisticated understanding of 
the psychosocial implications of ‘the organization of consent’. Gamification and the 
Technology Acceptance Model are two of these soft rhetorical tropisms surfacing in the 
world of IS, such as the highly-ambiguous motto of Google: ‘Don’t be evil’. The findings of 
this thesis contradict Venkatesh’s claim that current and future forms of computer technology 
will cause a reduction in the distinction between work and play. In contrast, empirics show 
the necessary role of prohibition in organizing desire. 
Contribution to innovation studies 
An understanding of adoption as hegemony practice contributes to the adoption literature, 
and leads us to re-examine the notion of interessement. Callon argues that to interest other 
actors means building devices which can be placed between them and all other entities who 
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want to define their identities otherwise in a network that combines the humans and the non-
humans. However, Callon’s underpinning belief in technical features is overstated: adoption 
decisions are never primarily technical, even though technicalities constitute the object of 
discussion. In fact, technical decisions are always subjected to signifying operations; i.e. in 
simpler terms, informal chats diffused through information networks, news feeds, videos 
posted on social networks (LinkedIn, Facebook etc.), community events and marketing 
materials. Unity’s ideological machinery, well-acted by the designers, spontaneously 
contaminates their users through information networks and becomes more powerful and 
mobilizing than the objects per se. Unity seeks interessement by generating identification, 
investment and… love. This affective contagion of innovation has very little to do with the 
device intrinsically, but much more to do with how we talk about it and why we fail to talk 
about it differently. Hence, technology adoption is above all the adoption of, and consensus 
around, a particular mode of jouissance, enjoyment-in-meaning, holding the community of 
users and designers together, rather than a mythical functionality.  
Thus, the conceptualization advanced here profoundly challenges the instrumental view of 
fantasy offered by the game design and Technology Acceptance literature. The impossibility 
of this view is that software cannot be fully gamified without excluding the enjoyment of the 
users and threatening their identity. This is to forget that fantasy functions as an informal 
transgression of the law, or as a resistance to official disclosure. It cannot replace the law. 
This leads us to distinguish between imaginary and real acceptance. On the one hand, 
imaginary acceptance, such as the acceptance of the tool by the team in phase 1, consists of a 
passive or cynical acceptance which relies on alienated subjects (attached to official 
discourse, and the organizing vision of the EU) rather than subjective integration. On the 
other hand, real acceptance is contingent, always enacted, and not without involving a certain 
thrill and erotics for its participants. In this sense, a subject-based study restores the role of 
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pain, the symbolic-affective violence of ideology, so to speak, in any process of acceptance, 
and it therefore destabilizes the foundations and intentions of the gamification project itself. 
Finally, the question of inscription is not a process of assigning positively information or 
data to the machine, it is a process through which an ideological effect is conquered word-by-
word through allusion, suggestions and between-the-line evidence: this is the fantasmatic 
dimension of fantasy. Its inscription should maintain an intentional vagueness, and never be 
direct. In this thesis, I have provided an account of the Real of technology implantation, how 
it cannot be inscribed in the technology and manifests itself when technology implantation 
dysfunctions: when it resists, when it produces us as subjects of affects and, more 
specifically, as subjects of anxiety:  
Whether through error (misperception, lack of understanding, slippage) or intent (sabotage, 
inertia, innovation), users often ignore, alter, or work around the inscribed technological 
properties. (Orlikowski, 2000: 409) 
As a result, the inscription of ideology, in order to be successful, needs to revert the 
supposition of explicit ‘inscribed technological properties’. What is inscribed is the abolition 
of the trace of lack; it is only when the genre of game has vanished entirely that the ideology-
effect can truly function and that the passage of force operates.  
Based on the above, I can now wrap up my findings in the following figure: 
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Figure 9. Overall contributions.  
 
 
Implications for policies and ethics  
The framework adopted in this thesis enables us to conceptualize a psychosocial ethical 
framework to the policies addressing the issue of Big Data. How data are used and collected 
is a highly sensitive issue; Morozov’s work, including The Net Delusion, is full of examples 
of how dictatorships and strong capitalist regimes have mobilized the game industry and 
entertainment to secure their power. The emergence of Big Data also raises questions about 
the use of entertainment to collect large data when the consent of the users is not given. To 
illustrate this tendency, let us look at the following definition of a serious game which was 
offered during a presentation at a specialized academic conference in game design in the UK:  
Adoption
•Adoption, as a practice of 
hegemony, articulated around the 
political and fantasmatic logic of 
diffusion
•Adoption requires ideology holding 
the community together through 
enjoyment
•Adoption as the adoption of a 
collective mode of enjoyment 
Acceptance 
•Acceptance is not a deterministic 
process through design heuristics, but 
a contingent process whose success or 
failure depends on subject-effect
•Anxiety is central to this process
•There is no other law of acceptance 
outside of the subject (not designers, 
not institutions)
Inscription 
•Inscription is part of an affective process, 
unlike data stored, engineered and 
memorized
•Inscription is really efficent when it is not 
a positive process, but a process of self-
effacement, setting the stage for 
contingency
•Inscription functions when the force is 
integrated, when users are subjected
245 
 
Serious games are games that engage the user, and contribute to the achievement of a defined 
purpose other than pure entertainment (whether or not the user is consciously aware of it). A 
game’s purpose may be formulated by the user her/himself or by the game’s designer, which 
means that also a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) game, used for non-entertainment purposes, 
may be considered a serious game. (my emphasis added) 
This example typically shows the ignorance of the ethical dimension associated with the 
use of game mechanics. The question of consent is not even problematized here, and yet it is 
a complex one; in addition, a full subject theory can clarify between the desiring subject (who 
does not want to provide personal information or have his information used and collected) 
and the alienated and addicted ego absorbed in a particular fantasy. This is clearly a question 
of ethics in the sense of the fundamental opposition (Glynos and Howarth, 2000) between the 
ideological logic of gamification, a hegemonic attempt at covering up the contingency (what 
if elderly people do not want to play, simple as that?) and the ethical logic of openness and 
acknowledgement of contingency or chance.  
In this thesis I have also shed light on the anxiety associated with technology 
implementation and clarified the lack of lack from which it originates. Yet this subject-based 
framework assumes that, in certain conditions, it is necessary to protect/legitimize those who 
risk their lives by transgressing institutional laws for the common good. This leads us to 
understand somewhat differently the actions of hackers and whistle-blowers as symptoms of 
anxiety: it depends on the specific context to judge whether their act is courageous or 
catastrophic. 
Future research  
Future topical routes for the studies of ideology, affect and subjective processes may 
address more politicized technology, such as free currencies (e. g. Bitcoin), which are 
typically derived from in-world currencies used in virtual worlds.  
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First of all, cryptocurrencies demonstrate a significant development of the topic of games 
and play which I studied in this thesis. In my doctoral research I have noticed that virtual 
worlds such as Second Life or Cyworld were the first to implement digital currencies in their 
in-world economy, such as the Linden dollar or the Dotori. Furthermore, monetary incentive 
is increasingly being used as a game mechanic for motivational purposes. For example, Fit 
Coin is a new app that allows users to monetize their visits to the gym. The mechanism is 
simple: the app is incorporated with popular activity trackers and wearables, and converts our 
heartbeats into a digital currency. Fit Coin’s founders hope that this currency can be used to 
buy exclusive goods from partners such as Adidas, or to reduce users’ insurance payments 
(Morozov, 2015). Some authors even argue that Bitcoin itself is gamification (Werbach, 
2014). 
However cryptocurrencies are an original topic and a departure from my doctoral work 
because in-game currencies and general currencies (such as Bitcoin) are quite different in 
terms of their context. Thus, more work needs to scrutinize more explicitly politicized 
technology than videogames and virtual worlds. Cryptocurrencies will provide me with a 
more evident political context, which involves more specifically an element of ‘public 
contestation’, and which is more obviously political than fitness apps or virtual worlds. Thus, 
one of the limitations of my thesis is that the game design industry does not involve an 
element of public contestation, and that the emergence of a new logic of game design for 
serious purposes was driven by the market, and not so much by political values. 
Finally, this topic would significantly expand my present theoretical work on ideology and 
hegemony; virtual currencies are very promising feature to examine, particularly in the 
context of the subprime crisis and Euroscepticism. Cryptocurrencies are one of the few 
serious alternative post-crisis models which may benefit from the rise and support of IT 
businesses. Thus, this future avenue also prolongs my first published paper (Pignot, 2015), 
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which addressed the corruption taking place in the finance industry and constituted a 
reflection on organizational ethics and the socio-political implications of the subprime crisis. 
Bitcoin typically questions the hegemony of existing financial institutions and our 
unquestioned relationship with money and the state. The LCE framework and the work of the 
Essex School of Discourse Analysis (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Glynos and Howarth, 2007) 
which I have mobilized in my thesis is extremely pertinent in addressing issues of hegemony. 
This thesis seeks to highlight the centrality of enjoyment in technology matters, to define the 
outline of a subject theory and to open a future avenue towards subject-based studies as an 
alternative to existing practice-based studies (e. g. Nicolini, 2010) for the study of technology 
in organizations. I do so by reinvigorating the poststructuralist theoretical tradition (Lacan, 
Laclau and Mouffe, Glynos and Howarth, Zizek, Butler, Badiou). 
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Limitations and reflexive thoughts   
Reflexivity has become inevitable in organization studies and researchers are increasingly 
asked to acknowledge their subjective position and the limitations of their perception (e. g. 
Cunliffe, 2003). Given the crisis of representation (Clifford, 1986) in the social sciences, 
confessional genre of representation becomes relevant (Schultze, 2000). In particular, I have 
attempted to criticize a managerial ideology from within the community of information 
systems management. Thus, I will address epistemological, empirical and ontological 
limitations of my work.  
The main (1) epistemological limitation of this work is, once again, that it is impossible 
not to acknowledge the unavoidable judgement in the analyst’s task of identifying and 
naming the logics and affects. The act of nomination and recognition definitely is political 
and may already be counter-hegemonic: for instance, even a slave might claim to be happy if 
he does not have at his disposal a language to think about his own condition and 
emancipation (Best and Connolly, 1982). Thus, Lacanian analysis does not claim to be 
objective, in a positivist fashion. The interpretation does not claim to be a truth-seeking, 
neutral operation and may be contested or adjusted with new signifiers, given that the 
researcher has only attended three or six first months of the design of serious games. Any 
‘retroactive interpretive intervention’ (Badiou, 2013) implies the fact that there is no 'proof' 
for identifying a phenomenon such as jouissance, and that it is always the outcome of an act 
of recognition and nomination by the analysts.  
This standpoint fits Nayak’s claim that the study of social process of organizing is not 
abstract but empirical, it doesn’t exist but acts, it partakes to the process of provoking 
thinking to ‘think beyond’ (2008). Any Lacanian analysis cannot suture the subjectivity of the 
author and the micro-political implications of his/er own mode of jouissance in analysing the 
data. As Thompson and Willmott put it (2015), researchers are likely to have to provide more 
confessional accounts of their own affective intertwining with their research subjects, their 
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own mode of jouissance. The author of these lines is French, although working in English, 
and an unconscious desire sustaining this thesis was also to engage a dialogue or a (modest) 
work of translation between two close European traditions, the Essex School of discourse 
analysis in the UK and the French  Political philosophy at Ecole Normale Supérieure. 
Furthermore, Badiou’s work has been translated in English only recently, and its relevance in 
organization and information studies, has still to be demonstrated; in fact, my personal 
inclination fitted nicely the context of Badiou’s penetration within the English-speaking 
community. The most important point is that Badiou was providing me with the (political) 
theory of affects which was missing from the logics framework. Although affectivity is 
central for the second generation of Essex researchers (after Laclau), their account remains 
conventional, aligned with the practice-based sensitivity. Badiou more directly addresses the 
psychosocial and ontological implication of a subject theory and explicitly adopts affects as 
unit of analysis. In other terms, Badiou more clearly assumes the destruction of the practice-
based imaginary. Badiou considered that a theory of the subject was missing to Marxism to 
succeed, hence its practical revolutionary ambition; my attempt, more modestly, has been to 
complement the theory of technological innovation addressing its subject-based roots.  
Furthermore, the (2) empirics also bear some limitations. Chapter 6 does not take into 
account the view of 3D artists on Unity. More complete data collection within the community 
of 3D artists would have great potential. Thus, Stavrakakis (2010) proposes artistic practices, 
and more specifically contemporary art, as a way to materialize the acceptance of lack. When 
lack is co-opted by the dominant ethic of consumption and the possibilities for innovative 
reconfiguration are closed, transformative orientations need to re-direct their objectives, with 
the frontier of antagonisms displaced to a new position. From this perspective, Unity Assets 
Store typically exemplifies the operation through which lack is institutionalized, generating a 
loss of agency. From Stavrakakis’ perspective, artistic practices may play the role of a third 
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agency beyond fashion and institutionalization (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996), which has 
the function of re-politicizing the patterns of professionalism involved in the 
‘institutionalizing of creativity’ (Zackariasson et al., 2006).  
Moreover, in chapter 7, the interpretation that an ‘act of courage’ emerges from the 
designers’ early conceptualization of the game could be contested and renamed as an anxious 
and unproductive restorative act, in other words an act of skepticism. Again, more signifiers 
would perhaps be needed. The point of a Lacanian critical intervention is ultimately to 
transform the mode of jouissance of a subject or a community of subjects, so my own 
subject-position lead me to adopt a strong critical stance towards gamification.  
This leads me to the (3) final ontological claim; the reader familiar with IS and 
organizational studies might wonder: is this a practice-based study? Of course, practice is a 
useful level of analysis, specifically here the design practice of serious gaming, and I do not 
deny its analytic relevance. However, the ontological stance adopted here contradicts the 
presuppositions of practice-based studies, for which notion such as contingency or re-
signification are not immediately relevant, given that practice theory, as a genre, is the study 
of mundane activity, not specifically of its transformation. Practice theories constitute 
fundamentally an ontological project in their attempt to provide a new vocabulary to describe 
the world and populate it with new ‘units of analysis’ (Nicolini, 2012). The approach adopted 
is pursuing this endeavor from a psychosocial perspective. Organization studies have shifted 
from the study of organization as things to the study of organization as discourse (linguistic 
turn), and then to study of organizing as a social process (practice turn, see Clegg et al. 1996). 
Therefore, this thesis examines the affective turn, namely the study of organizing as a 
subjective and affective process. From this perspective, affects are not only the effect of 
designed structures but also are significant in producing social relationships, institutions and 
organizational processes (Barbalet, 1998).  
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There are in fact existing vivid confrontations between the two traditions: Bourdieu 
criticizing Althusser (1992) and, the other way around, Butler criticizing Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice (Butler, 1997: 154-155), or Burawoy discussing with Bourdieu (2012). In other 
words, this study use logics and affects as core unit of analysis and from that perspective, it 
does not belong to the genre of practice-based studies. However, it was not my intent in this 
thesis to destroy the practice imaginary, in a Badiouan act, given the very realist stance of 
information systems research. It is probably the work for another book to establish subject-
based studies as a new genre-for-itself for work studies but I think it is worth mobilizing such 
a range of subject-oriented authors, not least to render this claim possible. However, I 
recognize this project is out of the scope of this thesis; my attempt here has been to raise a 
paradigmatic problem left un-thought by existing interpretive studies in IS and to exemplify 
and experiment the relevance of the corpus of subject theorists through the critique of the 
managerial attempt to turn work into play. Last but not least, the reader might be puzzled by 
how many different theories speak to each other. This raises two problems which pertain to 
the intellectual fuzziness which this may provoke but also to the relevance of applying 
heavily political frameworks to apparently mundane managerial issues. While political 
theorists mobilized in this thesis most obviously studied hegemony at the factory, I made the 
provocative claim that consent was produced through computer interaction, through video-
games, in the digital age. What is more, the relevance of applying Badiou’s framework out of 
the context of the 20th century’s communist history which Badiou interrogates in Theory of 
the subject might surprise the reader. However, Badiou himself in his work applies his core 
framework beyond politics to various phenomena like arts or love (Badiou, 2013), to name a 
few. Further, the constellation of authors mobilized in this thesis all have in common the 
centrality of Lacan and the political which echoes the project of the thesis, namely to 
foreground the centrality of consent in IS implementation and provide an account of 
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innovation, as a politico-affective process. Further Althusser is central in Laclauian theory; 
Badiou replaced Althusser at the Chaire of Philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, after 
his death. Fundamentally, Lacanian subject theory is the invisible thread which I am 
constantly following and I hope I have managed to demonstrate that the empirics, the 
epistemological and the ontological claims were mutually constitutive and thereby were 
telling one and same story.   
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Concluding remarks 
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In sum, I have addressed the research questions raised in the introduction. First, my study 
on the game engine has enabled to identify that an authentic appropriation of Unity software 
is achieved through the particular knotting together of political and fantasmatic logic. These 
logics are enacted through rituals and discourse, which produce enjoyment-value. They 
constitute precious insights for communicational actions as well as for strategy-in-practice, 
however a careful awareness of the ethical dimension of engagement with logics is necessary 
for not falling into ideological subjection, derision and cynicism which are less likely to 
generate sustainable innovation. Second, I have demonstrated that imagined use resist the 
actual design practice. Derision is, in a sense, the topic of the second case where the logic of 
gamification in the study of Elder Move does not generate desire as expected, through lack, 
but generates anxiety, through lack of lack. Consent is not achieved, which leads to the 
restorative acting out of the Man of Linz and a final product version which is more serious in 
style. Elder Move’s administration of enjoyment remains stated at the level of ideological 
subjection. However, in the third case, the developers and their clients manage to traverse the 
fantasy of gamification and adopt an ethical mode of enjoyment. Their engagement is 
authentic which presupposes the forgetting of existing work practices, namely the feelings 
and affects associated with the practice of geological fieldwork.  
Finally, it is crucial to re-politicize the debate and traverse the smoke-screen fantasy of 
gamification. Technology nowadays consists of more than tools; it consists of practices and 
even institutions. The democratic revolution that takes place in IT design consists not so 
much of its mainstreaming and hegemonic adoption, but rather of the reframing of 
technology-in-practice as a practice of articulation, where technology is primarily a signifying 
practice, an empty signifier open to contestation and polysemy: the logics framework 
provides the ontological apparatus to keep these crucial dynamics in place.   
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